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FIELD MANUAL 100-20
AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 3-20

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

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Foreword

Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20 represents the combined efforts of the Army and Air Force to develop comprehensive military doctrine and guidance to support the US government's activities in an environment of low intensity conflict (LIC).

This publication provides the basic foundation for Army and Air Force personnel to understand the complexities of operating in the LIC environment. It discusses the four major types of operations typically found in LIC—support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping operations, and peacetime contingency operations—and it explains the subtle yet critical differences between LIC and other conventional operations.

Low intensity conflicts have been a predominant form of engagement for the military over the past 45 years. In all likelihood, this will continue to be so for the foreseeable future. All military personnel must understand the characteristics of low intensity conflict if we are to conduct military operations successfully in this environment.



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REFERENCE

S/S FM 3-07, dtd FEB 2003

*FM 100-20/AFP 3-20

Field Manual
No. 100-20

Air Force Pamphlet
No. 3-20

Headquarters
Departments of the
Army and the Air Force
Washington, DC, 5 December 1990

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Preface

FM 100-20/AFP 3-20 establishes Army and Air Force guidance for planning, coordinating, and executing operations in low intensity conflict (LIC). It provides direction to Army and Air Force commanders and staffs charged with duties related to these operations. It also provides support for other related publications.

This manual applies to all Army and Air Force units participating in joint and combined operations in LIC. Foreign governments receiving security assistance from the US may also use it with appropriate modification.

References to activities of terrorist and insurgent organizations and to concepts of operations of foreign governments are for illustrative and informational purposes only. They do not constitute US Army or Air Force advocacy or approval of practices prohibited by US law or policies.

The proponents of this publication are the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the US Air Force Plans Directorate. Users of this manual are encouraged to recommend changes which will improve its clarity and utility. Army personnel should submit comments on Department of the Army Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms). Air Force personnel should forward changes on Air Force Form 847 (Recommendation for Change of Publication). Army comments should be forwarded to the Commandant, US Army Command and General Staff College, ATTN: ATZL-SWW-L, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900 and Air Force comments should be forwarded to HQ USAF, ATTN: XOXWD, Washington, DC 20310.

Unless otherwise stated, masculine pronouns apply to both men and women.

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*This publication supersedes FM 100-20, 16 January 1981

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Introduction

> War should never be thought of as something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy. Wars must vary with the nature of their motives and the situations which give rise to them.
>
> The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.
>
> **Carl Von Clausewitz**
> *On War*

> The game of strategy can, like music, be played in two keys. The major key is direct strategy, in which force is the essential factor. The minor key is indirect strategy, in which force recedes into the background and its place is taken by psychology and planning.
>
> **General Andre Beaufre**
> *An Introduction to Strategy*

> The functions of the Military Departments are as follows:
>
> To prepare forces and establish reserves of manpower, equipment, and supplies for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war . . .
>
> *Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 0-2*

This manual addresses military operations in low intensity conflict (LIC). These are military operations which support political, economic and informational actions.

The term low intensity conflict reflects an American perspective. Indeed, the term is a misnomer. To peoples more directly affected, the threat is immediate and vital. To us, it is subtle, indirect, and long-term; but potentially it is just as serious. The actions which take place in low intensity conflict are distinguishable from those in conventional war, more by differences in kind, than by degree of intensity.

Regardless of perspective, the instruments for the resolution of a conflict must be appropriate to its nature. The arsenal of national power includes political, economic, informational, and military instruments. The nature of the conflict environment determines the way leaders employ them.

The desired end-state is routine, peaceful competition among nations. In this environment, the states of the world pursue their own interests, sometimes in harmony, but with enough commonality of interests to avoid violence. The military instrument of

national power, although primarily focused on deterring war, is employed in support of political, economic, and informational efforts to achieve US goals and help preserve this peacefully competitive environment.

In war, military force contributes directly to the achievement of strategic aims; the direct use of military power establishes the conditions which make achievement of the desired political end-state possible. The political, economic, and informational instruments of national power support the military effort to establish those conditions.

Between peace and war is the ambiguous environment which has come to be called low intensity conflict. In LIC, the contribution of military force to the achievement of the strategic aim is indirect; that is, military operations support nonmilitary actions which establish the conditions under which the strategic aim can be realized. Frequently, these operations and actions assist friendly governments or resistance groups.

Military operations in LIC may include tactically direct actions such as direct assistance, strikes, raids, and shows of force or demonstrations. However, political, economic, or psychological objectives shape the way in which even these tactically direct operations are executed. At the operational and strategic levels military operations in LIC are best understood as indirect operations conducted for political, economic and psychological effects. While the concepts of direct and indirect operations are different, they are complementary, not mutually exclusive. It is possible, and sometimes necessary, to secure policy objectives by indirect operations, direct operations, or both.

When the United States uses military power directly against a hostile force in strikes or raids, the principles of combat operations govern tactical actions even though they occur in an environment short of declared war and are significantly influenced by constraints of policy and strategy.

Any conflict situation can involve elements of all three environments—routine peaceful competition, LIC, and war. Low intensity conflict does not invariably escalate into war. Indeed, military operations in LIC are designed to prevent that occurrence. Neither does war inevitably resolve all aspects of a conflict between nations. War can evolve into some form of LIC. Contemporary trends suggest that this type of transition is likely in the future.

Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5 and the Air Force's One and Two-Series manuals generally provide comprehensive and time-tested capstone doctrine for the direct engagement and defeat of an enemy in war. Their tenets characterize successful conventional military operations and apply, at the appropriate level, in LIC. However, in low intensity conflict, other imperatives—political dominance, legitimacy, unity of effort, adaptability, and perseverance—shape, guide, and add dimensions to these tenets. Most military initiatives require a blend of the tenets of conventional war and the imperatives of LIC. The relative influence of these principles changes with the evolving conflict. Commanders must be sensitive to this shift in emphasis, constantly focus on their objectives, and maintain a clear vision of the kind of war they are fighting.

This manual fills a void which has existed in the Army and the Air Force for some time. It complements warfighting doctrine by providing operational guidance for military

operations in LIC from which implementing doctrine can be developed. In the Army, the implementing doctrine will appear in specific operations manuals and will be integrated into branch and functional manuals. In the Air Force, it will appear in appropriate tactics, training, and operations manuals. There are also cases which require specific "stand-alone" implementing doctrine. Combatting terrorism and peacekeeping are two examples. This manual provides a common conceptual framework for successful military operations in LIC and a common doctrinal base to aid service interaction. It will enable the Army and the Air Force to provide effective support to the unified and component commands.

CHAPTER 1

Fundamentals of Low Intensity Conflict

> The political object, as the original motive of the war, should be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force and also the amount of effort to be made.
>
> **Carl von Clausewitz**

> What is important is to understand the role of military force and the role of other responses and how these fit together.
>
> **Caspar Weinberger**

This chapter outlines the role of military operations in low intensity conflict (LIC). It describes the environment of LIC and identifies imperatives which the military planner must consider. It describes the four major LIC operational categories—support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies; combatting terrorism; peacekeeping operations; and peacetime contingency operations. It also provides general guidance for campaign planning, and presents perspectives which are useful at the operational level. Subsequent chapters address the four major operational categories in detail.

DEFINITION

Low intensity conflict is a political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.

Nuclear parity, the dynamics of modern revolutionary warfare, and economic interdependence have significantly reshaped the international arena over the last four decades. In this environment, LIC poses complex challenges to US global interests. Unfavorable outcomes of LIC may gradually isolate the United States, its allies, and its global trading partners from each other and from the world community. Unfavorable outcomes of LIC may also cause—

- The loss of US access to strategic energy reserves and other natural resources.
- The loss of US military basing, transit, and access rights.
- The movement of US friends and allies to positions of accommodation with hostile groups.
- The gain of long-term advantages for US adversaries.

Conversely, successful LIC operations, consistent with US interests and laws, can advance US international goals such as the growth of freedom, democratic institutions, and free market economies.

US policy recognizes that indirect, rather than direct, applications of US military power are the most appropriate and cost-effective ways to achieve national goals in a LIC environment. The principal US military instrument in LIC is security assistance in the form of training, equipment, services and combat support. When LIC threatens friends and allies, the aim of security assistance is to ensure that their military institutions can provide security for their citizens and government. (A discussion of the role of security assistance in the context of overall foreign assistance and programs is at Appendix A.)



Figure 1-1. **Indirect versus Direct Applications**

The United States will also employ combat operations in exceptional circumstances when it cannot protect its national interests by other means. When a US response is called for, it must be in accordance with the principles of international and domestic law. These principles affirm the inherent right of states to use force in individual or collective self-defense against armed attack. (Appendix B provides an overview of the laws relevant to military operations in LIC.)

UNDERSTANDING THE ENVIRONMENT

To confront the challenge of LIC effectively, the military planner must understand its dynamics. He must put LIC dynamics into a historical context to understand how a complex group of players manipulate the LIC environment to advance their interests.

LIC Dynamics

Chief among the dynamic forces that contribute to LIC are change, discontent, poverty, violence, and instability. These interact to create an environment conducive to LIC.

Change can cause great stress in a society and often produces discontent. Governments or social systems must accommodate innovation or the sudden impact of external social influences. They may not successfully incorporate these changes within their traditional cultural value system. Addressing the problems posed by change requires considerable time and resources. The impatience of key groups and limits on resources make it difficult to respond fully to these problems.

When people sense injustice, they become discontented. Groups may form around specific issues of discontent. People may support or join groups committed to achieving

social or political change through violent means. The intensity of their sense of injustice often determines the degree to which they participate in violence.

Change brought about through violence may produce instability, but not all instability is detrimental. The United States itself was the product of change through revolution. It subsequently developed a form of government which allows social and occupational mobility through individual achievement and growth. The United States is not opposed to this sort of evolution in other nations. Its interests are not rigidly tied to the status quo. Indeed, long-term US interests may be put at risk when political groups with authoritarian, totalitarian, or other objectives impede revolutionary change and exploit instability. In fact, the threat to the United States in LIC is the exploitation of instability by groups opposed to US goals.

A Historical Perspective

Since the end of World War II, a host of groups and states have pursued their interests in the LIC environment. Many international wars and insurgencies have taken a heavy toll of lives and treasure. Most of them have occurred in the Third World and they have changed the international environment. Many Third World conflicts originated in the struggle to end the system of European empires. As nations achieved this goal, clashes among more or less conventional military forces sought to rectify artificially imposed relationships among newly independent states. This type of conflict continues. More frequently, insurgents have sought to alter the political, social and economic organization of these states, bringing about internal conflicts. These conflicts are also continuing. However, the means by which groups and nations conduct these conflicts have changed significantly, increasing the risks in the LIC environment.

Nuclear parity, the success of deterrence, and an increasingly interdependent world have created a period of transition in superpower relationships. Regional powers have developed, diffusing the international balance of power. Although the absolute strength of the superpowers has not declined, their relative strength in the world is less than it was two decades ago. Lesser powers have proliferated and have their own interests to pursue. Their independent actions provide many new possibilities for conflict, irrespective of relations among the superpowers.

Taken together, these factors reveal a world with a high potential for violent conflict. Mutual deterrence of war between the superpowers suggests that conflicts will occur in the Third World, where the interests of regional powers and those of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics meet and interact. The United States and its armed forces can expect to be involved in LIC and operations to prevent LIC for the foreseeable future.

Trends

Technological advances have also created an environment favorable to LIC. Established societies have become more vulnerable because technology has made more advanced weapons available to insurgent or terrorist groups. Large urban industrial and commercial areas present attractive targets. They depend on support facilities such as telecommunication and automation centers for their existence. These are easily sabotaged. In addition, advanced electronic communications media bring the full impact of political violence into homes worldwide. The result is instant recognition for formerly unknown or little-known insurgent or terrorist groups. Insurgents and terrorists recognize the importance of the public affairs arena to their struggles.

The possible use of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons is potentially a serious problem in LIC. The proliferation of NBC weapons and the threat of their use vastly increase the terror potential of a nation or group with this capability.

An interdependent world and mass communications make external material support easily accessible to groups and states involved in LIC. Sources of external support are not limited just to the superpowers. All countries can, and many do, provide active or passive, material and moral support.

The Players

Increasingly in the last two decades, new players have begun to take advantage of LIC as a means of advancing their foreign policy objectives. Frequently, their activities run counter to US interests and complicate the task of US planners and policy makers.

Urban guerrillas are increasingly active players in this contemporary conflict. The conflict in Northern Ireland, the civil war in Lebanon, and guerrilla warfare in the urban areas of Latin America provide examples. Increasing urbanization in the Third World generates the social and political forces which will lead to the spread of urban guerrilla warfare.

Anti-Marxist insurgents are relatively new players in the LIC environment. They illustrate that LIC can threaten not just US global interests, but those of the USSR and other powers as well.

The appearance of vigilante groups, including death squads, also threatens political stability. These vigilante groups often believe they are performing security or political tasks, even if illegal, which their government is unwilling or unable to do. They have become a prominent feature in some insurgencies. They are uncontrolled—or sometimes secretly controlled—by various factions in and out of the government. Their actions can alienate the very populace whose support their government or group is trying to win or maintain.

The development of professional, full-time revolutionaries and terrorists, some of whom are mercenaries available for hire, makes the political environment more dangerous and the response to terrorism more difficult. These individuals often receive arms, logistics, and training support through an international black market.

Some insurgent and terrorist groups finance their activities through illicit narcotics sales or through funds provided by drug dealers for protection of their trade. Political and practical constraints often limit the ability of Third World governments to institute drug control programs and vigorously prosecute them. Poor economic performance, challenges from insurgents, and the problem of staying in power in a volatile political environment compete for the attention of national leaders in the major narcotics growing and trafficking countries. Consequently, leaders of these countries may place a low priority on suppression of drug trafficking. In some cases, they may hesitate to introduce eradication programs that will eliminate a lucrative, if illegal, cash crop. They fear this action may bring appeals for aid from already tight governmental budgets, and possibly create a disaffected rural population susceptible to insurgent propaganda. At the same time, drug traffickers use their profits to undermine government actions against them by corrupting or intimidating civilian and military officials. They also protect their interests by acts of terrorism and subversion. Thus, these criminals or groups of criminals obtain and hold political power far beyond the strength of their numbers.

US and Soviet interests also impact on what would otherwise be local conflicts or power shifts. The Soviets are not responsible for all conflicts in the world, but they can and do exploit otherwise internal conflicts to implement their global strategy. Soviet surrogates and client states play an important role in this effort. They have followed a basically opportunistic and pragmatic strategy, but are displaying an increasingly sophisticated approach. This approach now includes techniques for creating instability where none existed previously. The Soviets tailor military assistance not only to appeal to their client but also to create a dependency that is costly to break. The government receiving Soviet assistance comes to rely on the USSR for training, technical advice, logistics support, spare parts, and repairs. It then finds itself in a double bind: on the one hand, it depends on the Soviets for its existence; but, on the other hand, the dependence on the Soviets (or any other nation) undermines that government's legitimacy.

Soviet advisors can influence the military and foreign policies of their client states by providing personal and interservice links that complement and shape overt ties. They recruit talented individuals for special instruction in the USSR. Soviet training of Third World nationals includes indoctrination in Marxist-Leninist ideology. The umbrella of Soviet military aid can also include the use of third country surrogates for security functions, training, overseeing of combat operations, and employment of combat forces.

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT IMPERATIVES

Success in LIC requires planning and conducting operations based on the following imperatives:

- Political dominance.
- Unity of effort.
- Adaptability.
- Legitimacy.
- Perseverance.

These imperatives apply in all four LIC operational categories.

Political Dominance

In LIC operations, political objectives drive military decisions at every level from the strategic to the tactical. All commanders and staff officers must understand these political objectives and the impact of military operations on them. They must adopt courses of action which legally support those objectives even if the courses of action appear to be unorthodox or outside what traditional doctrine had contemplated.

Unity of Effort

Military leaders must integrate their efforts with other governmental agencies to gain a mutual advantage in LIC. Military planners must consider how their actions contribute to initiatives which are also political, economic, and psychological in nature. Unity of effort calls for interagency integration and coordination to permit effective action within the framework of our governmental system. Commanders may answer to civilian chiefs or may themselves employ the resources of civilian agencies.

Adaptability

Adaptability is the skill and willingness to change or modify structures or methods to accommodate different situations. It requires careful mission analysis, comprehensive intelligence, and regional expertise. Adaptability is more than just tailoring or flexibility, both of which imply the use of the same techniques or structures in many different

situations. Successful military operations in LIC will require the armed forces to use adaptability not only to modify existing methods and structures, but to develop new ones appropriate to each situation.

Legitimacy

Legitimacy is the willing acceptance of the right of a government to govern or of a group or agency to make and enforce decisions. Legitimacy is not tangible, nor easily quantifiable. Popular votes do not always confer or reflect legitimacy. Legitimacy derives from the perception that authority is genuine and effective and uses proper agencies for reasonable purposes. No group or force can create legitimacy for itself, but it can encourage and sustain legitimacy by its actions. Legitimacy is the central concern of all parties directly involved in a conflict. It is also important to other parties who may be involved even indirectly.

Perseverance

Low intensity conflicts rarely have a clear beginning or end marked by decisive actions culminating in victory. They are, by nature, protracted struggles. Even those short, sharp contingency encounters which do occur are better assessed in the context of their contribution to long-term objectives. Perseverance is the patient, resolute, persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives for as long as necessary to achieve them. Perseverance does not preclude taking decisive action. However, it does require careful, informed analysis to select the right time and place for that action. While it is important to succeed, it is equally important to recognize that in the LIC environment success will generally not come easily or quickly. Developing an attitude of disciplined, focused perseverance will help commanders reject short-term successes in favor of actions which are designed to accomplish long-term goals.

OPERATIONAL CATEGORIES

US military operations in LIC fall into four broad categories. The categories are—

- Support for insurgency and counterinsurgency.
- Combatting terrorism.
- Peacekeeping operations.
- Peacetime contingency operations.

LIC operations may involve two or more of these categories. Understanding the similarities and differences between the operational categories helps the military planner establish priorities in actual situations.

Support for Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

US security interests may lie with an incumbent government or with an insurgency. Both insurgencies and counterinsurgencies are concerned with mobilizing the support of the people. How they distribute their efforts between building support for themselves and undermining the support and legitimacy of their opponents is perhaps the central dilemma for both the insurgent and counterinsurgent.

Combatting Terrorism

The aim of combatting terrorism is to protect installations, units, and individuals from the threat of terrorism. Combatting terrorism includes both antiterrorism (AT) and counterterrorism (CT) actions, throughout the entire spectrum of conflict. The combatting

terrorism program is designed to provide coordinated action before, during, and after terrorist incidents.

Peacekeeping Operations

Peacekeeping operations are military operations which maintain peace already obtained through diplomatic efforts. A peacekeeping force supervises and implements a negotiated truce to which belligerent parties have agreed. The force operates strictly within the parameters of its terms of reference (TOR), doing neither more nor less than its mandate prescribes. A distinguishing feature of these operations is that the peacekeeping force is normally forbidden to use violence to accomplish its mission. In most cases, it can use force only for self-defense.

Peacetime Contingency Operations

Peacetime contingency operations include such diverse actions as disaster relief, certain types of counter-drug operations, and land, sea and air strikes. The unifying feature of these actions is the rapid mobilization of effort to focus on a specific problem, usually in a crisis and guided, at the national level, by the crisis action system (see JCS Pub 5-02.4). Frequently, these operations take place away from customary facilities, requiring deep penetration and temporary establishment of long lines of communication (LOC) in a hostile environment. Peacetime contingency operations may require the exercise of restraint and the selective use of force or concentrated violent actions.

OPERATIONAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Long-range planning for LIC uses the same logic process commanders use in campaign planning during conventional war. The military leader must address these central questions:

- What conditions must be produced to achieve the strategic goal?
- What sequence of events will most likely result in the desired conditions?
- How should resources be applied to produce that sequence of events?

In LIC, the military leader cannot define the conditions he seeks to achieve in military terms alone; in many cases, they also are political, economic, or social. The sequence of events in an operation, the resources, and the control of resources may not translate easily into military terms. Thus, the Department of State, the Department of Treasury, or even the international banking industry may participate in actions associated with an operation in LIC.

The Conditions

Campaign planning for LIC will reflect the highly political environment in which the military conducts its operations. The military planner's first step is to determine the desired end state, or goal. What does he want to do? What conditions constitute success? What is the enemy's center of gravity? What is the enemy's objective and how can it be countered? The situation in LIC is often ambiguous. Mission analysis may be difficult; the analyst must understand the mission and the commander's intent in detail. Goals may change with changes in US national objectives, local conditions, or conditions elsewhere in the world. The analyst must consider the political, economic, informational, and military components of the end state. He must analyze each component to determine how to apply military resources to achieve the goal.

A deep understanding of host nation culture is indispensable to making effective decisions and avoiding costly mistakes in LIC situations. National and subnational cultures have specific expectations of the government, priorities of concerns, and effective symbols that may prove crucial to progress. Without a thorough understanding of their culture, a commander could expect people and societies to hold the same values and expectations that he considers normal solely from his perspective, and this could prove counterproductive.

Sequencing Events

The military planner must identify all steps necessary to achieve his goal. He must anticipate contingencies. He must synchronize use of the military instrument with agencies employing the other instruments of national power in order to design programs which promote unity of effort. Planning must provide methods to resolve disagreements among the cooperating agencies. Domestic and international law, internal US politics, or US public opinion may impose constraints and restrictions. Without this coordination, military efforts may prove useless or even counterproductive.

The planner should evaluate the completed military plan in the context of the national or international campaign plan which directs the total effort. He should also assess the effects of the military and other plans on related situations in the region or in the world at large.

Applying Resources

The operational-level planner spends much of his time marshalling and synchronizing available resources and setting priorities for their use. He may have to act through an agency other than his own. To achieve unity of effort, he may have to depend more on persuasion and cooperation than on the direct exercise of authority. He must adapt military resources to fit the circumstances. Success in low intensity conflict requires the synchronized use of all elements of national power, and detailed interagency and allied cooperation.

ESSENTIAL PERSPECTIVES

When engaging in LIC operations, Army and Air Force officers may face challenges to their ethics, morality, and leadership. They will confront complex roles and missions. Some perspectives on these issues follow.

The Ethical and Moral Dilemma

Low intensity conflict, more than war, will often present the United States and its armed forces with difficult ethical and moral challenges. The type of aggression encountered in LIC is not as blatant as that in war. Subversion, sabotage, assassination, and guerrilla operations encountered in another country may pose a threat to US interests, but the threat to national survival may be neither imminent nor obvious. The US response to this threat must be consistent with US and international law and US national values. The response of the United States to these threats may be controversial because there may be legitimate grievances that provoke them. Nonetheless, the decision to stand aside is as profound in its effect as the decision to become involved.

The decision to act in any of the four LIC operational categories is essentially a political one. International law and custom presume that an incumbent government is legitimate and legally constituted. A policy of involvement by an outside power must

demonstrate its legitimacy. The basis for the international use of force is self-defense or the defense of others.

The inevitable ambiguity of the proper employment of force demands that weight be given to other considerations. One is feasibility. However reprehensible the conduct of a government or group deep in the interior of a distant continent, military intervention may not be within US capabilities. Other factors besides time and distance may also make US action inappropriate. For example, the presence or extent of US national interests is also bound up with the basic idea of self-defense and collective defense. Where US interests are absent or minor, the United States may not expect international or domestic approval of its involvement. Limited national interests, the presumption against intervention, and lack of feasibility help explain apparent US tolerance of some undesirable situations.

On the other hand, noninvolvement accepts the piecemeal degradation of security interests and tolerates unnecessary human suffering, both of which might be prevented or alleviated by a more active, if necessarily selective, approach.

Leadership

Military leaders have two distinct, yet related, sets of responsibilities in the LIC environment. The first is their traditional responsibility to their military mission and their troops. But, in addition to simply capturing ground or destroying the enemy, they must also exercise a constructive influence to achieve larger political and psychological objectives.

In their traditional leadership role, commanders at all levels must take positive action to ensure the security of their force. This includes measures to provide for the physical protection of the force and the safeguarding of their supplies and equipment. Rules of engagement (ROE) and legal restrictions on the use of force by US military personnel must be agreed upon and clearly stated before commitment of the force. The commander must continually monitor and re-evaluate these rules and restrictions and take appropriate action throughout the operation. Predeployment training must be consistent with allowable measures of force protection in each situation.

In order to accomplish their larger objectives in LIC, military leaders must consider the effect of all their actions on public opinion. The legitimacy of the actions of an armed force, or even individual members of the force can have far-reaching effects on the legitimacy of the political system that the force supports. The leader must ensure that his troops understand that a tactically successful operation can also be strategically counterproductive because of the way in which they executed it and how the people perceived its execution.

The ambiguity of the LIC environment enhances the importance of the concepts of vision and commander's intent. Leaders must formulate a vision of success and communicate it to their subordinates. That vision must include political and psychological end states, as well as military objectives. The military leader must recognize the moral dilemma posed to his troops by the lack of a clear distinction between enemy combatants and noncombatants. He must convey to his subordinates a clear understanding of who the enemy is and, equally important, who he is not.

The military leader's responsibility to influence the larger community requires him to inspire action by persuasion in circumstances in which he lacks the authority to command. In the country teams and other interagency and international organizations,

and in his role as advisor, his voice is only one among several. He must be able to produce constructive results by the force of his argument and his example.

The military leader must have integrity, courage, and competence. He must act correctly without direct supervision, assistance, or advice. He must inspire those qualities among his subordinates and counterparts and give them his trust and support.

The Army and Air Force Role

Army and Air Force support to military operations in LIC ranges from military-to-military exchanges and security assistance, to overt military operations. The Army and Air Force provide forces to the unified commanders-in-chief (CINCs), trained, equipped, and prepared for military operations in LIC. At the direction of the Department of Defense, they also provide other military resources (individuals, units, and materiel) through the unified CINCs to ambassadors and country teams to support security assistance programs and other interagency activities. Army and Air Force members of each US country team advise the ambassador, interagency representatives, and foreign officials on LIC strategy and operational art. The relationships between the services, the CINC, and the ambassadors is situation-dependent. In general, the ambassador controls the activities of all departments in a given country.



Figure 1-2 **Army and Air Force Assistance**

Reserve Component forces of the Army and the Air Force have proven their effectiveness in operations in LIC. The employment of Reserve Component units and individuals in these operations often requires unique support arrangements. The providing and receiving commanders in both the Active and Reserve Components must understand and respond to these requirements. For example, due to the rapid rotation of Reserve Component units, it is normally necessary for an Active Component element to provide their intelligence support. This ensures consistency and continuity in the collection and analysis of intelligence on threats to the force. In addition, Active and Reserve Component organizations, both providing and receiving, should exchange lessons learned to maintain continuity in the operation.

Security assistance organizations (SAOs), from department-level to elements in the recipient country, execute the transfer of military materiel and services. Army and Air Force personnel assist the friendly government or group with force development and provide training through schools, mobile training teams (MTTs), and combined exercises. Army and Air Force combat support (CS) and Army combat service support (CSS) units support friendly military organizations. When authorized, they assist civilian agencies of the friendly government or group and the private sector, often in cooperation with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and other official or private US organizations.

Special operations forces (SOF) have significant utility in the LIC context. SOF may plan and conduct insurgency and counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense (FID), direct action, special reconnaissance, and counterterrorism operations. SOF provide senior decision makers with options for discriminate engagement, precluding or limiting the need to employ large, conventional, combat formations. SOF can provide training to indigenous forces, helping governments to help themselves. The regional orientation of SOF units and their wide variety of skills ensure that the National Command Authorities (NCA) and CINCs maintain a constant source of culturally acclimated, linguistically qualified, highly trained individuals and teams ready for immediate deployment.

US combat forces conduct strikes, raids, demonstrations, and shows of force to protect US interests, give warning to hostile groups, and encourage friendly groups. Combat operations in LIC are conducted primarily for their psychological effects. When required, US forces may engage and defeat the enemy or provide the opportunity for friendly forces to develop the capability to do the job themselves. However, US forces will not normally be committed to combat, particularly in a counterinsurgency. The principal function of US forces must be to assist the host nation, but the host nation must ultimately defeat the insurgency and eliminate the internal conditions which bred it.

CHAPTER 2

Support for Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

> I have sworn eternal hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of man.
>
> **Thomas Jefferson**

This chapter examines insurgency and counterinsurgency. It outlines principles and methods for the conduct of each. It discusses support for insurgency or counterinsurgency as options available to the United States. Agencies of the federal government other than the Department of Defense (DOD) normally exercise overall direction of these efforts, with US military forces serving a supporting role. At the direction of the NCA, US military forces may assist either insurgent movements or host nation governments opposing insurgency. In order to conduct these operations successfully, commanders must understand the nature of insurgency and counterinsurgency and apply the LIC imperatives discussed in Chapter 1 of this manual.

Insurgency and counterinsurgency are two aspects of the same process. However, they differ in execution. Insurgency assumes that appropriate change within the existing system is not possible or likely and therefore focuses on radical change in political control and requires extensive use of covert instruments and methods. Counterinsurgency uses principally overt methods and assumes appropriate change within the existing system is possible and likely. Because of these differences, implementing doctrine varies for insurgency and counterinsurgency, but it is rooted in common principles discussed below.

Insurgencies have specific causes and beginnings. The United States must understand the motives and objectives of the insurgents and their opponents, the counterinsurgents, in order to predict the behavior of each. This knowledge also enables military planners to assess the impact of their conflict on US goals and interests. It allows the United States to adopt an appropriate course of action. If the United States chooses to support the insurgents, this knowledge can help it provide constructive advice, proper equipment, and other appropriate forms of support. Conversely, if the United States chooses to oppose the insurgency, the knowledge allows it to predict the insurgents' behavior and provide advice and support to the host nation government to preempt the insurgency or prevent its further development.

THE NATURE OF INSURGENCY

An insurgency is an organized, armed political struggle whose goal may be the seizure of power through revolutionary takeover and replacement of the existing government. In some cases, however, an insurgency's goals may be more limited. For example, the insurgency may intend to break away from government control and establish an autonomous state within traditional ethnic or religious territorial bounds. The insurgency may also only intend to extract limited political concessions unattainable through less violent means.

To undertake an insurgency against the armed power of the state is a bold act, but the success of past insurgencies clearly demonstrates that the effort can be successful. Insurgencies generally follow a revolutionary doctrine and use armed force as an instrument of policy. At first, they usually have few resources other than the dedication of their members and the strength of their cause. Successful insurgents devise means to convert their own weaknesses into strengths and to turn the government's strengths into weaknesses.

Causes and Dynamics

Insurgencies succeed by mobilizing human and material resources to provide both active and passive support for their programs, operations, and goals. Mobilization produces skilled workers and fighters, raises money, and acquires weapons, equipment, and supplies of all kinds. Mobilization grows out of intense popular dissatisfaction with existing political and social conditions. The insurgency's active supporters consider these conditions intolerable. They are willing to risk death in violent confrontation with their government to effect change. The insurgent leadership articulates their dissatisfaction, places the blame on government, and offers a program to improve conditions. The insurgent leadership then provides organizational and management skills to transform disaffected people into an effective force for political action. Ultimately, the insurgents need the active support of a plurality of the politically active people and the passive acquiescence of the majority.

The insurgent leadership stresses and exploits issues which key social groups support. At the same time, it neutralizes groups supporting the government and seeks at least passive support from the society at large. The government, on the other hand, must convince key groups that its policies are reasonable, while keeping the passive support of the majority. The contest is for legitimacy. Each side seeks to demonstrate that it can govern better. Neither side needs to gain active popular support from the majority of the population as long as it gets more effective support than its opponent. This dynamic may take place within any political system, including a democracy.

Insurgency arises when the government is unable or unwilling to redress the demands of important social groups and these opponents band together and begin to use violence to change the government's position. Insurgencies are coalitions of disparate forces united by their common enmity for the government. To the extent that these coalitions find common ground, their prospects improve. As these groups evolve, they compromise and negotiate their differences. To be successful, an insurgency must develop unifying leadership, doctrine, and organization, and a vision of the future. Only the seeds of these exist when an insurgency begins; the insurgents must continually review and revise them.

A Framework for Analysis

This section discusses seven elements which are common to all insurgencies:

- Leadership.
- Ideology.
- Objectives.
- Environment and geography.
- External support.
- Phasing and timing.
- Organizational and operational patterns.

These elements provide a framework for analysis which can reveal the insurgency's strengths and weaknesses. Although the military planner examines them separately, he must understand how they interact to fully understand the insurgency. He can use the

knowledge he gains from this analysis to recommend whether to support the insurgency, or oppose it, or do nothing, and how to go about it. (See Appendix C for more detailed guidelines.)

Leadership.

Insurgency is not simply random political violence; it is directed and focused political violence. It requires leadership to provide vision, direction, guidance, coordination, and organizational coherence.

Figure 2-1 **Take The Cause to The People**

The leaders of the insurgency must make their cause known to the people. They must gain popular support. Their key tasks are to break the ties between the people and the government and to establish their movement's credibility. They must replace the government's legitimacy with that of their own. Their education, background, family, social connections, and experiences shape how they think, what they want, and how they will fulfill their goals. These factors also help shape their approach to problem solving.

Leadership is both a function of organization and of personality. Some organizations de-emphasize individual personalities and provide mechanisms for redundancy and replacement in decision making; these mechanisms produce collective power and do not depend on specific leaders or personalities to be effective. They are easier to penetrate but more resilient to change. Other organizations may depend on a charismatic personality to provide cohesion, motivation, and a rallying point for the movement. Leadership organized in this way can produce decisions and initiate new actions rapidly, but it is vulnerable to disruption if key personalities are removed or co-opted.

Ideology.

To win, the insurgency must have a program that explains what is wrong with society and justifies its actions. It must promise great improvement after the government is overthrown. The insurgency accomplishes this through ideology. Ideology guides the insurgents in offering society a goal. The insurgents often express this goal in simple terms for ease of focus. The insurgency's future plans must be vague enough for broad appeal and specific enough to address important issues.

The insurgent leader can use ideology—

- To provide an overview of the perceived social and political inequities in historical terms.

- To justify the use of violence and extralegal action in challenging the current social order.
- To form the framework of the program for the future—the road map for accomplishing the insurgency's goals.

Ideology is useful evidence for the military analyst. It identifies those sectors of society which the insurgency targets. The ideologies of groups within the movement may indicate differing views of strategic objectives. Groups may have ideological conflicts which they can resolve or which an opponent can exploit. Ideology may suggest probable objectives and tactics. It greatly influences the insurgent's perception of his environment. The combination of the insurgent's ideology and his perception of his environment shapes the movement's organizational and operational methods.

Unfortunately for the analyst, insurgents are not likely to describe their ideology in specific detail. The military planner must partly deduce it from other factors. Insurgents will project some ambiguity to accommodate differences in aims among the various groups within the movement. In addition, the analyst's own cultural bias may make it difficult for him to distinguish statements of ideology and strategic objectives from propaganda.

Objectives.

Effective analysis of an insurgency requires military planners to interpret its strategic, operational, and tactical objectives.

The strategic objective is the insurgent's desired end state; that is, how the insurgent will use power once he has it. The replacement of the government in power is only one step along this path; however, it will likely be the initial focus of efforts. Typically, the strategic objective is critical to cohesion among insurgent groups. It may be the only clearly defined goal which the movement presents. In any case, the military planner should examine the internal structure of the insurgent group to fully understand the often competing strategic objectives of its members. Ideology provides critical evidence in this examination.

Operational objectives are those which the insurgents pursue as part of the overall process of destroying government legitimacy and progressively establishing their desired end state. The following are examples of operational objectives:

- Isolation of the government from diplomatic and material support, and increased international support for the insurgency.
- Destruction of the self-confidence of the government's leaders, cadre, and armed forces, causing them to abdicate or withdraw.
- Establishment of civil services and administration in areas under insurgent control.
- Capture of the support (or neutrality) of critical segments of the population.

Tactical objectives are the immediate aims of insurgent acts, for example, the dissemination of a psychological operations (PSYOP) product or the attack and seizure of a key facility. These actions accomplish tactical objectives which lead to operational goals. Tactical objectives can be psychological as well as physical in nature. For example, legitimacy is the center of gravity for both the insurgents and the counterinsurgents. Legitimacy is largely a product of perception; consequently, it can be the principal consideration in the selection and attainment of tactical objectives.

Environment and Geography.

Environment and geography include cultural and demographic attributes as well as climate and terrain and affect all participants in a conflict. The manner in which insurgents and counterinsurgents adapt to these realities creates advantages and disadvantages for each. The effects of environment and geography are most visible at the tactical level where they are perhaps the predominant influence on decisions regarding force structure, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Other decisions which environment and geography influence include—

- Distribution of insurgent efforts between urban and rural areas.
- Adoption of appropriate organizational and operational patterns, for example, urban areas versus rural areas.
- Whether to advance to a new phase of operations, return to an earlier phase, or change patterns, programs, or strategies.
- Whether to open new operational areas.

External Support.

Historically, some insurgencies have done well without external support. However, recent examples, such as in Vietnam and Nicaragua, show that external support can accelerate events and influence the final outcome. External support can provide political, psychological, and material resources which might otherwise be limited or totally unavailable.

There are four types of external support:

- Moral—acknowledgment of the insurgent cause as just and admirable.
- Political—active promotion of the insurgents strategic goals in international forums.
- Resources—money, weapons, food, advisors, and training.
- Sanctuary—secure training, operational, and logistical bases.

Accepting external support may affect the legitimacy of both insurgents and counterinsurgents. It implies the inability to sustain oneself—a vulnerability the opponent will exploit. In addition, the country or group providing support attaches its legitimacy to the group being supported. It can, therefore, gain or lose legitimacy along with the insurgent or counterinsurgent group it supports. The consequences can affect programs in the supporting nation wholly unrelated to the insurgent situation. The military planner must consider these important collateral effects as well.

The probability of a long-term, harmonious relationship between a nation and the insurgents or counterinsurgents it supports increases if their objectives and ideologies are compatible. It decreases if they are incompatible.

Phasing and Timing.

Successful insurgencies pass through common phases of development. Not all insurgencies experience every phase, and progression through all phases is certainly not a requirement for success. The same insurgent movement may be in another phase of development in other regions of a country or theater. Successful insurgencies can also revert to an earlier phase when under pressure, resuming development when favorable conditions return.

Some insurgencies depend on proper timing for their success. Because of their limited support, their success depends on weakening the government's legitimacy so that it becomes ineffective. Then, an opportunity to seize power exists. When these insurgencies move to seize power, they expose their organization and intentions. If they move too early or too late, the government may discover their organization, and destroy it. Timing is critical.

The statement "Time is on the side of the insurgent" often appears in the literature on insurgency. This implies that an initially insignificant effort, maintained long enough, will succeed. Experiences in China and Vietnam support this assertion. These experiences, however, are not automatically transferable to other situations. Gaining time, or surviving, is a more effective measure of success for the insurgent than counting battles won or lost. It is an equally effective measure of success for the counterinsurgent. However, gaining time, by itself will not produce victory, although it is a necessary condition for it. In general, victory in an insurgency belongs to the side which has the stronger psychological commitment, which possesses the greater political and military skills, and which makes the least mistakes.

Organizational and Operational Patterns.

Insurgencies develop organizational and operational patterns from the interaction of all the factors discussed above. The four general patterns are—

- Subversive.
- Critical-cell.
- Mass-oriented.
- Traditional.

The analyst should understand that each insurgency is unique. No insurgent movement follows one model exclusively.

Subversive insurgents penetrate the political structure to control it and use it for their own purposes. They seek elective and appointed offices. They employ violence selectively to coerce voters, intimidate officials, and disrupt and discredit the government. Violence shows the system to be incompetent. It may also provoke the government to an excessively violent response—which further undermines its legitimacy. A highly compartmented armed element normally carries out insurgent violence. A political element guides the armed element and also maneuvers for control of the existing political structure.

A subversive insurgency most often appears in a permissive political environment in which insurgents can use both legal and illegal methods. The typical subversive organization consists of a legal party supported by a clandestine element operating outside the law. Subversive insurgencies can quickly shift to the "critical-cell" pattern when conditions dictate. The Nazi rise to power in the 1930s is an example of this model. Subversive insurgencies primarily present a problem for police and internal intelligence agencies. National defense forces normally act only in a reinforcement role.

In the critical-cell pattern, the insurgents also infiltrate government institutions. Their object is to destroy the system from within. The infiltrators operate both covertly and overtly. Normally, the insurgents do not reveal their affiliation or program. They seek to undermine institutional legitimacy and convince or coerce others to assist them. Their violence remains covert until the institutions are so weakened that the insurgency's superior organization seizes power, supported by armed force. The Russian revolution of October 1917, or Leninist model, followed this pattern.

Two variations of the critical-cell pattern deserve mention. The first is the co-opting of an essentially leaderless, mass popular revolution. The Sandanistas' takeover of the Nicaraguan revolution is a case in point. The insurgent leadership permits the popular revolution to destroy the existing government. The insurgent movement then emerges, activating its cells to guide reconstruction under its direction. It provides a disciplined structure to control the former bureaucracy. The mass popular revolution then coalesces around that structure.

A second variation of the critical cell pattern is the *foco* (or Cuban model) insurgency. A *foco* is a single, armed cell which emerges from hidden strong holds in an atmosphere of disintegrating legitimacy. In theory, this cell is the nucleus around which mass popular support rallies. The insurgents erect new institutions and establish control on the basis of that support. The Cuban revolution occurred in this manner. The Cuban experience spawned over 200 subsequent imitative revolutionary attempts patterned on it, principally in Latin America and Africa. They all failed. This does not discredit the *foco* theory; it does emphasize the importance of a particular set of circumstances to this model. Legitimacy must be near total collapse. Timing is critical. The *foco* must mature at the same time as the government loses legitimacy, and before any alternative appears. The Nicaraguan insurgency combined the *foco* with a broad-front political coalition, indicating a synthesis of methodologies typical of successful insurgencies.

In general, critical-cell insurgencies are police and internal intelligence problems. They normally involve the national defense forces only in a reinforcement role. However, *foco* insurgencies may require more direct action by regular armed forces. Foco insurgencies are often made up predominately of guerrilla fighters operating initially from remote enclaves. Civilian law enforcement agencies are generally too small and not configured to mount a direct attack against a heavily armed enclave. Security forces may need to employ military force directly to deal with this variation.

The mass-oriented insurgency aims to achieve the political and armed mobilization of a large popular movement. Unlike those in the two previous models, mass-oriented insurgents emphasize creating a political and armed legitimacy outside the existing system. They challenge that system and then destroy or supplant it.

These insurgents patiently build a large armed force of regular and irregular guerrillas. They also construct a base of active and passive political supporters. They plan a protracted campaign of increasing violence to destroy the government and its institutions from the outside. They organize in detail. Their political leadership normally is distinct from their military leadership. Their movement establishes a rival government which openly proclaims its own legitimacy. They have a well-developed ideology and decide on their objectives only after careful analysis. Highly organized and using propaganda and guerrilla action, they mobilize forces for a direct military and political challenge to the government. Examples of this model include—

- The communist revolution in China.
- The Vietcong insurgency.
- The *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path) insurgency in Peru.

Once established, mass-oriented insurgencies are extremely resilient because of their great depth of organization. To defeat them requires coordinated action by all branches of government, including the armed forces.

The traditional insurgency normally grows from very specific grievances. It initially has limited aims. It springs from tribal, racial, religious, linguistic, or other similarly identifiable groups. These insurgents perceive that the government has denied the rights and interests of their group and work to establish or restore them. They frequently seek withdrawal from government control through autonomy or semiautonomy. They seldom specifically seek to overthrow the government or to control the whole society. They generally respond in kind to government violence. Their use of violence can range from strikes and street demonstrations to terrorism or guerrilla warfare. These insurgencies may cease if the government accedes to the insurgents' demands. The concessions the insurgents demand, however, are usually so great that the government concedes its legitimacy along with them. Examples of this model include—

- The *Mujahideen* in Afghanistan prior to the Soviet withdrawal.
- The Ibo revolt in Nigeria (Biafra).
- The Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka.

Governments typically treat these insurgencies as military problems because they present a clear target for applying coercive force. However, a lasting settlement requires significant political action.

Different groups within the same overall movement may adopt different patterns. This indicates incompatibilities in leadership, ideology, or objectives.

No insurgency follows one pattern exclusively, as a close study of the cited examples reveals. Each develops unique characteristics appropriate to its own circumstances. Methods change as conditions change. Insurgents who cannot adjust their methods to suit local conditions rarely survive. These patterns are useful as a starting point for comparative analysis.

THE NATURE OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

This section describes counterinsurgency, all military and other actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. It also provides guidance for the organization and conduct of security force operations based on the internal defense and development (IDAD) strategy. The same IDAD rationale and guidelines can apply to an insurgency when it consolidates its authority and begins to perform some of the functions of a government in areas under its control.

Internal Defense and Development Strategy

The IDAD strategy is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The strategy focuses on building viable political, economic, military, and social institutions that respond to the needs of society. Its fundamental goal is to prevent insurgency by forestalling and defeating the threat insurgent organizations pose and by working to correct conditions that prompt violence. The government mobilizes the population to participate in IDAD efforts. Thus, IDAD is ideally a preemptive strategy against insurgency; however, if an insurgency develops, it is a strategy for counterinsurgency activities.

Concept.

The IDAD concept integrates military and civilian programs. Military actions provide a level of internal security which permits and supports growth through balanced

development. This development requires change to meet the needs of vulnerable groups of people. This change may in turn promote unrest in the society. The concept, therefore, includes measures to maintain conditions under which orderly development can take place.

The government often must overcome the inertia and incompetence of its own political system before it can cope with the insurgency against this system. This may involve the adoption of reforms during a time of crisis, when pressures limit flexibility and make implementation difficult.

The successful counterinsurgent must realize that the true nature of the threat to his government lies in the insurgent's political strength, not in his military power. Although the government must contain the insurgents' armed elements, concentration on the military aspect of the threat does not address the real danger. Any strategy that does not pay continuing, serious attention to the political claims and demands of the insurgents is severely handicapped. Military and paramilitary programs are necessary for success, but are not sufficient by themselves.

Functions.

The IDAD program blends four interdependent functions to prevent or eliminate insurgency. (See Figure 2-1.) These functions are—

- Balanced development.
- Security.
- Neutralization.
- Mobilization.



Figure 2-2. **Internal Defense and Development Strategy Model**

Balanced development attempts to achieve national goals through political, social, and economic programs. It allows all individuals and groups in the society to share in the rewards of development; it thus alleviates frustration. Balanced development satisfies legitimate grievances that the insurgents attempt to exploit. The government must recognize conditions that contribute to insurgency and take preventive measures. Correcting conditions that make a society vulnerable is the long-term solution to the problem of insurgency.

Security includes all activities to protect the populace from the insurgency and to provide a safe environment for national development. Security of the populace and government resources is essential to counterinsurgency. Protection and control of the populace permit development. They deny the enemy access to popular support. The security effort should establish an environment in which the local populace can provide for its own security with limited government support.

Neutralization is the physical and psychological separation of the insurgents from the population. It includes all lawful activities to disrupt, disorganize, and defeat an insurgent organization—except those which degrade the government's legitimacy. Neutralization can take many forms. It can involve public exposure and discrediting of the leaders during a low level of insurgency with little political violence; it also can involve arrest and prosecution when laws have been broken, or combat action when the insurgency escalates.

All neutralization efforts must respect the country's legal system. They must scrupulously observe constitutional provisions regarding rights and responsibilities. The need for security forces to act lawfully is essential not only for humanitarian reasons but also because this reinforces government legitimacy while denying the insurgents an exploitable issue. Special emergency powers may exist by legislation or decree. Government agents must not abuse these powers because they might well lose the popular support they need. Denying the insurgents' legitimate issues discredits their propaganda and leaders.

Mobilization provides organized manpower and materiel resources. It includes all activities to motivate and organize popular support of the government. This support is essential for a successful counterinsurgency program. If successful, mobilization maximizes manpower and other resources available to the government while it minimizes those available to the insurgent. It also allows the government to strengthen existing institutions and to develop new ones to respond to demands. It promotes the government's legitimacy.

Principles.

Although each situation is unique, certain principles guide efforts to prevent or defeat an insurgency. Planners must apply the IDAD strategy and these principles to each specific situation. The principles are—

- Unity of effort.
- Maximum use of intelligence.
- Minimum use of violence.
- Responsive government.

Unity of effort is essential to prevent or defeat an insurgency. Unity of effort means coordinated action and centralized control at all levels. The organizational basis for coordinating and controlling activities, including those of security forces, appears below in the section on organizational guidance.

Maximum use of intelligence refers to the use of intelligence as the basis for all action. Internal security requires an organization with special police functions to assess the insurgent threat, to warn the government, to penetrate the insurgent organization, and to help neutralize it. The government must develop and improve the intelligence capabilities of all security forces.

A threatened government must carefully examine all courses of action in response to insurgent violence. It should stress the minimum use of violence to maintain order. At times, the best way to minimize violence is to use overwhelming force. At other times, it is necessary to proceed with caution, extending the duration but limiting the intensity or scope of violence. In either case, discreet and judicious use of force is the guideline.

Positive measures are necessary to ensure responsive government. The government's ability to mobilize manpower and resources and to motivate its people reflects its administrative and management capabilities. In many cases the leadership must provide additional training, supervision, controls, and follow-up, to ensure responsiveness of government personnel.

Organizational Guidance

This section presents a model for an organization to coordinate, plan, and conduct counterinsurgency activities. Actual organizations must vary from country to country in order to adapt to existing conditions. They should follow the established political organization of the nation concerned. The organization should provide centralized direction and permit decentralized execution of the counterinsurgency plan. The organization should be structured and chartered so that it can coordinate and direct the counterinsurgency efforts of existing governmental agencies; however, it should not interfere with those agencies' normal functions. Examples of national and subnational organizations show how to achieve a coordinated and unified effort at each level.

National-Level Organization.

The national-level organization plans and coordinates programs. Its major offices normally correspond to branches and agencies of the national government concerned with insurgency problems. Figure 2-2 depicts a counterinsurgency planning and coordination organization at the national level.

The planning office is responsible for long-range planning to prevent or defeat insurgency. Its plans provide the chief executive with a basis for delineating authority, establishing responsibility, designating objectives, and allocating resources.

The intelligence office develops concepts, directs programs, and plans and provides general guidance on intelligence related to national security. It also coordinates intelligence production activities and correlates, evaluates, interprets, and disseminates intelligence. Representatives from the intelligence agencies, police, and military intelligence staff this office.

The populace and resources control (PRC) office develops programs, concepts, and plans and provides general operational guidance for all forces in the security field. Representatives of government branches concerned with law enforcement and justice staff this office.

The military affairs office develops and coordinates general plans for the mobilization and allocation of the regular armed forces and paramilitary forces. Representatives from all the major components of the regular and paramilitary forces staff this office.

Five separate offices covering psychological operations, information, and economic, social, and political affairs represent their parent national-level branches or agencies. They develop operational concepts and policies for inclusion in the national plan.



Figure 2-3. **Counterinsurgency Planning and Coordination Organization**

Subnational-Level Organization.

Area coordination centers (ACCs) may function as combined civil-military headquarters at subnational, state, and local levels. ACCs plan, coordinate, and exercise operational control over all military forces. They also control civilian government organizations within their respective areas of jurisdiction. The ACC does not replace unit tactical operations centers or the normal government administrative organization in the area of operations.

ACCs perform a twofold mission. They provide integrated planning, coordination, and direction for all counterinsurgency efforts. They also ensure an immediate, coordinated response to operational requirements. The ACC should conduct continuous operations and communications. A senior governmental official heads it. He supervises and coordinates activities of the staffs responsible for formulating counterinsurgency plans and operations in their separate areas of interest. The staffs contain selected representatives of major forces and agencies assigned to, or operating in, the center's area of responsibility. The ACC includes members from the—

- Area military command.
- Area police agency.

- Local and national intelligence organization.
- Public information and PSYOP agencies.
- Paramilitary forces.
- Other local and national government offices involved in the economic, social, and political aspects of IDAD.

There are two types of subnational ACCs which a government may form—regional and urban. The choice depends upon the environment in which the ACC operates.

Regional ACCs normally collocate with the nation's first subnational political subdivision with a fully developed governmental apparatus (state, province, or other). These government subdivisions are usually well-established, having exercised governmental functions in their areas before the insurgency's onset. They often are the lowest level of administration able to coordinate all counterinsurgency programs. A full range of developmental, informational, and military capabilities may exist at this level. Those that are not part of the normal governmental organization should be added when the ACC activates. This augmentation enables the ACC to better coordinate its activities by using the existing structure.

Urban areas require more complex ACCs than rural areas in order to plan, coordinate, and direct counterinsurgency efforts. The urban ACC organizes like the ACCs previously described, and performs the same functions. However, it includes representatives from local public service agencies; for example, police, fire, medical, public works, public utilities, communications, and transportation. When necessary, a staff operates continuously to receive and act upon information requiring an immediate response.

When a regional or local ACC resides in an urban area, unity of effort may dictate that urban resources collocate in that center; here planners can coordinate and direct urban operations. The decision to establish an urban center or to use some other center for these purposes rests with the head of the urban area government. He bases his decision on available resources.

If the urban area comprises several separate political subdivisions with no overall political control, the ACC establishes the control necessary for proper planning and coordination. Urban ACCs are appropriate for cities and heavily populated areas lacking a higher-level coordination center.

Civilian Advisory Committees.

Committees composed of government officials and leading citizens help coordination centers at all levels to monitor the success of their activities and to gain popular support. These committees evaluate actions affecting civilians and communicate with the people. They provide feedback for future operational planning. Involvement of leading citizens in committees such as these increases their stake in, and commitment to, government programs and social mobilization objectives.

The organization of a civilian committee varies according to local needs. Changing situations require flexibility in structure. The chairman of the committee should be a prominent figure appointed by the government or elected by the membership. General committee membership includes leaders in civilian organizations and other community groups who have influence with the target population. Such leaders may include—

- Education officials, teacher representatives, distinguished professors.
- Religious leaders.
- Health directors.

- Minority group representatives.
- Labor officials.
- Heads of local news media, distinguished writers, journalists, editors.
- Business and commercial leaders.
- Former political leaders, retired government officials.

Some representatives may hold positions in the ACC and in the civilian advisory committee. The success of a civilian advisory committee will depend upon including leading participants from all major political and cultural groupings, including minorities.

Security Force Operations

The next several paragraphs outline concepts and doctrine for operations by the affected nation's security forces in counterinsurgency. Security forces include the civil police, the paramilitary, and the military. These forces face three basic tasks:

- To isolate or protect the people from covert insurgent agencies (the infrastructure).
- To isolate or protect the people from overt insurgent agencies (guerrilla units).
- To defeat the guerrilla forces.

The first of these is primarily a police task, but may require military help. The second is primarily a paramilitary or military task which will require police assistance. Police participation will greatly aid even the third task, which is clearly a military job. Improper actions by security forces, or their overreaction to violence, can aid the insurgent cause. A nation vulnerable to insurgency should give high priority to developing a well-trained and effective police force.

Police Role.

Maintenance of law and order is a fundamental responsibility of government. Insurgents often commit terrorist or other criminal acts to gain their objectives. Countering illegal insurgent actions is initially the responsibility of the police, who are well-suited for this task. Law enforcement personnel are the first line of defense against insurgent and terrorist actions.

The police usually are an accepted point of contact between government and the people. They are closer to the centers of unrest. Also, the people may more readily accept legal restraints if local police—rather than the military—enforce them. The police usually are better trained, organized, and equipped than the military to gather intelligence on local conditions and to handle low levels of violence, conspiracy, and subversion.

Police forces often need assistance from military or paramilitary forces, or from some type of auxiliary organization. The government may commit military forces if large groups of organized insurgents operate in an area. National mobilization normally includes establishment of local paramilitary forces. Depending on the approach adopted at the national level, these forces may be only police auxiliary units. The IDAD strategy may demand greater mobilization to develop an extensive intelligence system, to increase PSYOP capability, and to establish civil defense programs.

Armed Forces Role.

The host nation's armed forces provide a shield behind which the civil agencies of its government can execute their parts of the national campaign plan. The host nation's

armed forces conduct operations to protect the people from the insurgent threat. Government leaders may call on military and paramilitary security forces to assist the police in operations against the insurgent's infrastructure.

The host nation's military forces conduct operations in coordination with other government agencies. They support counterinsurgency operations chiefly through—

- Intelligence.
- Civil affairs (CA) and civil-military operations (CMO).
- Population and resources control.
- PSYOP.
- Tactical operations.
- Deception.
- Advisory assistance.

Leadership Considerations

A disciplined force and clear command guidance are critical to successful security force counterinsurgency operations. The force will face diverse and demanding requirements. Subordinate commanders should have maximum flexibility in executing their missions. However, they should also receive detailed instructions on their responsibilities and enough guidance to ensure a coordinated effort. The commander's flexibility in decision-making and the internal discipline of his unit allow him to meet these requirements.

All personnel maintain combat readiness regardless of their frequency of contact with guerrilla forces. To counter a false sense of security, commanders continually update their subordinates on the operational situation and their role in it. Command and staff action in counterinsurgency operations emphasizes—

- Detailed planning of small-scale, decentralized operations.
- Command and control over extended distances.
- Extensive contingency planning for employment of quick reaction reserves, fire support, and close air support.
- Extensive training to meet the probable threat.
- Detailed coordination and direction of intelligence.
- Use of electronic combat operations.
- Detailed planning and close coordination with nonmilitary government officials.
- Support of the government's internal development programs in the operational area.
- Integration of support functions, especially aerial resupply, into all planning.
- Comprehensive operational and informational security measures.

Maintaining high unit morale and discipline in counterinsurgency operations is vital. However, this presents problems different from those encountered in conventional operations. Counterinsurgency personnel operate against an elusive force that rarely offers a clear target, and in situations where tangible results are seldom visible. This requires continuous indoctrination and training. Success in counterinsurgency operations depends on the discipline and understanding of the individual soldier. Leaders must explain the situation to their soldiers, telling them what they require of them, and the reasons for the force's actions.

US ROLE IN INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

The United States may assist either a government or insurgent forces operating against a government. The NCA make the decision to intervene. They base their decision on the threat to US interests, on the merit of the supported force, and on the feasibility of the intended action. The burden of carrying on the conflict must remain with the government or the insurgents. To do otherwise is to "Americanize" the conflict, destroying the legitimacy of the entity we are attempting to assist. The focus of US efforts in insurgency or counterinsurgency must be to build legitimacy, not destroy it. US military actions range from providing intelligence, materiel, and training support to strategic, operational, and tactical advice. US military commanders observe legal obligations and constraints when planning for commitment in such a conflict.

Policy Considerations

US policy requires that commitments to support an insurgency or a government should be sufficient and sustained until the United States achieves its policy objectives. The criterion for US commitment cannot be simple worthiness; feasibility and compatibility of aims are also important. The supported force—insurgent or counterinsurgent—must carry out the effort to establish its own legitimacy. Governments receiving US assistance are responsible for developing and executing their own programs to defeat insurgency. Conversely, a US-assisted insurgency must develop its own programs to advance its cause.

Many operations that support governments or insurgent groups are special intelligence activities. Conduct of these operations falls under the authority of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). By exception, the President can order other US governmental agencies to participate.

US Military Role

US military actions in support of an insurgency or a counterinsurgency should be part of a coordinated blend of available instruments of national power, designed to achieve clearly defined political objectives. The military instrument can be an effective complement to diplomatic, economic, and informational initiatives. US forces will not in general be combatants. A combat role for US armed forces in Third World conflicts has to be viewed as an exceptional event. It would be self-defeating for the US to declare a "no use" doctrine for its forces in the Third World; its forces' principal role there will be to augment US security assistance programs. Mainly, that means providing military training, technical training, and intelligence and logistical support.

US military support to insurgencies or counterinsurgencies will normally center on security assistance program administration efforts that complement those of other US government agencies. Initially, these efforts may include providing training advice and materiel. US policy makers will decide the degree of military participation based on US interests, an analysis of the immediate overall threat, and the capabilities and desires of the host government or group. Whether the United States supports the insurgency or the counterinsurgency, the objective of the military instrument will be to improve the efficiency of the supported security force and its military operations, and to help curtail the influx of external hostile support.

The military services augment other US government agency efforts by—

- Administering military aspects of security assistance.
- Participating in the development of joint and combined plans.

- Supporting the Department of State's cultural exchange program, exchanging US and foreign military personnel for visits, training, and education.
- Supporting the USIA, known overseas as the US Information Service (USIS), through direct liaison at national and field levels. The military provides the USIA with timely information concerning US military operations and visits, training, and education provided by US military personnel.
- Supporting the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) through direct liaison at national and field levels. Military personnel do this by administering military aspects of security assistance affecting civil-military action, and military and paramilitary activities. They also provide support through training and other related exercises that achieve both USAID and US military readiness objectives.
- Supporting the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in drug interdiction operations outside the territorial United States.
- Supporting any and all other US agencies when directed to do so.

JCS Pub 0-2 further explains the Services responsibilities.

Legal Considerations

Insurgency and counterinsurgency raise important legal questions. Commanders at all levels, therefore, should consult their legal advisors throughout the planning and execution process for insurgency or counterinsurgency support missions.

International Law and Insurgency.

Before 1949, international law addressed conflicts only between countries. The law of war, therefore, was concerned only with the rights and duties of countries in relation to each other and to their armed forces. The drafters of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 recognized that conflicts "not of an international character" occur. Article III of each of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 provides a list of the minimum standards of treatment that must be given to persons involved in "armed conflict not of an international character."

Under international law, the extent of the application of the provisions of both customary and conventional laws of war, including the Geneva Conventions of 1949, depends upon the nature of the conflict. The nature of the conflict, in turn, depends upon a host of legal and political factors. These factors guide US policy makers in deciding whether the US will become involved with an insurgency or a counterinsurgency.

Captives and Noncombatants.

Captured insurgents who meet the criteria for, and who are accorded the status of, lawful combatants, must receive prisoner of war treatment. Commanders should consult FM 27-10 and AFP 110-34 and seek legal advice, to determine if the criteria for legal combatants apply. Due to the factual circumstances of many insurgencies, however, insurgents often cannot meet the criteria for lawful combatant status. The Geneva Conventions nonetheless protect captives of these conflicts by prohibiting—

- Violence to life and person; in particular, murder, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture.
- Hostage-taking.

- Outrages upon personal dignity; in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.
- Sentences and executions—without previous judgment by a regularly constituted court which provided the captives with all commonly recognized judicial guarantees.

The US policy for treating insurgents in military custody during counterinsurgency operations requires that they receive humanitarian care and treatment from the moment they are detained until they are released or repatriated. The observance of this policy is equally binding on US personnel whether they are troops who capture the insurgents or custodial personnel who guard them or serve in some other capacity. This policy also applies to detained or interned personnel. It applies whether they are known or suspected to have committed acts of espionage or sabotage, or war crimes, including terrorism. Their punishment is adjudicated and administered under due process of law and by legally constituted authority. Inhumane treatment, even under stress of combat and with provocation, is a serious and punishable violation under international law and the US Uniform Code of Military Justice.

In the insurgency and counterinsurgency environment, US personnel must give humane treatment to civilian noncombatants they encounter in the course of operations and scrupulously observe all relevant laws. Improper treatment of noncombatants is illegal. It serves the enemy's cause and is self-defeating in the struggle for legitimacy.

US MILITARY SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY

The United States supports selected insurgencies opposing oppressive regimes who work against US interests. The United States coordinates this support with its friends and allies. Feasibility of effective support and the compatibility of US and insurgent interests are major considerations. Because support for insurgency is often covert, many of the operations connected with it are special activities. Because of their extensive unconventional warfare (UW) training, special operations forces are well-suited to provide this support. General purpose forces may also be called on when the situation requires their functional specialties. Their tasks may also include support and advice. Command and control (C2) relationships are normally situation-specific.

Insurgencies rely on mobilization of personnel and resources from within the country to be successful. They must build their legitimacy. Therefore, their efforts must also include political, social, and when possible, economic development. Because of this, the basic principles of the IDAD strategy will apply in this effort, especially in areas under insurgent control.

When US armed forces are directed to do so, they will provide equipment, training, and services to the insurgent force. The following are types of operations in which US forces can assist insurgents:

- Recruitment, organization, training, and equipping forces to perform unconventional or guerrilla warfare.
- PSYOP.
- Institutional and infrastructure development.
- Intelligence gathering.
- Surreptitious insertions.
- Linkups.
- Evasion and escape of combatants.

- Subversion.
- Sabotage.
- Resupply operations.

Supporting doctrine outlines the relevant tactics, techniques, and procedures.

US MILITARY SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

The United States supports counterinsurgency based on the principles of the IDAD strategy. This concept uses all the leadership, organizational, and material resources available to the host government. The host government identifies the genuine grievances of its people and takes political, economic, and social actions to redress them. It acts in an orderly way within its constitutional system. The actions it takes should mobilize support for the host government and pre-empt insurgent mobilization efforts. Host nation security forces (military, paramilitary, and police) defeat the insurgents' combat elements and neutralize their leadership to establish an environment of security in which development can occur. They cannot depend upon outside combat forces to wage their battles for them. The host nation's security forces support the development effort through CMO conducted in accordance with the host nation's national plan.

The United States will use its military resources to provide support to a host nation's counterinsurgency operations in the context of foreign internal defense (FID). FID is the participation by civilian and military agencies in any of the action programs another government takes to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The US ambassador, through his country team, provides the focal point for interagency coordination and supervision of FID. Military support to FID is provided through the unified CINC. The United States conducts FID operations in accordance with the IDAD concept. Military resources provide materiel, advisors, trainers and security assistance forces to support the host nation government's counterinsurgency operations through security assistance organizations (SAO). More direct forms of support may be provided when required. This section describes the roles of these different forms of support.

Security Assistance Organizations

The term SAO refers to all US armed forces organizations that have security assistance responsibilities and are permanently assigned to an overseas US diplomatic mission. As part of the US country team, and in coordination with the team's other interagency representatives, the SAO reports to the US ambassador and assists host nation security forces by planning and administering military aspects of the security assistance program—the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, and foreign military financing (FMF), both cash and credit; they also may be called upon to perform limited advisory and training assistance. The scope and importance of these functions demand that personnel assigned to an SAO possess a full range of planning, management, and advisory skills.

SAOs also help US country teams communicate host nation assistance needs to policy and budget officials within the US government. This is accomplished via the Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance (AIASA) and the consolidated data report (CDR). The former provides the basis for formulation of the annual US security assistance budget request and has two parts—defense articles and services, and military training. The CDR furnishes an update on developments which have occurred since

submission of the AIASA. The projections made in both the AIASA and CDR are critical to the successful management and effectiveness of each eligible country's security assistance program.

The SAO may assist the host nation's armed forces with their counterinsurgency programs and operations. The training and advisory functions of SAOs are secondary to security assistance management functions. Mobile training teams (MTTs), training assistance field teams (TAFTs), or technical assistance teams (TATs) may perform advisory and training missions.

Advisors and Trainers

Providing advice to foreign counterparts is likely to be an implied mission for US personnel assigned to other primary duties. Thus, members of the SAO, attaches, TAFTs, MTTs, exchange officers, and senior officers on official visits are likely to offer advice as they consult with their counterparts. They assist host nation personnel in solving problems ranging from major questions of strategy to combat developments and improvement of administration.

The mission of advisors is to recommend solutions to specific problems facing the host nation. As the problems may be unique to the host nation, it is a mistake in most instances to try to replicate US methods or forces. Rather, US advisors must keep abreast of the host nation's circumstances and adapt US military doctrine, as appropriate, and be able to develop unique solutions, when required. US advisors should know the language, culture, and political and military background of their counterparts. They must also understand US policy and objectives for the region and should coordinate and clear their actions with the US ambassador.

The mission of trainers is to transfer military skills. This usually involves a fairly direct application of US doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures. Trainers may also be asked for advice because they develop close rapport with their counterparts. Thus, they have the opportunity to contribute to broader national goals beyond their training mission. This includes setting an example of respect for democratic procedures and civilian control of the armed forces, as well as respect for subordinates and the general population. Therefore, to the extent possible, they, too, should receive cultural, political, and language training or orientation.

Foreign Internal Defense Augmentation Force

The Foreign Internal Defense Augmentation Force (FIDAF) is a conceptual, composite organization which augments the SAO when needed; it can be the primary source of augmentation for the SAO. When constituted, the FIDAF operates under a US unified command or a subordinate joint task force (JTF). Its FID mission is to assist SAOs with training and operational advice, and to provide assistance to host nation forces. It employs MTTs and small detachments to fulfill specific mission requests. Ideally, the FIDAF should be a specially trained, area-oriented, mostly language-qualified, and ready force.

Ground, air, and sea forces can provide backup elements to operate in conjunction with the FIDAF. They may be called upon to augment the FIDAF when specific skills, increased workload, or changing security conditions require a larger effort. Backup forces may use interpreters to offset language deficiencies. Mission preparation must include a thorough orientation on local customs and how they affect backup force activities.

Operations by US Forces

This section describes the types of operations US forces perform in support of a host nation conducting counterinsurgency. The principles governing host nation armed forces' counterinsurgency operations generally apply to US operations. The scope of US operations, however, can not be as broad as that of the host nation's armed forces. When planning support of counterinsurgency operations, US commanders and staff officers must consider factors unique to US forces' activities.

Operations by US forces in counterinsurgency situations may cover the entire spectrum of the use of force. These operations will rarely be direct combat engagements against the insurgents. Normally, they will be indirect operations in support of the friendly government such as security assistance training, advice, and logistic support to aid the host nation in developing a needed capability. Other forms of indirect support include joint or combined exercises, and exchange programs. Certain forms of direct assistance such as intelligence sharing, communications support, humanitarian assistance, civic actions, and opportune intratheater airlift can also be employed. Operations by US forces can include building roads and installing communications systems done in conjunction with host nation forces to develop critical infrastructure or facilities. Other US operations can include running hospitals or medical facilities, providing air traffic control or running supply and maintenance depots. When outside intervention threatens the host nation, the rapid insertion of US combat forces to deter aggression or to demonstrate support and resolve may be appropriate. These US operations may not lead to direct combat; they can be side-by-side training operations with the host nation's forces. No matter how US forces are employed in support of a host nation conducting counterinsurgency operations, security of US forces remains the responsibility of the US forces commander. Arrangements can be made with host nation authorities to provide security, but the ultimate responsibility to protect the force remains with the US commander.

Psychological preparation of the host nation and of US units is critical to the successful employment of US forces in these situations. An information campaign must be developed in coordination with the host nation and initiated prior to the introduction of US forces. It should stress that US forces are coming to assist the people at the invitation of the host government, that the host nation will retain its sovereignty, and that US forces will depart when the mission is complete or when the host nation requests them to.

Operations by US forces in support of a host nation conducting counterinsurgency include—

- Intelligence operations.
- Joint-combined exercises.
- Civil-military operations, including CA and PSYOP.
- Humanitarian or civic assistance.
- Logistical support operations.
- Populace and resources control operations.
- Counter-drug operations.
- Tactical operations.

Intelligence Operations.

Intelligence provides the basis for all US and host nation plans and operations in counterinsurgency. Prior to commitment, US military forces provide specific intelligence requirements to the US strategic intelligence community. This ensures that national-level collection focuses on force requirements. Cooperative or combined military intelligence



Figure 2-4. **Support of a Host Nation**

operations are integral to effective intelligence collection and production. Intelligence units provide technical expertise, management, and advice to develop host nation intelligence capabilities. They help establish objectives and develop common procedures.

Tactical intelligence support may be the single most beneficial support the United States can provide in many situations. US forces can contribute experience and expertise to establish and manage all-source intelligence operations and enhance overall management of the intelligence effort. Tactical intelligence interests in FID extend beyond data on the hostile military threat. They include data on internal unrest, on external support for the insurgency, and on the host nation's counterinsurgency capabilities. The threat of sabotage, terrorism, and subversion requires military intelligence staffs to focus their collection efforts in areas normally considered police matters; for example, individual surveillance and monitoring of business transactions. This requires close coordination with host nation police and legal officials.

Continuing close coordination with local police is important to the intelligence collection process. Close cooperation and planning maximize the information available to the US and host nation's forces and ensure that actions are complementary. Some unilateral operational and analytical tasks will, however, require independent action.

In a country in which a cooperative or combined intelligence system already exists, newly arrived US military tactical units normally work with area intelligence elements on a mutual support basis. They support ACC intelligence programs. When the US tactical situation forces them to move frequently, these units should not assume responsibility for long-term, area-oriented intelligence programs. They may, however, contribute significantly to short-term collection and production efforts. All military personnel provide information which, when tied into the data-gathering system, produces useful intelligence.

Joint-combined exercises.

These exercises test, evaluate, and improve the mutual capabilities and interoperability of the United States and its foreign coalition partners. They complement security

assistance goals by testing and evaluating capabilities that security assistance recipients have expressed a desire to improve. In addition, they include certain types of training and construction, and humanitarian assistance and civic action projects within the host nation. They can also support political and psychological goals by demonstrating—

- The values of officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) professional education and training.
- Alternatives to traditional relationships between classes or groups within the society.
- The subordination of the military to civil authority.

Joint-combined exercises are an important means of achieving the objectives of the IDAD strategy. Other exercises may be conducted on a service to service basis. However, they are most useful when they involve joint as well as combined operations.

Civil-military operations.

These operations include all military efforts to support the host nation's development, undermine insurgent grievances, gain support for the national government, and attain national objectives without combat. They include, for example, medical, engineer, communications, transportation and logistical activities undertaken incident to the combined exercises. Successful CMO reduce or eliminate the need for combat operations. This minimizes destruction of life and property. However, CMO can play a major role in preparing the area of operations (AO) for combat forces, should they be required. CMO are developmental, psychological activities which support—

- CA—Military operations embracing relationships between US military forces, civilian authorities, and the populace.
- PSYOP—Development of favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile foreign groups.

US commanders should foster and maintain an environment in which favorable relationships exist between individual US military personnel and host nation civilians. All US military activities, combat or noncombat, have psychological implications.

An effective staff of well-qualified CA and PSYOP specialists should supervise CMO. An appropriately trained civil-military officer should exercise staff responsibility for CMO at the main US military command. He coordinates all CS and CSS activities supporting national development and preparation of the battlefield. He works closely with public affairs officers on the US country team and appropriate host nation officials.

US sponsored CA projects for the host nation support national and subnational developmental programs and objectives. They encourage active support for military operations. The CA planners obtain the appropriate ACC's approval for all such projects affecting its specific region. Civic actions by US forces must reinforce the popular perception that the host nation controls the programs' design and execution.

National-level authorities establish and coordinate overall PSYOP policies and programs. They provide general guidelines within which lower military and civilian echelons plan and conduct PSYOP. US military units ensure that PSYOP supports and agrees with US objectives, the combined national PSYOP program, and programs of relevant political subdivisions. Appropriate ACCs provide regional PSYOP coordination.

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA).

These operations provide a mechanism through which US military personnel and assets augment other US non-military programs to assist Third World populations. HCA improves the quality of life through rudimentary construction, health care, and sanitation programs. Engineer, medical and SOF are the principal forces used in these programs. These operations are defined by law and limited to—

- Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country.
- Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.
- Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
- Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

The Department of State must approve most HCA operations and the US Congress funds them through appropriations specifically set aside for HCA. The United States may not provide HCA, directly or indirectly, to individuals, groups, or organizations engaged in military or paramilitary activity. HCA operations are most effective when the United States uses them within the guidelines of a coordinated interagency program developed by the Department of State, USAID, DOD, and the Unified Commands. Both active and reserve components may conduct HCA missions.

These operations assist a host nation to attack the causes of instability. They can help prevent the need for greater assistance at a later date. HCA operations may also take place in peacekeeping operations, or in the limited circumstances of peacetime contingency operations.

Logistical support operations.

The United States provides logistical support for a host nation's counterinsurgency operations through the security assistance system in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). US units may provide direct logistical support when authorized. As with all other operations by US forces in support of counterinsurgency, the presence of US personnel must be minimized for two reasons—to prevent degrading the legitimacy of the host nation government by our overwhelming presence and to facilitate force protection of US personnel. Generally, logistical support requires bare base operations, with expedited access to CONUS or intermediate overseas support bases, and with host nation providers performing many support functions through contracts.

Populace and Resources Control (PRC) Operations.

PRC measures are the exclusive province of the host nation. In country US forces should avoid assuming PRC missions. They should concentrate instead on providing security for host nation forces conducting these missions. Because PRC operations are, by definition, politically sensitive, US forces should participate in PRC operations only when the situation is clearly beyond the capabilities of the nation's security forces, only on the request of the host nation, and only after approval by appropriate US authorities, to include the US ambassador. Planners should limit US operations to tactical and area security support. If US forces are assigned PRC responsibilities, host nation police or military personnel accompany them to provide area knowledge and legal advice. In addition, the presence of the host nation's police or military personnel demonstrates that US forces only support the host nation government's program.

Counter-drug Operations.

Counter-drug operations outside the territorial United States must be part of an overall FID effort to be effective. US military forces will usually execute them in support of on-going DEA programs, under the overall control and supervision of the US country team.

Tactical Operations.

Tactical operations by US forces against insurgents will be an unusual occurrence resulting from unique circumstances. Direct actions will be rare, and focus, for example, on interdicting support from out of country sources, conducting security screens so that the host nation's forces can regain the initiative, or securing key facilities and installations, thus freeing the host nation's forces to reassume complete responsibility for combat operations.

Historical experience suggests that US combat operations in support of a host nation's counterinsurgency efforts should be strategically defensive. Responsibility for the counterinsurgency program must remain with the host nation's government if its legitimacy is to survive.

If the situation requires US forces to take the initiative from the host nation, then the transition to war has begun. The psychological effect of US forces fighting indigenous forces is such that these operations can be counter-productive unless the local population is firmly against the insurgents and fully supports US involvement. Unless the local population is supportive, such operations cannot enhance the legitimacy of the host nation government and cannot be considered LIC operations. The United States must conclude such operations quickly or the nature of the conflict is likely to be permanently altered. If the host nation's government cannot sustain or reestablish its legitimacy, the counterinsurgency will become a war—with the United States in the role of invader. This underlines the necessity of committing US combat forces only in extreme circumstances—and even then the commitment must be sharply limited in scope and duration. Destruction of the infrastructure and elimination of the conditions which cause the insurgency must be the domain of the host nation's armed forces.

The host nation's military plan and the US military support plan must be combined to govern US tactical operations. When the United States employs combat forces they are normally assigned missions which support the security component of the IDAD strategy. This allows the host nation to establish a secure base for mobilization and balanced development programs and to form and train effective security forces.

Host nation, not US, forces should conduct neutralization programs, particularly coercive measures such as PRC. The host nation should also provide representatives to assist US combat forces in any contacts they may have with local populations.

US forces may conduct strike operations to disrupt and destroy the insurgents' combat formations or to interdict their external support. These operations can prevent the insurgents from undertaking actions against government controlled areas. They can also disrupt the insurgents' efforts to consolidate and expand areas already under their control.

US combat forces may conduct security screens in support of host nation consolidation operations to expand the government's mobilization base. These security screens prevent actions by the insurgents to support their operations in the consolidation

zone. Continued success in consolidation operations will enable the host nation to resume conduct of the military aspects of its counterinsurgency campaign and allow US combat forces to withdraw.

Host nation and US policies and agreements determine command relationships between the respective forces. When each force remains under its own national authority, commanders may plan and coordinate combined operations locally. Normally, a US unit participates in an ACC with host nation agencies located in the area of operations. The ACC does not replace operational centers or the political and administrative organizations of the host nation. It only coordinates the operations.

CHAPTER 3
Combatting Terrorism

> Kill one, frighten ten thousand.
>
> **Sun Tzu**

This chapter discusses terrorism, US Army and Air Force efforts to counter the threat of terrorism, and basic principles to assist a government in response to the threat. Commanders and staffs must understand terrorism in order to plan effective countermeasures to reduce the probability of a successful attack against their installations, units, or personnel.

DEFINITION AND ENVIRONMENT

The DOD defines terrorism as the "the unlawful use of—or threatened use of—force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives." Religious and ideological objectives compel political action; thus, it is violence to modify political behavior which is the primary military concern.

Figure 3-1. **Political Action through Terrorism.**

It is often difficult to distinguish the acts of politically motivated terrorists from violent acts performed by criminals or individuals in the society at large. These acts create similar tactical-level problems for security forces, but normally have no political intent or effect. Some criminal organizations, especially narcotics traffickers, have become powerful enough to have vested political interests. When they pursue these interests by acts of terrorism, they become a concern for the military like any other political terrorist group.

Whether performed by criminals, mentally disturbed individuals, or for clearly political reasons, violence to alter political behavior is the focus of combatting terrorism programs.

The terrorist neither requires nor necessarily seeks popular support. Terrorist operations, organizations, and movements require secrecy. Their activities do not conform to rules of law or warfare. Their victims are frequently noncombatants, or symbolic persons and places, and usually have no role in either causing or correcting the terrorist's grievance. Terrorist methods include hostage taking, hijacking, sabotage, assassination, arson, hoaxes, bombings, and armed attack or threats thereof.

THE THREAT

The Terrorist

Understanding modern terrorism requires an appreciation of the emotional impact that the terrorist act has on the terrorist's target audience, people other than the victims. The audience must know of the act to respond to it; therefore, media coverage is imperative to terrorists wishing to excite public fear or to gain attention for their cause. To a great extent, the terrorist's desire for attention determines his choice of tactics.

The role that the terrorist group perceives itself as playing also determines its choice of tactics and selection of targets. Terrorism can be an element of an insurgency or revolutionary effort when employed with other military and political activities designed to gain autonomy or to supplant the existing political system. Some political traditions which are violence-prone include the practice of terrorism as a standard technique; that is, terrorism becomes accepted along with other forms of political violence as a way to influence political behavior. Finally, terrorism can be a mere gesture used in isolation from any meaningful political effort. In this context, terrorists frequently claim affiliation with some vague cause or obscure political philosophy to give their actions a veil of respectability.

A terrorist group's selection of targets and tactics is also influenced by its governmental affiliation. For some years, security forces categorized terrorist groups according to their operational traditions: national, transnational, and international. Ease of international travel and the growing tendency toward cooperative efforts among terrorist groups have rendered these categories of little use operationally. Today, terrorist groups are distinguished mostly by government affiliation. This helps security planners anticipate their targets and their degree of sophistication in intelligence and weaponry. They are generally categorized as nonstate supported, state supported, or state directed, although networking and mutual support make any categories somewhat arbitrary.

Nonstate supported.

In this category, the terrorist group operates autonomously, receiving no significant support from any government. Italy's Red Brigades and the Basque *Euskadi ta Askatasuna* (ETA) are examples of such nonstate supported groups.

State supported.

A state supported terrorist group generally operates independently but receives support from one or more governments. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is an example of a state supported terrorist group.

State directed.

In this category, the terrorist group operates as an agent of a government. It receives intelligence, logistics, and operational support from that government. Libyan "hit teams" targeted against Libyan exiles are an example of state directed terrorist groups.

CHAPTER 3

Terrorist Objectives

Terrorist events can be classified by their immediate objectives. Five types of terrorist objectives are—

- Recognition.
- Coercion.
- Intimidation.
- Provocation.
- Insurgency support.

A terrorist organization may pursue one, some, or all of these objectives. The terrorist organization may establish its objectives and strategy or the government supporting the terrorist organization may dictate them. In either case, the military planner must identify these objectives and strategies in order to defeat the terrorist organization and prevent it from attaining its goals.

Recognition.

At the outset of a terrorist campaign, the objective of terrorist acts may be national or international recognition of a cause. The reasons for seeking recognition might also include attracting recruits, obtaining funds, or demonstrating strength.

Groups seeking recognition require events that have a high probability of attracting media attention. Specific incidents may be the hijacking of an aircraft, the kidnaping of prominent people, the seizing of occupied buildings, or other hostage barricade situations. Once they gain attention, the terrorists may demand that political statements be disseminated.

Terrorist groups sometimes use organizational names or labels designed to imply legitimacy or widespread support. For example, a tiny isolated group may use "front," "army," or "brigade" in its name to achieve this effect.

Coercion.

Coercion is the attempt to force a desired behavior by individuals, groups, or governments. This objective calls for a strategy of very selective targeting which may rely on publicly announced bombings, destruction of property and other acts which are initially less violent than the taking of human life. Contemporary examples include the bombing of corporate headquarters and banking facilities with little or no loss of life.

Intimidation.

Intimidation differs from coercion. Intimidation attempts to prevent individuals or groups from acting; coercion attempts to force actions. Terrorists may use intimidation to reduce the effectiveness of security forces by making them afraid to act. Intimidation can discourage competent citizens from seeking or accepting positions within the government. The threat of violence can also keep the general public from taking part in important political activities such as voting. As in the case of coercion, terrorists use a strategy of selective targeting although they may intend the targets to look as though they were chosen indiscriminately.

Provocation.

The specific objective of terrorist acts in this category is to provoke overreaction on the part of government forces. The strategy normally calls for attacking targets symbolic of the government (for example, the police, the military, and other officials). Attacks of this type demonstrate vulnerability to terrorist acts and contribute to a loss of confidence

in the government's ability to provide security. But more importantly, if the security forces resort to a heavy-handed response, the resulting oppression can create public sympathy, passive acceptance, or active support for an insurgent or terrorist group.

Insurgency Support.

Terrorism in support of an insurgency is likely to include provocation, intimidation, coercion and the quest for recognition. Terrorism can also aid an insurgency by causing the government to overextend itself in attempting to protect all possible targets. Other uses of terrorist skills in insurgencies include acquiring funds, coercing recruits, obtaining logistical support, and enforcing internal discipline.

Terrorist Tactics

Terrorist incidents may be classified according to the tactics terrorists use. There are many tactics, but generally each cell favors and specializes in the use of one or two. The tactics establish a distinct, identifying pattern of operation. Generally, techniques used to analyze criminal behavior are also useful in analyzing terrorist behavior. The study of terrorist behavioral patterns can reveal much about a terrorist group. This information is helpful in implementing AT measures and conducting CT operations. A terrorist organization may use any or all of the tactics discussed below.

Assassination.

Assassination is a euphemism for murder. The term generally applies to the killing of prominent persons and symbolic enemies as well as to defectors from the terrorist group.

Arson.

Arson has the advantage of low risk to the perpetrator. It requires only a low level of technical knowledge and is easily disclaimed, if desired.

Bombing.

The improvised explosive device (IED) is the contemporary terrorist's weapon of choice. It is inexpensive to produce and terrorists use it frequently. Due to the various detonation techniques available, the IED poses a low risk to the trained terrorist. Other advantages include its attention-getting capacity and the terrorist's ability to control casualties through time of detonation and placement of the device. In recent years, approximately one-half of all recorded terrorist incidents worldwide used IEDs.

Hijacking.

Hijacking produces a spectacular hostage situation. Although terrorists have hijacked trains, buses, and ships, aircraft offer them greater mobility and worldwide media attention. Terrorists may also use hijacking as a means for escape.

Hostage-taking.

This usually is an overt seizure of one or more people to gain publicity, concessions, or ransom in return for the release of the hostage or hostages. While dramatic, hostage situations are risky for the terrorist in an unfriendly environment. A comparison of the seizure of the Iranian Embassy in London in 1981 with the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979 demonstrates how environment can affect the outcome of hostage situations. In the former incident, a hostile environment, only one terrorist survived; in the latter, a friendly environment, all the hostage-takers survived.

Kidnaping.

While similar to hostage-taking, kidnaping has significant differences. Kidnaping is usually a covert action and the perpetrators may not make themselves known for some time. While hostage-takers seek immediate publicity for their terrorist acts, news media attention to kidnaping is usually less intense since the event may extend over a prolonged period. Because of the time involved, a successful kidnaping requires elaborate planning and logistics, although the risk to the terrorist is less than in a hostage situation.

Maiming.

Maiming creates fear and causes pain, but is not as negative to the terrorist's image as killing a hostage.

Raids.

Armed attacks on facilities usually have one of three purposes: to gain access to radio or television broadcast facilities (to make a public statement); to demonstrate the government's inability to guarantee the security of critical facilities; or to acquire money and materiel (for example, by means of bank or armory robberies).

Seizure.

Seizure usually involves the capture of a building or object that has value for the target audience. Publicity is the principal objective. The risk to the terrorist is high because security forces have time to react to the attack. They may opt to use force to resolve the incident since few or no innocent lives may be at risk.

Sabotage.

The objective in most sabotage incidents is to demonstrate how vulnerable society is to the terrorist's actions. In the more developed countries, utilities, communications, and transportation systems are so interdependent that a serious disruption of one affects all and gains immediate public attention. Sabotage of industrial, commercial, or military facilities is one means of showing the vulnerability of the target while simultaneously making a statement or political or monetary demand.

Hoaxes.

Any terrorist group can successfully employ a hoax. A threat against a person's life causes him and those around him to devote more time and effort to security measures. A bomb threat can close down a commercial building, empty a theater, or disrupt a transportation system at no cost to the terrorist. The longer-term effects of "false alarms" on the security forces are more dangerous than the temporary disruption of the hoax. Repeated threats that do not materialize dull the analytical and operational effectiveness of security personnel.

Use of NBC Weapons.

Although a nuclear device is beyond the reach of all but the most sophisticated state-sponsored terrorist groups, a chemical or biological weapon is not. The technology is simple and the cost per casualty is extremely low. This makes such weapons ideal for those with little or no regard for the consequences of their act. Fear of alienation from peer and support populations probably inhibits their use, but this restraint could disappear as competition for headlines increases. There is a potential for terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons as substitutes for conventional explosives in many

situations. The potential for mass destruction and the great fear that most people have of chemical and biological weapons could be attractive to a group wishing to make the world take notice.

Structure and Security

Terrorist groups develop organizational structures appropriate for the environments in which they operate. Since terrorists usually work in a hostile environment, security is one of their primary concerns. As a result, the organizational structure of terrorist groups is normally cellular. Each cell is relatively isolated. This type of organization protects members of the group. In the event of defection or capture, no one member can identify more than a few others. Some groups may organize multifunctional cells that combine several skills into one tactical unit; others create separate, specialized cells that come together for an operation on an *ad hoc* basis.

Larger terrorist groups normally have a central command and control element with one or more subordinate elements. Geographical boundaries frequently are the basis for these elements (for example, Italy's Red Brigades). These regional commands direct the actions of operational and support cells in their area of responsibility. Smaller groups may have a single command element that directly controls all cells regardless of their locations.

Terrorist groups are structurally similar to rudimentary military organizations. A few—the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and some factions of the PLO, for example—are disciplined enough to function along clear lines of authority and command. However, in others, group dynamics, egos, and philosophical differences override organizational principles. Because of these internal differences, members may take actions not consistent with their stated objectives. These internal conflicts cause terrorist groups to splinter into new factions. Splintering complicates the security forces' intelligence efforts. The commonly used deception technique of claiming credit for an action in the name of a previously unknown terrorist group adds to the problem.

In general, terrorist organizations, especially those with little or no access to government resources, need a support structure. As shown in Figure 3-2, a typical terrorist organization consists of functionally organized operational members as outlined above, plus two categories of supporters.

Leadership.

Leadership is at the top of the pyramid. It defines policy and directs actions. Leadership is intensely committed and may include charismatic figures. If the group is state supported or directed, the leadership usually includes one or more members who have been trained and educated by the sponsoring state.

The cadre are the most active members, the men and women who carry out the actual attacks and train others. While many of the cadre are deeply committed to the cause, its membership may include "professional" terrorists who are not necessarily ideologically motivated.

Active supporters.

Active supporters are people who do not actually commit the violent acts of terrorism. However, they assist the terrorists by providing money, information, legal and medical services, "safe houses," and forged or stolen documents. Active supporters frequently agree ideologically with some or all of the group's goals, but are ambivalent about the use of violence. There are also some unstable thrill-seekers who join these groups simply

to be a part of a forbidden organization. Most terrorist groups recruit cadre from the ranks of their active support element since these people have proven their loyalty and their skills.

Passive supporters.

Passive supporters are more difficult to define and identify. Most of them are sympathetic to the terrorist's cause, but either will not or cannot assume an active role. Some passive supporters are involved by intimidation or blackmail. Passive support may be unwitting; for example, contributions to "charitable" causes or other ruses. The terrorist relies on passive supporters for financial aid, public displays of support, and minor logistical support.



Figure 3-2. **Terrorist Organization.**

MEETING THE THREAT

This section discusses US policy toward terrorism, and outlines the responsibilities of appropriate agencies within the federal government. It includes a brief review of Army and Air Force programs to combat terrorism, and principles useful in situations in which US military personnel help friendly nations to combat terrorism.

Policies and Responsibilities

In the past two decades, the US government has developed a terrorism policy which addresses acts against US citizens, both at home and abroad. The following statements summarize this policy:

- All terrorist actions are criminal and intolerable; thus, whatever their motivation, they should be condemned.
- All lawful measures will be taken to prevent terrorist acts and to punish those who commit them.
- The United States presumes that the host government will exercise its responsibility under international law to protect all persons within its territories.

When US citizens are abducted or held captive, the host government must effect their safe release.

- During incidents affecting US citizens abroad, the United States maintains close and continuous contact with the host government and supports it with all practicable intelligence and technical services.
- International cooperation to combat terrorism is a fundamental tenet of US policy. The United States should exhaust all avenues to strengthen such cooperation.

Other policies exist in international agreements, statements of senior US officials, and the practices of US government agencies. Treaties concerning aircraft hijacking, measures to protect diplomats, and denial of sanctuary to terrorists are included in many international agreements.

Legal Considerations

Terrorist acts are criminal, whether committed in peacetime or war. In peacetime, terrorists may be prosecuted for violating the criminal laws of the country in which they commit their crime. Terrorists may also be subject to the extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction of other nations (for example, if the nation officially regards the murder of one of its citizens anywhere in the world as a crime punishable by its laws and in its courts). They also may be subject to "universal" jurisdiction by any nation for international offenses such as piracy.

If the conflict involved is an insurgency as described in Common Article Three of the Geneva Conventions, the requirement for humane treatment does not prevent legal prosecution for the crimes the terrorist may have committed. If the insurgency has attained legal status as a belligerency, and individual insurgents are lawful combatants, then the entire Geneva Conventions would apply together with international law applicable to armed conflicts. Doubts about the right of an individual to receive prisoner of war status must be resolved by a competent tribunal in accordance with Article Five of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. However, terrorist acts committed by lawful combatants may still be legally prosecuted as war crimes, including "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions.

A commander has the inherent authority and duty to enforce security measures and to protect persons and property under his command. Commanders should consult with their legal advisors to determine the extent of their authority to deal with terrorists.

US Organizations

US agencies involved in combatting terrorism follow a principle known as the "lead agency concept." Military policies, directives, and plans for combatting terrorism reflect the lead agency concept in accordance with federal laws and memoranda of agreements.

Department of Justice.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) is the lead agency for dealing with acts of terrorism committed within the US, its territories, and possessions. Within the DOJ, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has the lead. The FBI can train police forces of friendly nations in both antiterrorism and counterterrorism operations. Under US law, the FBI has authority to apprehend terrorists anywhere in the world who have committed offenses against US citizens.

Federal Aviation Administration.

In cases involving aircraft in flight, the administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) leads enforcement activities which affect the safety of persons aboard the craft (49 US Code 1357 (e)). In flight is defined as the period of time beginning after all external doors of the aircraft are closed following embarkation and until the moment a door opens for debarkation.

Department of State.

The Department of State is the lead agency for any US response to terrorist acts against US personnel and facilities in foreign countries. Under international law, the foreign government on whose soil the act occurs has the responsibility for dealing with it. The Department of State coordinates US actions with those of the host government.

Department of Defense.

Most DOD agencies are involved in combatting terrorism in the US and abroad. Individual agencies and the armed services are responsible for their own antiterrorism programs. The lead agency relationships do not relieve commanders at all levels from the responsibility for protecting their force. The commander should coordinate force protection planning and operations with the appropriate agency (FBI or Department of State), but responsibility for protection of the force remains inherently his. In 1981, the DOD established a counterterrorism JTF with permanent staff and specialized forces. These forces, which report to the NCA through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provide a flexible range of response options designed to counter the myriad of terrorist acts. In addition, SOF and general purpose forces may augment and support the counterterrorism joint task force (JTF).

PROGRAMS

This section discusses both general principles which apply to any national program to combat terrorism and the programs established by the Army and Air Force to reduce their vulnerability to terrorist attack.

Principles of a National Program

No two nations or societies are exactly alike; therefore, no two national programs for combatting terrorism are identical. This is because a national program expresses the values of the society and government that creates it. There are, however, several principles common to most. These concern policy and organization. In situations other than an internationally recognized insurgency, for example, the use of conventional military forces (other than highly specialized counterterrorism units) in a domestic counterterrorist role can lead to overreaction and abuse. This would be counterproductive and lend support to the terrorist's cause.

Policy.

A government must develop a single, consistent policy; the national leadership must express it clearly. Statements of national policy address three audiences:

- The domestic population.
- The international community.
- The terrorists.

The terrorist attempts to undermine popular faith in a government's ability to protect its citizens. A significant part of the government policy, therefore, must demonstrate to

its citizens that their government will take action to protect them. The domestic population must not perceive government actions as more detrimental to their well-being than the terrorist acts the government attempts to prevent.

A second audience, the international community, views the government's policy as a statement of national resolve and commitment. It evaluates the policy for consistency with agreements, treaty commitments, and adherence to national and international law. To the extent the policy achieves this, government legitimacy grows while that of the terrorists diminishes. However, a strong national policy against terrorism is meaningless without the resolve and the means to implement it. The international community will respect a nation that is consistent in both its public and private commitments.

The terrorists are the third audience for national policy. In general, terrorism is—at this time—a low-risk operation. Bombings, hijackings, and assassinations offer terrorist groups a high probability of success and low risk of capture or death. However, a strong and consistent national program, effectively executed, can increase the terrorist's risks. It can also separate the terrorists from the populace, thereby denying them sanctuary, recruits, funds, and support. The terrorist evaluates the government's program by comparing its public statements with the effectiveness of its policies.

Organization.

A government cannot easily organize and support a new system whose sole mission is combatting terrorism, due to the expense and degree of sophistication required. Therefore, it usually employs existing organizations. Ideally, the government should organize and train as many personnel as possible to deal specifically with terrorists.

Terrorists attack a broad range of targets which fall into many different civil and military jurisdictions. Thus, no single element of government can fully cope with all aspects of a nation's terrorist problems. To be successful, it is necessary for a government to orchestrate the activities of the many agencies involved. National leaders must actively participate in this orchestration.

Each society is unique, but certain organizational principles can apply to any society fighting terrorism. One way to focus the national effort is to establish an office which deals exclusively with terrorism. Such an office requires a mechanism for policy coordination. A council composed of senior personnel from all government agencies involved in the antiterrorism program could provide this mechanism. The head of the terrorism office should chair this council; ideally, he should report directly to the nation's leader.

Functions of a National Program

The functions of a government's program for combatting terrorism are similar to those for counterinsurgency. Chief among these functions are—

- Intelligence.
- Information.
- Security.

Intelligence.

Intelligence provides the key to both successful AT and CT programs. A nation's ability to recognize, analyze, and move against a terrorist threat depends upon the effectiveness of its intelligence apparatus. An effective system of information exchange and control between the police and the military should provide both organizations with essential current intelligence. Since modern terrorism is often international in scope,

coordination with foreign intelligence services to help collect and compile information is imperative. The police normally have more extensive contact with the general population than the military. Thus, information concerning terrorist plans, recruitment, and support structures will normally surface from police sources earlier than from military sources.

Planners should evaluate local conditions before accepting the intelligence developed by the police and the host nation's military sources at face value. In some countries, one or more security forces have become so politicized or corrupt that the people perceive them more as a threat than protection. Information may still be available from such sources, but it should be suspect. Also, lack of education, training, and commitment can result in an inept police force which has only limited value in combatting terrorism.

Security.

Security in the context of a national program to combat terrorism includes both AT and CT. AT programs are the most difficult to plan and implement because they require active participation by all agencies and, to varying degrees, the public. CT, on the other hand, generally involves only intelligence, police and, on occasion, selected military personnel. The fundamental elements of an AT program include awareness and physical security. A state experiencing terrorism must first assess the threat (Who or what is attacking it? Why? How? What are they attacking?) Then it must begin information and education campaigns to encourage the population to adopt defensive behaviors. Awareness efforts must accommodate the needs of individuals and groups at greater risk than the society in general. But such extraordinary efforts must not be allowed to generate excessive fear in the population.

One of the defensive behaviors the AT campaign encourages is physical security. This includes efforts to both physically strengthen and control access to facilities which are likely terrorist targets. In brief, by developing public awareness and implementing or enhancing physical security, the government "hardens" the terrorist's targets. This makes the terrorist's task more difficult. More importantly, it increases the risk of injury, capture, or death for the terrorist.

Information.

In combatting terrorism, the government coordinates a variety of policy instruments, both internally and among its allies. Informational activities are one of the most important ingredients in a national security strategy. Policy makers should understand how using informational assets can strengthen the government's standing in both world and domestic public opinion. PSYOP, public affairs (PA), and public diplomacy are all informational activities. Each can play an important role in combatting terrorism.

When government uses information to persuade, it is a PSYOP weapon. When it uses information to discuss matters of public interest, it becomes PA. When the government integrates information into a comprehensive program involving both informational and cultural activities supporting a national strategy, it becomes a part of public diplomacy.

In combatting terrorism, PSYOP can contribute immensely to an offensive strategy. It can help avoid collateral damage to the general populace. A well-planned and executed program puts the terrorist on the defensive psychologically, forcing him into more predictable behavior patterns. Decision makers should understand that successful execution of an offensive PSYOP strategy offers great benefits. PSYOP, integrated with other operations, help separate the terrorists from their sources of support and instigate rivalry between different groups.

Terrorists and terrorist organizations promote their cause through the news media. To counteract this, the government must preempt the terrorists' exploitation of the media through rapid and accurate disclosure of their activities and intentions. Only serious national security and operational requirements should be allowed to alter this procedure.

Adhering to such a full disclosure policy helps offset terrorist propaganda. It may help turn public opinion against terrorists by exposing their cruelty and destructive acts. Close coordination among PA, PSYOP, intelligence, and operations officials supports this objective. But, a policy of full disclosure must also avoid the release or exposure of counterproductive information.

While PA and PSYOP officers work together, they should avoid any blurring of missions. This blurring, real or perceived, damages the PA representative's credibility and limits his ability to present the government's message.

Consistency within the national program and education of the population and military forces combine to reduce the risk of terrorism. Unity of effort and legitimacy are key factors in any program to combat terrorism. But leadership and effective management are paramount. No amount of training, money, or equipment can overcome poor judgment or inattention to detail in the struggle against terrorism.

Principles of Combatting Terrorism

A well structured antiterrorism program is the foundation of any effective combatting terrorism effort. The basics of such a program include the collection and dissemination of timely threat information, the conduct of information awareness programs, and the implementation of sound defensive measures. Defensive measures include preparation and exercise of response forces and procedures. Because absolute protection against terrorist activities is not possible, protective plans and procedures are based on assessment of the threat and an evaluation of friendly vulnerabilities. The resulting plans should strike a reasonable balance between the protection desired, the mission requirements, and the availability of resources.

Army Combatting Terrorism Program

Within the Army, combatting terrorism is one aspect of force protection. It therefore falls within the staff responsibility of operations officers at all levels (for example, Army staff, installation, and tactical units).

The Army designed its combatting terrorism program to reduce the vulnerability of installations, units, and personnel during peacetime, mobilization, and war. AR 525-13 provides the program responsibilities for combatting terrorism. FM 100-37 provides a more complete discussion of basic doctrine. The Army's program concentrates on developing a protective posture in peacetime which can carry over to war. The Army's approach to combatting terrorism has two distinct, but not separate, aspects—antiterrorism and counterterrorism.

Antiterrorism.

Antiterrorism includes all measures that installations, units, and individuals take to reduce the probability of their falling victim to a terrorist act. AT includes those defensive measures that reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property. The extent of these measures varies based on assessments of the local threat. These include personnel awareness and knowledge of personal protection techniques. They also include crime prevention and physical security programs to "harden" the target, making Army installations and personnel less appealing as terrorist targets.

FM 100-37 (and also TC 19-16) describe the basis for developing an installation program. They outline considerations needed in the planning and execution of an installation's response to the terrorist threat. The Army and Marine Corps publication, FC 100-37-1/Operational Handbook 7-14.1, contains guidance for a unit program. It addresses force protection during predeployment, deployment, and redeployment. Users of this manual should also consult appropriate publications describing personal protective measures, especially actions and techniques which can reduce the probabilities of the soldier and his family becoming victims of a terrorist.

Counterterrorism.

Counterterrorism includes the full range of offensive measures to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. This chapter, however, addresses only those actions taken to terminate an incident or to apprehend individuals responsible for a terrorist act. Other counterterrorism measures—preemption, intervention, or retaliation with specialized forces operating under direction of the NCA—have the characteristics of strikes or raids. Those measures are addressed in Chapter 5.

Air Force Antiterrorism Program

The Air Force uses a corporate approach to the problem of force protection. No single agency is given sole responsibility for development of doctrine, procedures, hardware or training. All agencies and major commands are responsible for coordinating individual programs into a unified action. The Air Force inspector general's office serves as the focal point for the Air Force long-term antiterrorism program. It has the responsibility to streamline and enhance physical security, intelligence-gathering and analysis, education and awareness, procedures, and funding. The goal of the Air Force antiterrorism program, under the authority of Air Force Regulation 208-1, is to reduce vulnerability of individuals and property to the terrorist threat. The Air Force director of plans and programs, through the Air Force combatting terrorism center, is responsible for near-term anti-terrorism and all Air Force counterterrorism activities. The center—

- Monitors the worldwide terrorist threat; including AT and CT operations, and other deployments, exercises, and contingencies.
- Recommends to senior Air Force decision makers near-term actions required to counter terrorism and the terrorist threat.
- Acts in coordination with the secretary of the Air Force, inspector general, office of antiterrorism as the focal point for all antiterrorism matters addressed by the JCS and the National Security Council (NSC).

AFR 208-1 contains the basic framework for the Air Force antiterrorism program. This regulation spells out the installation commander's responsibilities in planning and administering the antiterrorism program. Users should consult it in conjunction with AFR 125-17, AFR 125-37 and AFR 355-11.

CHAPTER 4
Peacekeeping Operations

> Peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it.
>
> Anonymous United Nations Peacekeeping Soldier

This chapter discusses peacekeeping operations. These are military operations conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties to a conflict to maintain a negotiated truce and to facilitate a diplomatic resolution. The United States may participate in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of an international organization, in cooperation with other countries, or unilaterally. Peacekeeping operations may take many forms:

- Withdrawal and disengagement.
- Cease-fire.
- Prisoner-of-war exchanges.
- Arms control.
- Demilitarization and demobilization.

Peacekeeping operations support diplomatic efforts to achieve, restore, or maintain the peace in areas of potential or actual conflict.

ENVIRONMENT

Peacekeeping operations may occur in ambiguous situations requiring the peacekeeping force to deal with extreme tension and violence without becoming a participant. These operations usually occur after diplomatic negotiations (which include the belligerents) establish the mandate for the peacekeeping force. The mandate is the peacekeeping force's authority to act. It describes the force's scope of operations including constraints and restrictions. It typically identifies the participating nations and determines the size and type of force each contributes. As a result, each peacekeeping operation is unique. US participation may involve military units or individuals acting as observers.

PRINCIPLES

Eight general principles are fundamental to and form the doctrinal basis for peacekeeping operations. The following paragraphs discuss these principles.

Consent

The presence and degree of consent determine the success of a peacekeeping operation. The disputing parties demonstrate their desire for, or acquiescence in, these operations by the degree to which they consent to them. Nations participating in the peacekeeping force also consent to these operations for their own interests. They may limit the employment of their forces through rules of engagement or terms of reference. Consent also applies to other interested states. They may support peacekeeping operations or at least agree to refrain from actions harmful to their success. The principle of consent interacts with other principles, as discussed below.

Neutrality

Neutrality is closely linked with consent. Ideally, states contributing peacekeeping forces should be neutral in the crisis for which the force is created. However, any interested state may participate, if the belligerents consent. To preserve neutrality, the peacekeeping force must maintain an atmosphere and an attitude of impartiality.

Balance

Balance refers to the geographic, political, and functional make-up or composition of the peacekeeping force. Balance is a function of consent. The belligerents may insist that the force include elements from mutually acceptable, geopolitically balanced countries.

Single-Manager Control

The appointment of an individual or agency to execute the policies of the parties to the agreement results in single-manager control of the operations. Single-manager control is exercised at the interface point between the peacekeeping structure and the body which authorizes the operations and appoints the manager. For example, if the United Nations authorizes peacekeeping operations, the Secretary General is the single manager.

Concurrent Action

Concurrent action refers to all other actions taken to achieve a permanent peace while the peacekeeping force stabilizes the situation. Any activity by the peacekeeping force which facilitates agreement between the contending parties aids in this long-term objective.

Unqualified Sponsor Support

Organizations or countries contributing to a peacekeeping operation should give the peacekeeping force their full and unqualified support in accordance with the terms of the mandate which established the force. This support may be financial, logistical, or political; it relies heavily on consent and neutrality. The contributing groups should permit the peacekeeping force to operate freely, within policy guidance, but without unnecessary interference.

Freedom of Movement

The entire peacekeeping force and all its components should have guaranteed freedom of movement. The force should be able to move unhindered in and around buffer zones, along demarcation lines, or throughout a host nation. The principle of consent affects this freedom.

Self-Defense

The use of force in self-defense is essential to the peacekeeping operations concept. The principle of self-defense is an inherent right; it is the one principle that cannot be affected by consent. The ROE describe the circumstances and the manner in which peacekeepers may use force to resist attempts to prevent them from performing their duties. The ROE normally allow peacekeepers to use force only in self-defense. The ROE should be clearly and unambiguously stated in the mandate.

ORGANIZATION

Peacekeeping operations generally have three levels, or tiers, of organization: the political council, the military peacekeeping command, and the military area command (see Figure 4-1). The peacekeeping force includes all three of these tiers.

Political Council

The political council is the highest level of the peacekeeping organization. It provides a mechanism for negotiating and coordinating with the leaders of the disputing parties. Through negotiation, the council encourages self-sustaining solutions which are acceptable to the disputing factions. The chief of the peacekeeping force may be a member of the political council.



Figure 4-1. **Schematic of Peacekeeping Organization.**

The political council receives the mandate for the peacekeeping operation and coordinates status of forces agreements (SOFAs) with the belligerents.

Military Peacekeeping Command

Overall control of the peacekeeping forces exists at the military peacekeeping command level. Control and staffing at this level is normally multinational. The force commander exercises operational control of the combined forces, with command functions

remaining within national channels. The military peacekeeping command may collocate with the political body established by the political council.

This command rarely has the authority to negotiate political matters. It may have authority to maintain liaison with military or paramilitary headquarters and to mediate regional disputes and misunderstandings. Language-qualified personnel and communications equipment must be available as appropriate and when required. The missions of the command include—

- Deterring violent acts by the disputants.
- Protecting vital installations and critical facilities.
- Informing the political council of peacekeeping force requirements (for example, operational requirements not covered in the agreements).
- Collecting and providing information to the political council.
- Ensuring the impartiality of peacekeeping forces.

The command issues directives and instructions concerning operations and procedures to follow.

Military Area Command

The third, or operating, level of peacekeeping is the military area command. The area command usually consists of forces from a single nation. It operates in a specific area of responsibility. It reports to the military peacekeeping command. It receives logistic support from the command or through its own national channels.

The area command is normally composed of highly visible units with distinctive markings on all uniforms and equipment. These identifying marks increase the impact of their presence, increase the effects of reassurance, and imply confidence. Area command forces should have extensive, redundant communications to support their missions.

The area command deters violent acts by its physical presence at violence-prone locations. It collects information through normal overt means, for example, observation posts, patrols, visual sightings, aerial reconnaissance, conversations with local inhabitants, and routine reports. It collects, analyzes, and reports intelligence information to the military peacekeeping command.

FORCE COMPOSITION

The structure of a peacekeeping force can range from military police and light infantry formations to armored cavalry, mechanized, or armor formations. If the use of airspace by the disputing parties in an area or corridor threatens to renew violence, extensive airspace surveillance and air defense units may be required. The basic force structure and appropriate augmentation are situation-dependent. Planners must also consider using language-proficient units and liaison parties when structuring forces. The conditions likely to produce a renewal of violence and the potential level of violence influence the composition of the peacekeeping forces. When clashes in urban areas can give rise to insurrection, the peacekeeping force must have the appropriate structure and police powers. If border clashes between regular forces of disputing parties are the primary threat, the force must have an appropriate composition and a clearly designated area of operations.

OPERATIONS

Peacekeeping operations require commanders to position their units in potentially hostile environments. Commanders are responsible for the security of their forces and

must not knowingly expose their units to unreasonable danger or to situations which violate sound military judgment. To be effective, and maintain their security, the peacekeeping force and its support units must remain impartial entities. The commander should withdraw his force if the situation deteriorates and jeopardizes the force's impartiality. He should keep current on changing events and make plans to reduce the vulnerability of peacekeeping forces to hostile elements.



Figure 4-2. **Peacekeeping Troops.**

The transition from combat to diplomacy is a tense and sensitive maneuver. The peacekeeping force must monitor the belligerents' situation carefully. The initial phases of peacekeeping operations involve a finely timed series of phased withdrawals and redeployments. The peacekeeping force makes complementary deployments and redeployments, synchronized with the withdrawals of the belligerent. The force also ensures that the belligerents fulfill the conditions of the disengagement agreement.

During all phases, the peacekeeper continuously demonstrates to the concerned parties that he is following the terms of the agreement. Reasonable complaints by any belligerent party against any member of the peacekeeping force will undermine the credibility of the mission and weaken the force's position.

The control of violence in peacekeeping operations requires a combination of techniques. These include—

- Observation.
- Surveillance and supervision.
- Patrolling.
- Investigation of complaints.
- Negotiation and mediation.
- Information gathering.
- Implied tasks.

The next several paragraphs of this chapter discuss these techniques in detail.

Observation

Observation is a technique common to all peacekeeping operations. It is the peacekeeper's primary responsibility and basic requirement. The observer monitors everything that happens within his area of observation. He provides timely and accurate reports on any suspicious situation, incident, or occurrence.

Observation requires comprehension of both the facts and their implications. The observer should pass information to the next higher echelon without delay. Successful peacekeeping depends on impartial, factual reporting accompanied by as much pertinent data as possible; for example, maps, field sketches, diagrams, photographs (if permitted), and references to specific agreements or instructions. The observer can gather such information by—

- Deploying observation posts in the confrontation areas.
- Deploying subunits in sensitive areas and potential trouble spots.
- Manning checkpoints on both major and minor access roads and in towns and villages.
- Patrolling, including aerial reconnaissance.
- Conducting fact-finding exercises, inspections, and investigations.
- Using video cameras and cassette recorders.
- Using aerial photography (if permitted).
- Monitoring radio transmissions of belligerent forces (if permitted). The establishment of a good working relationship with the contending parties is vital to a successful observation mission. Careful management of such a relationship enhances the peacekeeping force's image of impartiality.

Surveillance and Supervision

Surveillance and supervision are operation-specific techniques. They help ensure implementation of the agreements. Frequently encountered tasks include the surveillance or supervision of—

- Cease-fire and armistice lines.
- Armament control agreements.
- Military deployment limitations.
- Military withdrawals or disengagements.
- Prisoner-of-war exchanges.
- Civilian movement in and out of disputed areas and along demarcation lines.
- The use of natural resources shared by the belligerents.
- Refugee camps.
- Plebiscites and elections.

Surveillance and supervision require restraint, tact, and patience.

Patrolling

Patrolling is a key factor in most peacekeeping operations. If it is well planned and executed, patrolling can achieve important tactical advantages for the peacekeeper. Restrictions on patrolling, if any, need clarification at the time peacekeeping force agreements are drafted. Patrols need freedom of movement and observation to be fully effective.

Foot, ground vehicle, or air patrols usually have a combination of four tasks: information gathering, investigation, supervision, and publicizing a presence. Of these, publicizing a presence requires some explanation. In this context, it means making the military or civilians in the area aware that a peacekeeping force exists and will monitor and report any sign of deterioration or potential threat to the peace. The visible presence of the peacekeeping force is intended to generate confidence among the local populace and to deter those who seek to promote violence.

Patrolling may be confined to daylight hours in areas in which armed confrontations continue to occur. When limited visibility makes identification difficult, the front line troops of the opposing sides may be nervous and apt to fire without hesitation. Even so, the peacekeeping force's mandate may require the commander to send out patrols in these conditions. The procedures and ground rules under which patrols operate must be clearly defined and known by all, including the opposing armed forces.

Investigation of Complaints

A primary peacekeeping task is investigation of complaints or allegations. The peacekeeper's ability to make a thorough and objective investigation and a fair assessment may determine whether fighting resumes and tensions increase. It will enhance the impartial image of the peacekeeper in the minds of the antagonists. Inevitably, a decision which favors one side does not please the other. However, if the peacekeeper is fair, objective, and consistent, the antagonists may grumble, but they will respect and accept the peacekeeper's judgments. The peacekeeper should always remember that there are two or more sides involved, and that it is his duty to listen to all sides before making a decision.

Negotiation and Mediation

Negotiation and mediation are diplomatic activities. They are the concern of governments and experienced diplomats. They demand a political rather then a military approach. In peacekeeping, however, situations arise which require military personnel to negotiate, mediate, and perhaps arbitrate disputes. These may involve minor points of contention between the belligerents or disagreements concerning the daily routines of the peacekeeping force.

The success of the effort depends on the peacekeeper's personality, power of reasoning, persuasiveness, common sense, tact, and patience. Of these, tact and patience are the most important. The unaccustomed role of peacekeeper can be exhausting and frustrating. Once the peacekeeper gains the confidence of the parties involved, he may act as a mediator; his good offices can then effect solutions. To the extent that the peacekeeper can resolve minor problems at the lowest level, he can prevent major issues from arising and the purposes of the peacekeeping mission are served. Nevertheless, peacekeeping force personnel must remain aware of their limitations. They must not hesitate to refer problems to the peacekeeping command when they are beyond their ability to resolve. The peacekeeper's reputation for objectivity and a good relationship with all parties in the dispute are fundamental to his success as a negotiator.

Information Gathering

Belligerent parties may perceive information gathering as a hostile act. Intelligence operations may therefore destroy the trust which the parties should have in the peacekeeping force. However, it is reasonable to assume that the parties will pursue their divergent aims by exploiting the presence of the peacekeeping force. They may even attempt to deceive it from time to time. Circumstances may place the force under direct attack. Such attacks may come from one of the parties to the agreement, or from extremist elements acting independently. This poses a serious problem; but, whatever the circumstances, the peacekeeper needs information. If the peacekeeper cannot use the full range of his national intelligence resources, he must at a minimum have their products.

Every item of operational information becomes important. The members of a peacekeeping force have to be information-conscious at all times. The peacekeeper must

remain constantly alert to what takes place around him and to any change or inconsistency in the behavior, attitude, and activities of the military and civilian populace.

Implied Tasks

The mandate or changing circumstances may require the peacekeeper to undertake additional tasks. These can include clearing mines, marking forward limits of each side's military forces, and seeking and receiving the remains of soldiers killed in action.

Mines or unexploded ordnance may litter the battlefield after opposing forces have withdrawn. Mine clearing may then become a priority for peacekeeping forces. Engineer requirements must be considered in the peacekeeping force structure negotiations. Mine clearing tasks may fall to the ordinary soldier if sufficient engineer assets are not available. Soldiers serving with peacekeeping forces should know the techniques for clearing mines and for handling the necessary equipment.

The recovery of remains is often a part of any disengagement mission. Soldiers should appreciate the delicate nature of the operation and respect relevant religious customs and rites. Searches for remains require careful planning and discussion with all involved parties.

ADMINISTRATION

When peacekeeping operations are approved, DOD designates a service to be executive agent for the specific operation. The executive agent provides administrative, personnel, operational, and logistic support. It also provides command, control, and communications (C3) support for committed US military forces. It may also assist forces of other nations when such support is in accord with diplomatic agreement.

Peacekeeping demands a flexible administrative system because of the complex administrative problems the force will face. Much of the basis for this system lies in three key administrative documents: terms of reference, letters of instruction (LOIs), and area handbooks. The next several paragraphs discuss these documents and their importance to peacekeeping operations.

Terms of Reference

The executive agent publishes TOR, which describe how the United States will implement its portion of the peacekeeping operation. These TOR describe—

- The mission.
- Command relationships.
- Organization.
- Logistics support.
- Accounting procedures.
- Responsibilities of the US contingent to the peacekeeping force.
- Coordination and liaison arrangements.

They may also describe public affairs procedures and any bilateral relationship with other national contingents in addition to those described in the mandate.

Letters of Instruction

Letters of instruction are prepared by the major organization tasked with providing units and elements for the US peacekeeping force contingent. LOIs reflect the information contained in the TOR that governs US military participation in the

peacekeeping operation. LOIs furnish information and guidance to units for preparation, deployment, and execution of the mission. Each LOI should contain information on the topics discussed in the following paragraphs.

Organization and Equipment.

Diplomatic negotiations determine the size and composition of the US contingent of the peacekeeping force. The organization of the force reflects any restrictions or special instructions on weapons and equipment.

Operations.

The LOI must specify the AO of the peacekeeping forces and types of operations that disputing factions are permitted. It designates responsibility for maintaining good order among the populace within the area; this responsibility may lie with peacekeeping forces or with the local police.

The principal responsibilities of the peacekeeping force are to—

- Maintain area surveillance.
- Observe area activities.
- Report findings.
- Oversee rectification of violations.

The force accomplishes these responsibilities through the use of checkpoints, observation posts (aerial and ground), and sector control centers.

Intelligence.

The LOI provides intelligence on the people, armed forces, topography, and climate in the AO. Area studies, area handbooks, and intelligence products from recent operations and incidents in the area are vital sources of information.

Personnel.

The LOI gives information on personnel and administrative procedures to prepare individuals and units for deployment in the AO. For example, it may specify that postal services and legal assistance should continue throughout peacekeeping operation, and that uniforms should carry special identifying insignia.

Logistics.

Logistic support may come from several sources identified in the LOI. Primary logistic support will come from a military logistic support unit under the control of the peacekeeping command. Civilian contractors may also provide support. Major items of equipment may accompany deploying units or the peacekeeping command may provide them in the AO. Units must have medical facilities and supplies in the AO; medical evacuation channels and evacuation procedures should also be established.

Public Affairs.

The LOI establishes procedures for the release of information to the public about the peacekeeping operation. It also gives guidance on public information and command information activities and support.

Finance.

The LOI details financial support procedures for the peacekeeping operation. It specifies the finance services available to personnel in the AO.

Air Operations.

The LOI provides information and guidance for the conduct of air operations. The peacekeeping command and contingents of other nations providing forces may provide such support.

NBC Defense.

The LOI addresses NBC requirements, including individual protective clothing and equipment; detection, warning, monitoring, sampling and survey equipment; medical treatment materials and facilities; and decontamination materials and equipment available in the AO.

Command Relationships.

The LOI specifies the relationships of US military peacekeeping units, elements, and individuals with each other and with the military peacekeeping command. It also specifies the relationships with the parent organization and the unified command responsible for the area.

Communications and Electronics

The LOI establishes guidelines and responsibilities for installation and operation of the communications network for the US contingent. It outlines the network within the AO and its interface with US elements outside the area.

Area Handbooks

All personnel serving with peacekeeping forces receive an area handbook. This handbook contains information on the peacekeeping organization, the history and culture of the people, the terrain, the weather, and the local armed forces. It may provide graphic information on the insignia, markings, and identifying characteristics of armed forces, military weapons, and equipment. (Appendix F provides an outline that may be followed in the preparation of an area handbook.)

PEACEKEEPING VERSUS PEACEMAKING

Situations may arise which require deployment of US military forces to impose peace. These operations are often labeled peacekeeping, but are better described as peacemaking. Peacemaking missions differ greatly in execution from peacekeeping missions. While the ultimate objective may be to maintain a peace, the initial phase in peacemaking is to achieve it. The significance of the difference is that peacemaking is often unilateral, possibly with some consent from the beneficiary, and the peacemaking force imposes it. The planning, deployment, and conduct of peacemaking operations are discussed in Chapter 5.

CHAPTER 5

Peacetime Contingency Operations

> . . . to attain this end it is necessary to . . . avoid all passive and inflexible methods.
>
> **Mao Tse Tung**

This chapter discusses the principles of peacetime contingency operations. It lists certain operational considerations, and describes important types of operations and factors involved in their planning.

Peacetime contingency operations are politically sensitive military activities normally characterized by short-term, rapid projection or employment of forces in conditions short of war. They are often undertaken in crisis avoidance or crisis management situations requiring the use of military instruments to enforce or support diplomatic initiatives. Peacetime contingency operations include, but are not limited to—

- Shows of force and demonstrations.
- Noncombatant evacuation operations.
- Rescue and recovery operations.
- Strikes and raids.
- Peacemaking.
- Unconventional warfare.
- Disaster relief.
- Security assistance surges.
- Support to US civil authorities.

Military efforts in peacetime contingency operations complement political and informational initiatives. This distinguishes peacetime contingency operations from contingency operations in war, which are often conducted for purely military objectives. Clear command relationships and communications procedures must be established by agreement, because the lead organization varies according to the type of mission. An understanding of these matters is necessary to ensure smooth coordination of the effort.

Peacetime contingency operations are politically and time sensitive. They use tailored forces, are usually short in duration, and joint or combined in scope. Military forces employed in peacetime contingency operations will normally use service-specific tactical doctrine or joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) in the execution of their mission. A basic tenet is to rapidly project military forces consistent with the factors of METT-T in order to bring the contingency to an immediate close under conditions favorable to the United States. The forces employed should be chosen from designated contingency forces who have planned and trained to execute these types of operations. The time available will rarely allow any other forces to train to the required standard necessary for the successful conduct of the operation.

PRINCIPLES

Three principles are uniquely important to peacetime contingency operations—coordination, balance, and planning for uncertainty.

Coordination

The military forces cooperate with other government and private agencies to manage sensitive situations. For example, the military provides advice to other participating agencies on the capabilities and limitations of its resources. Military public affairs officers provide background briefings to the news media. They arrange for journalist pools, explain operational security requirements and encourage cooperation with them.

Balance

Military commanders must consider both the combat readiness of their troops and the volatile environment in which they function. This requires a balance of required and specialized training of forces and political awareness within the chain of command. The commander must provide for the security of his force within the constraints of the unique ROE and the political sensitivity of each situation. Since national policy goals determine military requirements and military force composition, the commander requires clearly stated objectives and operational parameters in order to balance his security needs with national policies. A balance must be struck between political goals and the scale, intensity, and nature of military operations supporting those goals.

Planning for Uncertainty

Situations filled with uncertainty require detailed but flexible planning, incorporating the principles of coordination and balance. This requires a full awareness of the political and social realities of the area in dispute. In such cases, logistic and intelligence support planning must be comprehensive.

OPERATIONAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Commanders give particular attention to the following areas in the planning and execution of peacetime contingency operations:

- All-source intelligence.
- Command and control.
- PSYOP, civil affairs, and public affairs plans.
- Logistics support.
- Other constraints.

All-Source Intelligence

Success requires proper intelligence preparation of the battlefield. All available collection assets focus on the priority intelligence requirements of the mission. Planners must anticipate requirements and prepare useful products capable of rapid updating.

Types of information which must be readily available include—

- Accurate maps.
- Dispositions and order of battle of all forces, both friendly and hostile.
- Area-specific factors (including cultural values which impact on target selection or conduct of the operation.)
- City plans with complete details of utilities.
- Personality profiles of local officials.
- Details of specific ports, airports, roads, and bridges.

Command and Control

The unified CINCs and their component commands are best able to plan and execute peacetime contingency operations along established command lines. This ensures that the commander who plans the mission executes it, thus avoiding unnecessary confusion.

As the senior military commander within the theater, the CINC is responsible for all US military activities within his area of responsibility (AOR) and, in this capacity, he determines other US departments and agencies with which he must interface. Regularized relationships with these agencies in peacetime facilitate the conduct of all contingency operations. The ambassador is the President's personal representative in each country. CINCs develop close personal relationships with each ambassador and country team in their AORs. It is imperative that CINCs plan contingency operations in full cooperation with the ambassador and country team to ensure that all military actions support US interests.

Peacetime contingency operations are normally undertaken during crisis situations. The unified CINCs and their component commands, therefore, plan and conduct them using established crisis action procedures. The CINCs, JCS, services and other agencies practice these procedures during exercises to ensure that the system will be responsive when required in actual situations. The procedures are flexible and respond to the demands of rapidly changing situations. The commander tailors his force by task organizing and obtaining augmentation for specific capability requirements. For additional information on crisis action procedures, see JCS Pub 5-02.4.

Special command and control considerations may arise because SOF teams under the control of the CINC's Joint Special Operations Command operate far from their parent commands while supporting the needs of the ambassador and his country team. In these instances, military and diplomatic authorities must arrange for their support, plan for their extraction if they become at risk, and determine whose control they would revert to during a contingency operation.

PSYOP, Civil Affairs, and Public Affairs Programs

PSYOP, civil affairs, and public affairs programs can exploit enemy vulnerabilities and target audiences whose support is crucial. They are suited to both short-term and longer-term involvements. To be effective in short-notice operations, these programs require continuous preparation, regional expertise, and consistent coordination between civilian and military authorities.

Logistics Support

Logistics support plays an important role in peacetime contingency operations. Logistical requirements may dominate the mission and place extraordinary demands on support forces. The missions are likely to begin on short notice, under unique circumstances, and in austere environments. Typically, the numbers and types of available aircraft and ships will be limited. Planners must include comprehensive logistical support packages in peacetime contingency operations.

Other Constraints

The United States conducts peacetime contingency operations for specific, limited purposes. Their scope must be closely defined and targets and areas of operations specifically designated. The most prominent expressions of these constraints are found in the statement of the mission and the rules of engagement (ROE). Commanders must clearly communicate ROE to their forces in orders and in their statements of intent. The NCA determine the criteria for the use of tactical forces in peacetime. The mission, threat, and US, domestic, and international laws shape each operation. Host nations and other countries can also impose constraints affecting force deployments. This environment requires the utmost patience, training, and dedication of the force. Protecting the force while observing the restrictive ROE that typify LIC place great demands on leadership.

CHAPTER 5

TYPES OF OPERATIONS

A discussion of the major types of peacetime contingency operations follows.

Shows of Force and Demonstrations

Forces deployed abroad lend credibility to a nation's promises and commitments, increase its regional influence, and demonstrate its resolve to use military force as an instrument of national power. In addition, the NCA orders shows of force or demonstrations to bolster and reassure friends and allies. These operations can influence another government or political-military organization to respect US interests or to enforce international law. Examples include—

- Forward deployment of military forces.
- Combined training exercises.
- Aircraft and ship visits.
- The introduction or buildup of military forces in a region.

The mission of shows of force and demonstrations must be well defined and clearly understood. An effective show of force must be demonstrably mission-capable and sustainable. The requirements for sustainment are adequate C3, intelligence, interdepartmental and international liaison, and ready and responsive forces. Logistical arrangements for these operations should be the same as if the mission were to be accomplished by the use of force.

Political concerns dominate shows of force and demonstrations. Military forces conduct these operations within delicate legal and political constraints. The political will to employ actual force—should a demonstration of it fail—is vital to the success of these operations. Actual combat is not their goal. The force coordinates its operations with the country team or teams. Prior to commitment, the chain of command should certify that the force understands the national purpose, ROE, and inherent risks of the operation.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

Noncombatant evacuation operations relocate threatened civilian noncombatants from locations in a foreign or host nation. These operations normally involve US citizens whose lives are in danger. They may also include selected host nation natives and third country nationals.

Under ideal circumstances, there should be little or no opposition to an evacuation; however, commanders should anticipate possible hostilities. In the LIC environment, this type of operation usually involves swift insertion of a force and temporary occupation of an objective followed by a planned rapid withdrawal. It uses only the force required for self-defense and the protection of the evacuees.

Military, political, or other emergencies in any country may require evacuation of designated personnel as the situation deteriorates. The Department of State will initiate requests for military assistance and obtain necessary clearances from other governments. This assistance can include basing and overflight authorizations, and the use of facilities essential to performing the evacuation.

If he anticipates trouble, the chief of the US diplomatic mission should direct the early withdrawal of dependents and nonessential personnel by ordinary transport. If this has already occurred, only a minimum number of personnel will normally require emergency military evacuation. Thorough planning will ensure that US, host nation, and

international media understand the intent of the operation. This enhances security and the dissemination of positive information.

The evacuation may take place in a benign environment, face a threat of violent opposition, or require combat action. The specific situation determines the type of evacuation required. The evacuation force commander has little influence over the local situation. He may not have the authority to preempt hostile actions by military measures; yet he must be prepared to defend the evacuation effort and provide protection for his forces. Thus, the key factor in noncombatant evacuation planning is a correct appraisal of the political-military environment in which the force will operate.

An understanding of the role and status of host nation security forces is important. Host nation resources can provide essential assistance to the operation. These politically sensitive operations are often monitored or controlled at the highest level. Diplomatic and legal restraints limit military actions to only those activities which permit the evacuation to proceed without hindrance. Care of civilians and the maintenance of order at the evacuation site will be the ground forces commander's responsibility.

Airlift operations demand close cooperation among the airlift control element, the ground forces commander, and the diplomatic mission. Aircraft commanders supporting the evacuation should coordinate flight information with the appropriate sovereign airspace authorities to the maximum extent possible. However, positive airspace control may be difficult and airspace control systems may be inadequate. In cases where sovereign authorities are unable or unwilling to either approve or deny clearance, individual aircraft commanders must operate at their own discretion, using caution proportionate to the circumstances to minimize risk. If no effective airspace control exists, the airlift commander should assume airspace control responsibilities and keep the diplomatic mission and ground forces advised on the progress of the airlift.

Commanders should remember that noncombatant evacuation operations can quickly turn into peacemaking or peacekeeping operations, and plan for these contingencies.

Rescue and Recovery Operations

Rescue and recovery operations are sophisticated actions requiring precise execution, especially when conducted in hostile countries. They may be clandestine or overt. They may include the rescue of US or friendly foreign nationals, and the location, identification, and recovery of sensitive equipment or items critical to US national security.

Hostile forces can oppose rescue and recovery operations. On the other hand, these operations may remain unopposed if the potentially hostile force is unaware of them or unable or unwilling to interfere. Stealth, surprise, speed, and the threat of overwhelming US force are some of the means available to overcome opposition. Rescue and recovery operations require timely intelligence, detailed planning, deception, swift execution, and extraordinary security measures. They usually involve highly trained special units, but they may also receive support from general purpose forces.

Strikes and Raids

The United States executes strikes and raids for specific purposes other than gaining or holding terrain. Strikes and raids can support rescue or recovery operations or destroy or seize equipment or facilities which demonstrably threaten national collective security interests. They can also support counter-drug operations by destroying narcotics

production or transshipment facilities or supporting a host government's actions in this regard. Strikes and raids are the most conventional of peacetime contingency operations. The principles of combat operations apply directly. The unified CINC normally plans and executes them.

Strikes are attacks by ground, air, and naval forces to damage or destroy high-value targets or to demonstrate the capability to do so. Raids are usually small-scale operations involving swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, seize an objective, or destroy targets. Strikes and raids end with a planned withdrawal. Successful strikes or raids can create situations which permit seizing and maintaining the political initiative.

In peacetime, the NCA approve strikes and raids. When commanders and their staffs plan these activities, they develop courses of action which meet ethical, legal, political, and technical feasibility criteria. Planners require precise, time-sensitive, all-source intelligence. They develop as many alternative courses of action as time and the situation permit. They carefully weigh each alternative. They must answer the following key planning questions:

- What is the strategic goal?
- What is the tactical objective?
- What resources are available?
- What are the constraints and restrictions?

Mission execution usually requires a tailored force operating against limited, specific objectives.

Target selection must be the product of careful analysis which fully understands the enemy's center of gravity, confirms its susceptibility to military action, and determines the appropriate military action. Common target characteristics are—

- Strategically significant objectives.
- Targets with high psychological value.
- Key personnel and facilities in hostile areas.

Commanders must weigh the psychological advantages and disadvantages of employing military force in these operations.

Strikes and raids are viable peacetime contingency operations. To be successful, they require the proper focus of planning, organization, training, and equipment. Because of inherent time constraints, these contingency operations need a dedicated, permanent planning cell able to build precise, well-conceived mission plans. Planning cell personnel will require security clearances to all pertinent intelligence data and operational estimates. Cell members must understand unit capabilities and be fully qualified in their areas of expertise. The planning cell serves as the liaison and weapons system planners for the JTF. Written and rehearsed operations and contingency plans can serve as starting points for planning. A streamlined chain of command is an essential organizational requirement for a strike or raid. This chain of command emphasizes responsibility and accountability from the first moment of initial planning to the final moment of mission completion. Command and control requirements for strikes and raids in contingency operations are monitored from much higher levels than during conventional war because of the high political impact of the operation. Tactical operational responsibility and authority remains with the designated task force commander.

Time permitting, strike force personnel should fully rehearse all strikes and raids. The key elements in determining the level of detail and the opportunities for rehearsal

available prior to mission execution are time, operational security, and the need for deception. To the fullest extent possible, commanders should disguise rehearsals by conducting them along with routine training. Commanders must introduce support specialists into strikes and raids during the initial planning stages. They must identify these specialists well in advance of operations.

Peacemaking

The United States conducts peacemaking operations with its military forces when it is in the national interest to stop a violent conflict and to force a return to political and diplomatic methods. The United States typically undertakes peacemaking operations at the request of appropriate national authorities in a foreign state or to protect US citizens as part of an international, multilateral, or unilateral operation. The peacemaking force does not represent a wholly disinterested power or such a drastic commitment would not be made. However, the interests of the country or countries which provide forces for these operations are best served by a cessation of violence and a negotiated settlement.

The long-range goals of a peacemaking operation are often unclear; therefore, these operations are best terminated by prompt withdrawal after a settlement is reached, or by rapid transition to a peacekeeping operation (see Chapter 4). Unless the peacemaking force has the necessary power, both military and political, to compel a lasting settlement, it may find itself attempting to govern in the face of opposition from both parties. Extrication from such a situation may be difficult and the force may leave the area having made the situation worse than it was before it intervened.

The political complexities of peacemaking require that the available force be sufficient, but its use be applied with discretion. ROE are apt to be restrictive because the purpose of the force is to establish and maintain law and order. Political considerations influence the size and composition of the force more than operational requirements. The commander must prepare himself to deal with pressures to depart from sound military practice. He may have to adjust his operations to reconcile the conflicting demands of political considerations, mission accomplishment, and protection of the force. The commander uses PSYOP, intelligence, communication, and maneuver to achieve a decisive concentration of power at the critical time and place.

The mission requires that the forces be appropriate to the environment. The commander must understand the constraints and political sensitivities of this environment and should recognize that local law and customs will often influence his actions. Peacemaking is difficult and unusual. It requires—

- Consistent mission analysis.
- Clear command and control relationships.
- Effective communications facilities.
- Joint and combined force liaison.
- Effective public diplomacy and PSYOP.

Unconventional Warfare

Unconventional warfare is a series of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled, or politically sensitive territory across the conflict spectrum. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, and other operations of a low visibility, covert, or clandestine nature. UW may be prosecuted singly or collectively by predominantly indigenous personnel, is usually supported by external sources, and can occur during all conditions

of war or peace. US military support to UW operations can include the use of both SOF and general purpose forces, for example, CSS support for guerrillas. Unlike most peacetime contingency operations, UW is usually a long-term effort.

Techniques and tactics for certain UW operations are similar to those employed in support for insurgencies. However, support for insurgency differs from that for UW. Insurgency accomplishes strategic aims directly; UW often supports larger campaigns, typically conventional campaigns. The difference is significant because it affects the operational and strategic design of these operations. For example, operations in support of insurgency give priority to infrastructure and political development, while UW emphasizes military actions.

Disaster Relief

Disaster relief operations provide emergency assistance to victims of natural or manmade disasters abroad. They are responses to requests for immediate help and rehabilitation from foreign governments or international agencies. They may include refugee assistance, food programs, medical treatment and care or other civilian welfare programs.

In the LIC environment, disasters can worsen an already unstable situation. When properly orchestrated, US participation in disaster relief can have significant, positive effects. The military can provide the logistic support to move supplies to remote areas, extract or evacuate victims as needed, provide emergency communications or conduct direct medical support operations.

Military elements involved in disaster relief operations have various missions. They assess the damage, the extent of the disaster, and the host nation's ability to deal with the emergency. They execute assistance programs developed by the Department of State or US Agency for International Development. Army CS and CSS as well as Air Force CS units play major roles in these operations. Combat arms units can provide additional support, if needed.

Security Assistance Surges

The United States accelerates security assistance when a friendly or allied nation faces imminent threat. In these surges, operations usually focus on logistical support. Geography, the magnitude of the logistics effort, and time limitations determine airlift and sealift requirements. US support to Chad in the early 1980s and to Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War illustrate this type of peacetime contingency operation. Geographical limitations, compounded by political constraints, forced the use of airlift and ground transportation in Chad. The Yom Kippur War demonstrated the importance of airlift in the initial stages of conflict, and the follow-on strength of sealift. These examples illustrate principles which numerous, less-visible, security assistance surge operations in Thailand, Korea, and El Salvador have reinforced.

Support to US Civil Authority

Support to US civil authority includes those activities carried out by military forces in support of federal and state officials under, and limited by, the *Posse Comitatus* Act and other laws and regulations. Congress and the courts traditionally view requirements for military support in civilian domestic affairs as situation-specific. They generally restrict military support to situations involving disaster assistance, civil disorder, threats to federal property, and other emergency situations. Congress has also defined drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and customs violations as threats to national security warranting military operations.

Military forces may be involved in a variety of actions taken to detect, disrupt, interdict, and destroy illicit drugs and the infrastructure (personnel, materiel, and distribution systems) of illicit drug trafficking entities. Such actions will always be in support of one or more governmental agencies such as the Coast Guard, Customs Service, Border Patrol of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of State, or the Drug Enforcement Agency.

Military support to counter-drug operations can include—

- Mobile training teams.
- Offshore training.
- Advisory personnel.
- Logistic support (materiel, maintenance, resupply, and transportation).
- Civic action.
- Informational, detection and surveillance operations.
- Intelligence support.

When military forces are employed as a unit in a counter-drug mission, that operation assumes the characteristics of a traditional conventional military operation. In those instances, military forces will be under the control of a unified CINC.

APPENDIX A

Foreign Assistance in Low Intensity Conflict

This appendix discusses US foreign assistance programs and the role they play in foreign internal defense. It stresses the special qualities required of US military personnel assigned foreign assistance and security assistance responsibilities. Foreign internal defense may be conducted either unilaterally or through collective security arrangements with other supporting nations.

ORGANIZATION

Military commanders must understand the political ramifications and complexity of military activities in LIC. The LIC-related tasks that commanders execute often evolve from foreign assistance programs. The activities within these programs range from disaster relief measures to economic and military assistance. It is important, therefore, to have an overview of US foreign assistance organizations and collective security agencies and their responsibilities.

Direction and Coordination Agencies

The agencies that direct and coordinate US foreign assistance programs are—

- The Department of State.
- The National Security Council.
- The Central Intelligence Agency.
- The United States Information Agency.

Department of State.

The President has assigned the Secretary of State the authority and responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of US interdepartmental activities overseas. This includes continuous supervision and direction of the overall foreign assistance program. Figure A-1 shows the major Department of State elements through which the Secretary of State exercises this responsibility. Elements responsible for security assistance functions are discussed under "Security Assistance Agencies" below.

The Inspector General of Foreign Assistance is responsible to the Secretary in matters relating to the effectiveness of US foreign assistance programs, Peace Corps programs, and Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) activities. The Inspector General's office inspects these programs, makes recommendations to the head of the agency concerned, and reviews any subsequent changes.

Five assistant secretaries direct the geographic bureaus responsible for US foreign affairs regional activities. They advise the Secretary of State on the formulation of US policies toward the countries within their jurisdictions. They also direct, coordinate, and supervise interdepartmental and interagency matters for these regions.

Country directors within each of the bureaus set policy guidelines for their assigned countries and coordinate outside their bureau for country-related issues. Country directors are the focal point for serving the needs of US diplomatic missions. They work closely

with Department of State representatives overseas to administer and implement foreign assistance programs.



Figure A-1. **Department of State Organizations for Foreign Assistance.**

National Security Council.

Congress created the National Security Council in 1947 as a mechanism to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies

relating to national security. Additional purposes of the NSC include making recommendations to the President on the basis of—

- The assessment and appraisal of the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to its actual and potential military power.
- A consideration of all government policies concerned with national security.

Congress subsequently amended the National Security Act of 1947 by directing the President to establish the Board for Low Intensity Conflict within the NSC. Composed of representatives from all key US government agencies, the board considers, formulates, recommends, and orchestrates US policy and strategy for LIC to and on behalf of the President.

Central Intelligence Agency.

The CIA coordinates the intelligence activities of other US departments and agencies in the interest of both collective and national security. The CIA—

- Advises the NSC on matters concerning intelligence activities of all governmental departments and agencies which concern national security.
- Recommends policy to the NSC to coordinate national security-related intelligence activities of governmental departments and agencies.
- Correlates and evaluates intelligence related to national security, and appropriately disseminates it within the government.
- Conducts special activities approved by the President. Executive Order No. 12333 (4 December 1981) directs that in peacetime, no US agency except the CIA may conduct any special activity unless the President determines through a finding that another agency is more likely to achieve the objective. The armed forces may conduct these activities without a presidential determination only when war has been declared by Congress or during any period covered by a report from the President to the Congress in compliance with the War Powers Resolution (WPR).
- Performs additional services when directed by the President.

United States Information Agency.

The USIA supports US foreign policy objectives by influencing public attitudes in other nations. It also advises the President, his representatives abroad, and various departments and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated US policies, programs, and official statements. The USIA uses various media and methods to encourage constructive public support abroad for policy objectives, and to report the facts concerning hostile attempts to distort or frustrate US policies.

Developmental, Humanitarian, and Civil Assistance

The United States Agency For International Development manages US developmental, humanitarian, and civic assistance activities. It supervises and gives general direction on all nonmilitary assistance programs under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Public Law 480, and similar legislation. The USAID plans and implements overseas programs to improve economic and social conditions.

The USAID administers humanitarian and civic assistance programs in conjunction with the Department of Agriculture. Under arrangements made with USAID, US affiliates of international voluntary agencies conduct most of the food programs under Public Law 480. Although USAID is concerned primarily with developmental assistance and humanitarian and civic assistance, some of the programs it administers are security

related. The USAID representative in the host nation fully coordinates these programs with the DOD representative.

Security Assistance Agencies

The chief agencies involved in US security assistance activities are—

- The Department of State.
- The Department of Defense.
- The US diplomatic mission.

Department of State.

The Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology coordinates policy, plans, and programs of all departments and agencies involved in security assistance activities, including NSC, DOD, Department of State, USAID, CIA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of Management and Budget, and the Department of Treasury. Representatives of these agencies bring issues concerning security assistance to the attention of the primary decision makers. Decisions concerning funding levels for military assistance and military-related economic support are made by the Under Secretary of State, in agreement with the above-mentioned departments and agencies. Coordination encourages mutually supporting programs and increases the efficiency of the security assistance program. Although subordinate to the deputy secretary of state, he has direct access to the secretary of state for security assistance matters. The Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs also advises the secretary of state on issues and policy problems relating to defense and foreign policy. US diplomatic missions in allied and friendly countries develop and implement US collective security programs. The diplomatic chief leads the mission. He normally is a US ambassador and works under policy guidance and instructions from the Secretary of State.

Department of Defense.

The DOD assists selected countries in maintaining their internal security. The DOD aims to help these nations achieve a proper balance in their military capabilities to meet external and internal threats. Figure A-2 shows DOD organizations for security assistance.

The Department of Defense exercises its security assistance functions through the following staff organizations:

- Under secretary of defense for policy.
- Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA).
- Unified commands.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Service component commands.
- Security assistance organizations.
- Foreign internal defense (FID) augmentation forces.
- Military departments.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy serves as the principal adviser and assistant to the Secretary of Defense for all matters concerned with the integration of DOD plans and policies into overall national security objectives. He exercises direction,



Figure A-2. **DOD Organizations for Security Assistance.**

authority, and control over the Defense Security Assistance Agency. The DSAA is a DOD agency. The DSAA—

- Administers and supervises security assistance planning and programs.
- Formulates and executes security assistance programs in coordination with other governmental agencies.
- Conducts international logistics and sales negotiations with foreign countries.
- Manages the credit financing program.
- Serves as the DOD focal point for liaison with US industry concerning security assistance activities.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff play a key role in the US security assistance effort. They assist in this effort through the joint planning process. Key JCS plans are the joint strategic planning document (with its supporting analysis), the joint strategic capabilities plan, the joint security assistance memorandum, and the joint intelligence estimate for planning. In addition, the JCS continually review current and ongoing programs for specific countries and regions to ensure compatibility with US global security interests.

All military-related security assistance guidance, plans, and programs formulated at the national level are referred to the JCS for review. The JCS ensure that directives and

communications pertaining to military assistance do not inadvertently circumvent or ignore force objectives, strategic concepts, and military plans. The JCS also fully coordinate program recommendations from SAOs and unified commands to ensure consistency with US global security plans.

The under secretary of state for security assistance, science, and technology chairs an interagency review committee, the Arms Transfer Management Group, which manages and coordinates security assistance matters. It includes representatives from agencies throughout the executive branch who deal in security assistance matters. It includes representatives from the NSC, DOD, JCS, Department of State, USAID, CIA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of Management and Budget, and the Department of the Treasury. These representatives bring issues concerning security assistance to the attention of primary decision makers. The group coordinates military assistance and military-related supporting assistance. This coordination encourages mutually supporting programs and increases their efficiency.

Chiefs of US Diplomatic Missions

The CINC appoints a contact officer to represent his interests in each country. The contact officer works with both the diplomatic mission and the host nation military forces.

The role of the CINC is critical in LIC. He advises the JCS on significant events in his AO. His perspective is both regional, and country-specific. He focuses on the operational level of conflict. He identifies and applies necessary resources to achieve US strategic and foreign policy goals in his region. When employed properly and in a timely fashion, these resources minimize the likelihood of US combat involvement.

The service component commands participate in the security assistance planning process, especially in training matters. They have a large role in executing and managing all relevant programs.

The SAO manages DOD security assistance functions in a friendly or allied country. It oversees all foreign-based DOD elements in that country with security assistance responsibilities.

The SAO may be known in-country by any number of names according to the number of persons assigned, to the functions performed, or to the desires of the host nation. Typical SAO designations include "joint US military advisory group" and "joint US military group," "US military training mission," "defense field office," or "office of defense cooperation." In countries where the US has no SAO, another member of the mission has the responsibilities for security assistance; for example, the defense attache or a Foreign Service officer.

The SAO is a joint organization. Its chief is essentially responsible to three authorities: the ambassador (who heads up the country team and controls all US civilian and military personnel in country), the CINC of the unified command, and the director of the DSAA. The ambassador has operational control of the SAO for all matters affecting his diplomatic mission, including security assistance programs. Unified CINCs, on the other hand, command and supervise SAOs within their operational theaters in matters which are not the ambassador's responsibility.

The United States tailors each SAO to the needs of its host nation; for this reason, there is no typical or standard SAO organization. However, a large SAO normally has Army,

Navy, and Air Force sections. Each of these is responsible for accomplishing its service portion of security assistance activities. A small SAO has divisions by function but no separate service sections. Figure A-3 depicts a SAO with service sections and one with a functional alignment.

The primary functions of security assistance personnel are logistics management, fiscal management, and contract administration of country security assistance programs. Security assistance personnel—

- Maintain liaison with host government defense establishments.
- Operate with the host nation's military, primarily at the national level, to interpret US policies, to resolve problems in materiel delivery, and to obtain technical assistance for defective materiel.



Figure A-3. **Typical Security Assistance Organizations.**

- Provide host governments with information necessary to make decisions concerning the acquisition and use of defense articles and services. (These services include training under the auspices of US security assistance programs.)
- Obtain information to evaluate the host-nation military's capability to employ and maintain the equipment requested.
- Process security assistance proposals of foreign governments.
- Maintain a continuing dialogue with host nation defense officials on military matters such as the threat and host nation military capabilities.

The SAO can provide limited advisory and training assistance from its own resources. This assistance can, however, be expanded when the SAO is augmented by survey teams, MTTs, TAFTs, TATs, and other such teams and organizations placed under the direction and supervision of the local chief of the US diplomatic mission.

An MTT provides the host nation a self-training capability in a particular skill. It trains selected host nation personnel who then constitute an instructional base for continuing the training.

The programmed length of deployment of an MTT is for less than a six-month period. The MTT capabilities are mission-specific. Under most circumstances, the MTT operates directly under the control of an SAO. A specific command and control element accompanies the MTT when the mission requires it.

Documents describing SAO responsibilities and functions include DOD Directive 5132.3 and DOD Manual 5105.38. The directive provides broad guidance on the functions and responsibilities of the SAO. It constitutes the basic TOR for all DOD organizations assigned security assistance responsibilities. The manual sets forth responsibilities, policies, and procedures governing the administration of security assistance programs. It is the basic program management manual. DOD Directive 2055.3 prescribes requirements for the selection and training of security assistance personnel.

In addition to using these basic references, the chief, SAO, may draft supplemental instructions for a specific country. He coordinates them with the chief of mission, submits them to the unified commander and JCS for comment, and sends them to the DOD for approval.

Thus framed, these TOR provide guidance regarding the SAO's mission, command relationships, organization, administration, logistical support, and functions. The SAO may modify them as the requirements change.

Foreign internal defense augmentation forces can augment SAOs. They support operations in situations that range from conditions short of open hostility to limited or general war. They may locate strategically and vary in size and capabilities according to theater requirements. US military services may assign forces to the FIDAF from those already within the region, or from forces based in the United States.

The FIDAF consists of a headquarters element that may be joint or uniservice, as required. It also may include CA, PSYOP, combat, CS, and CSS elements tailored to requirements (see Figure A-4). Though limited in depth and sustainability, elements of the FIDAF can provide the government a wide range of advice and assistance on counterinsurgency activities and techniques.

The FIDAF headquarters element includes a CMO officer, who has staff responsibility for CA and PSYOP. The following are special staff element members—the surgeon, staff



Figure A-4. **Type of Foreign Internal Defense Augmentation Force**

judge advocate, chemical officer, communications-electronics officer, engineer, public affairs officer, comptroller, and chaplain. Combat, CS, and CSS elements also provide special staff officers when they are assigned or attached to the FIDAF.

The CA unit of the FIDAF provides assistance and advice to US and host-nation officials, agencies, and military forces to strengthen the host nation's developmental posture. The CA unit reflects the requirements of the FIDAF.

The PSYOP unit provides training, advice, and operational assistance to other FIDAF elements and the host nation's military forces to strengthen the host nation's PSYOP programs. It also assists a SAO or US civil agency in the host nation. The specific requirements of the assistance operation determine the organization and numbers of teams.

The combat, CS, and CSS elements provide the remaining expertise and experience to advise, train, and assist the host nation's military combat units and staffs within the context of security assistance requirements. When specifically empowered by competent authority, CS elements may include military police sections.

Deployment considerations for the FIDAF rest on the concept of employing MTTs and small detachments to fulfill specific mission requests in a designated time period. Visits to the host nation by FIDAF representatives before deployment are beneficial; the representatives should request them whenever possible. Visiting personnel gather

information concerning the anticipated mission, organization, concept of operations, control, and logistical support, including personal services available in the host nation. They do this to prepare the force adequately and to ensure its success upon arrival in country.

In most cases, the resources available to the SAO through US military or civilian agencies may be adequate to support small elements of the FIDAF with the administrative, legal, and health services they need; this requires proper coordination. Many of these services may draw on embassy assets and will require a Department of State support agreement.

Transportation and maintenance requirements also are important in planning. Using in-country transportation and other resources is preferable to establishing additional US support activities for short-term operations. After-action reports of prior MTT missions can assist other teams in the same area.

The flexibility of organization and the wide range of skills available in the FIDAF provide the CINC with forces to augment the capability of the SAO temporarily in a country faced with an externally supported insurgency. The FIDAF can repeatedly deploy its personnel into a country for short periods, providing advice, assistance, and continuity to specific, monitored programs. The CINC may locate the nucleus of the FIDAF out of country where administration, logistics, and planning and operations can support in-country efforts.

The role of the military departments resembles that of the regional component commands. The departments play an even larger role in the planning phase and in the execution of materiel-related programs. They develop, negotiate, and execute agreements. They provide advice on matters such as costs, availability, and lead time on military equipment and training. In this way, they ensure delivery of materiel and services. The departments also provide necessary resources and administrative support to move assets to recipients.

US Diplomatic Mission.

The US diplomatic mission to a host nation includes representatives of all US departments and agencies physically present in the country. The President gives the chief of the diplomatic mission, normally an ambassador, immediate "direction and control" over US in-country government personnel. This does not include personnel in another mission or those assigned to an international agency or to a unified CINC, including their subordinate elements. The in-country SAO is an exception to this latter rule.

The chief of mission ensures that all in-country activities best serve US interests as well as regional and international objectives. He promotes positive program direction by seeing that all activities are necessary, are efficiently and economically administered, and are effectively interrelated. The country team, illustrated in Figure A-5, is the chief of mission's major tool to fulfill these responsibilities.

The country team concept denotes the process of in-country, interdepartmental coordination among key members of the US diplomatic mission. This concept of embassy management developed in the early 1950s. In 1974, the term received its first official mention in Public Law 93-475.



Figure A-5. **The Country Team.**

The composition of a country team varies widely, depending on the desires of the chief of mission, on the in-country situation, and on the number and levels of US departments and agencies present. The principal military members of the country team are the defense attache and the chief of the SAO. Although a US area military commander (the CINC or his subordinate) is not a member of the diplomatic mission, he often participates in meetings of the country team.

The team coordinates many activities under the CINC's control because of their political and military implications. This coordination ensures continuity of effort and eliminates politically counterproductive initiatives.

US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

The majority of US programs for developing nations are economic, political, and humanitarian in nature. Some foreign assistance, however, does take the form of selected military programs. How developing nations resolve their social, economic, political, and military problems influences the prospects for a stable world order. Ultimately, how the

problems are resolved impacts—for good or ill—on the security and economic well-being of the United States.

The presence of a LIC situation does not determine the level or scope of foreign assistance to individual countries. Nevertheless, the programs discussed below provide the mechanisms through which the United States may render foreign assistance.

Developmental Assistance Programs

Selected nations receive US developmental assistance primarily for economic and social reasons. This assistance can result in improved security, and direct and immediate relief of human suffering. Humanitarian and civic assistance helps a nation's development as much as assistance in security matters. Developmental assistance programs are administered by USAID.

The progressive goals of developmental assistance are fundamentally long-term; they are achieved slowly. Developmental assistance can—

- Support political, economic, and social progress.
- Increase agricultural and industrial production.
- Educate and train people.
- Help prevent population growth from outrunning economic growth.
- Build lasting institutions.
- Reduce economic disparities.
- Promote wider distribution of the benefits of economic progress.

In this context, the United States can assist developing nations through developmental loans and technical assistance. Planners use these tools separately or in combinations.

Loans.

Developmental loans finance the purchase of a wide range of commodities and related technical services that developing countries need for schools, clinics, irrigation works, and roads. The US government may make these loans or private banks may make them, with or without government guarantee. Developing countries repay the loans with interest. Interest rates charged to the borrowing country are lower than commercial rates; the United States often approves long-term credit agreements.

Technical Assistance.

Technical assistance primarily affects people—their skills, their productivity, and the institutions they build and administer. It allows the people of developing countries to generate what they need for economic and social growth and modernization. Self-sustaining growth depends on the effective use of natural resources, capital facilities, and labor. Technical assistance speeds up the process by which people gain an education, learn skills, and develop positive attitudes so they can more effectively help themselves.

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Programs

Humanitarian and civic assistance is another component of US foreign assistance. It basically consists of welfare and emergency relief.

Welfare.

The largest part of welfare support is in food programs for mothers and children. It also provides nutritional supplement programs for schools.

Emergency Relief.

Disaster and emergency relief and refugee assistance make up the second largest category in this group. These programs have helped in emergency situations overseas ranging from natural disasters to war.

Elements of the DOD may participate in these programs on a case-by-case basis, in support of the responsible agency. Additionally, Title 10 of the US Code (Chapter 20) allows the DOD to conduct humanitarian and civic assistance activities along with military operations—in certain narrowly defined circumstances with prior approval of the Secretary of State.

Security Assistance Programs

US security assistance includes programs that assist friendly foreign countries to establish and maintain an adequate defense posture. The programs also help them to improve internal security and resist external aggression.

The basis for such assistance lies in the strategy of collective security, a national security policy which recognizes that the security and economic well-being of friendly foreign countries are essential to US security. Security assistance programs aid collective security. They help allied and friendly nations to resist aggression and contribute to national and regional stability.

Narrowly defined, security assistance is activity pursuant to a body of laws that authorizes and controls the entire process; for example, the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 and related amendments. Considered more properly as a strategic element, security assistance is a primary tool of US foreign policy. It has application across the spectrum of international competition. It is a bridge that links collective security with US friends and allies in times of peace and in times of crisis.

Constraints.

Operationally, in a LIC environment, security assistance is the principal US military instrument for most forms of support to friends and allies. However, its budgetary process in the narrow definition makes it largely a long-range preventive tool rather than a short-range reactive tool. The security assistance budget is a part of the Department of State (Program 150) foreign assistance budget. The budget planning cycle takes about two years to respond to new program requirements. Moreover, the general budgetary climate in which it evolves tends to be extremely limited. Due to these constraints the United States must usually engage in long-range programs of mutual defense planning with a friend or ally. Specific security assistance initiatives are especially effective in cases where the friend or ally already has a sound financial program for its own defense.

There are limited, special emergency authorities in the Foreign Assistance Act and the AECA which the President may use in a crisis to speed up the budgetary process. Nevertheless, he uses them rarely and for relatively low levels of US government financing.

Categories.

Security assistance includes selling or granting defense articles and services, training, and economic support in the form of loans or grants to offset the costs of maintaining armed forces. Specifically, security assistance provides allied and friendly military forces the equipment, spare parts, supporting materiel, and services that enhance their

capability to deter aggression and to maintain internal security. It can provide training assistance to—

- Improve effectiveness.
- Promote proper usage and maintenance of equipment.
- Establish a sound base for the nation's training activities.
- Standardize procedures that enhance combined military operations.
- Promote friendship and goodwill toward the United States.

Conditions.

The United States will provide security assistance if threatened nations—

- Assume the primary responsibility for providing the manpower for their own defense.
- Devote a fair share of other resources to the defense effort and use resources effectively.
- Assume increasingly greater responsibility for their own defense; for fundamental, related decisions; and for necessary resources.
- Learn to identify the total costs of their forces. This understanding allows them to make informed choices in allocating limited resources. The economic consequences of military spending by supported nations should not impede their economic development.

Grant aid terminates as soon as possible. Use of available credit programs makes transition to aid on a sales basis easier. Grant aid and credit resources focus on capital investment needs, with the receiving country assuming operating and maintenance costs. Development of assistance and self-help goals should reflect the current threats, risks, costs, resource constraints, and manpower limitations. This provides a realistic basis for the allocation of security-oriented resources. The economic consequences of military spending by supported nations will not impede their economic development.

When the United States provides security assistance to a host nation, a primary concern is the host nation's ability to plan and manage its defense resources by and for itself. Host nation military organizations may never develop this ability if they continue to request help when they no longer need it; that is, in areas where they have already achieved self-sufficiency.

Major Programs.

The United States conducts five major security assistance programs, all of which fall under the control of the Department of State. The DOD administers two: International Military Education and Training (IMET), and foreign military financing (FMF), both cash and credit. The Department of State and USAID administer the remaining three programs: Economic Support Fund, peacekeeping operations, and commercial export sales. (See Glossary to compare and contrast characteristics of these programs.)

The IMET program provides instruction and training to foreign military and qualifying civilian personnel either in the United States or overseas on a grant-aid basis. It improves the ability of friendly foreign countries to use their own resources and to operate and maintain equipment acquired from the United States.

IMET helps countries develop greater self-reliance and improves their training capabilities. The training promotes rapport between the armed forces of foreign nations and US armed forces. It fosters a better understanding of the United States including its

people, its political system, its institutions, and the policies and objectives by which it pursues world peace and human rights. IMET encompasses—

- The formal and informal instruction of foreign students in the United States.
- Training at civilian institutions.
- Technical education and training aids.
- Informational publications.
- Assistance to foreign military elements by MTTs or technical field training service personnel.
- Orientation tours of US military installations.

The FMF program enables foreign governments and international organizations to purchase defense articles, services, and training through DOD with their own financial resources. The program also includes supply and support arrangements that provide materiel, supply, and maintenance support to foreign customers for their US-made military purchases. Foreign military construction sales involve the sale of design and construction services to eligible purchasers.

The Special Defense Acquisition Fund enhances the US government's ability to meet urgent foreign needs for military equipment, while minimizing adverse impacts on US readiness. It finances the acquisition of defense articles and services in anticipation of authorized FMS cash or loan purchases. While the fund is limited in scope, it can shorten the lead time of selected items; for example, infantry equipment and tactical radios. The DSAA manages this fund.

Under normal procedures prescribed by the AECA, payment for FMS must be in advance of equipment delivery or performance of services. The President may defer the repayment date until 60 days after delivery (without interest being charged to the foreign country). He even may extend the deadline to 120 days after delivery provided he requests a special appropriation from Congress. These authorities are used only in rare circumstances.

The FMS financing program provides credit and loan guarantees to eligible foreign governments for the purchase of defense articles, services, and training. The United States recognizes the advantages in encouraging foreign governments to use direct credit or guaranteed loans to meet their defense needs. It makes an effort to obtain loans at less than market interest rates for countries that cannot afford the market rates.

The United States evaluates all FMS activities in the context of their impact on social and economic development programs in recipient countries and for their impact on regional arms races. In accordance with its policies, the United States approves sales to countries or international organizations to improve internal security, self-defense, or civic action, or to improve regional collective security agreements. It is US policy not to sell materials and services to governments that deny fundamental rights or social progress to their people. The President may waive these restrictions in extreme circumstances when this is necessary for US security.

The ESF program promotes economic or political stability in areas where the United States has special security interests; for example, when the United States determines that economic assistance is useful in securing peace or averting economic or political crises. The ESF enables recipient nations to devote more of their own resources to security purposes than would otherwise be possible without serious economic or political consequences.

The ESF provides economic aid in the form of loans or grants for a variety of economic purposes including balance of payment support, economic infrastructure projects, and health, education, agriculture, and family planning needs. ESF funds cannot be used to purchase military hardware or military training. When recipient nations attain reasonable political and economic stability, the United States shifts from the ESF to normal developmental assistance programs.

The peacekeeping program provides that portion of security assistance devoted to peacekeeping operations. This assistance includes participation in the multinational forces and observers in the Sinai, in the US contribution to the United Nations forces in Cyprus, and in other programs designed specifically for peacekeeping.

US industry makes direct AECA-licensed commercial export sales to a foreign buyer. The Defense Trade Center, Department of State, establishes the US governmental control procedures.

Although it is not commonly listed as one of the seven major security assistance programs, the antiterrorism assistance program strengthens the bilateral relationship between the United States and participating countries and fosters a cooperative relationship among foreign civilian law enforcement agencies. The Department of State administers this program.

Advisory and Training Requirements.

Military advisory and other security assistance personnel need a wide array of skills to handle the diverse activities encompassed in security assistance and FID operations. They need a broad educational foundation to have a better appreciation of the social systems of developing nations. Language training is essential.

A proper advisor-client relationship depends on successful intercultural communications. Advisors frequently work with counterparts from their respective cultural, educational, and military backgrounds.

An effective advisor understands his counterpart's sociological, psychological, and political make-up. Accomplishment of the advisory mission often depends more upon positive personal relationships between US advisors and host nation counterparts than upon formal agreements. Host nation leaders may not desire the assistance offered. Indeed, they may tolerate it only to obtain materiel and training assistance. Even when they accept US advice, host nation military leaders may not immediately act upon it because of internal constraints and restrictions.

The US military advisor works in support of an overall US national effort. He frequently collaborates in-country with civilian members of other US country team agencies. Many of their activities cross mutual jurisdictional boundaries. He must know the functions, responsibilities, and capabilities of the other team agencies. The specific relationship with nonmilitary country team members depends largely on the desires of the chief of the diplomatic mission.

APPENDIX B

The Law and Low Intensity Conflict

Three bodies of law are relevant to the conduct of US military operations in LIC: international, US, and host nation law.

INTERNATIONAL, US, AND HOST NATION LAW

International Law

The United States conducts LIC operations in accordance with international law. International law includes the law of war, as well as international agreements and customary international law. International agreements prescribe the rights, duties, powers, and privileges of nations relative to particular undertakings. International agreements will affect US assistance in LIC operations in such matters as—

- The status of US personnel in a foreign country.
- Construction and operation of US bases.
- Aircraft overflight and landing rights.
- The processing of claims for damage to persons and property.

The military planner must understand that all aspects of operations carried out in a foreign country will be governed by such agreements or customary international law.

US Law

LIC operations must also comply with US law, whether in the form of a statute, executive order, regulation, or other directive from a branch or agency of the federal government. The US Uniform Code of Military Justice will apply to questions of military justice; the Federal Acquisition Regulation and various statutes will govern the acquisition of supplies and services for US forces; the Foreign Assistance Act and Arms Export Control Act will govern the extent of assistance given to a foreign country; Executive Order 12333 and service regulations will govern intelligence activities; and the Case Act and implementing directives will govern the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements. The planner must therefore consult his organization's legal advisor and ensure that proposed courses of action comply with applicable law.

Host Nation Law

All laws of the host nation, whether at the national or the local level, will apply to US forces in that country unless an international agreement provides otherwise. The types of laws that may inhibit US operations are in the fields of immigration, labor, currency exchange, procurement of goods and services, customs and taxes, and criminal and civil liability. The planner must therefore understand what the law is in order to assess whether it will adversely affect the operation. Assistance may be available from the local US consul or the command judge advocate, or the command may have to rely on other sources for guidance. If local law conflicts with the operation, other US agencies may assist the planner in negotiating agreements that will exempt US forces from local law.

WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

Public Law 93-148, the War Powers Resolution of November 1973, requires the to consult with and report to the US Congress when introducing US armed forces—

- Into hostilities.
- Into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.
- Into foreign territories when equipped for combat (except for supply, repair, replacement, and training).
- In numbers which substantially increase the number of US forces equipped for combat in a foreign country.

The resolution also applies to the "assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government when such military forces are engaged, or there exists an imminent threat that such forces will become engaged, in hostilities."

Procedures have been established for the legal advisor to the chairman, JCS, to review all force deployment actions routed through the JCS to which the WPR may apply. The chairman's legal advisor subsequently reports to the DOD general counsel concerning the WPR's applicability. If the DOD general counsel determines that the situation merits further interagency discussion, he consults with the Department of State's legal advisor and, perhaps, with the attorney general. This process is intended to provide the President advice concerning the Congressional consultation and reporting requirements mandated by the WPR.

Commanders and military planners should be aware that the advisory and training commitment of US military personnel may require review for applicability of the WPR. Advisory duties, especially in an insurgency or counterinsurgency situation, may fall in the category of actions requiring consultation and reporting.

If found to be applicable, the WPR requires the withdrawal of US forces within 60 days of the reporting date, or 90 days when the President deems it militarily necessary, unless Congress approves otherwise.

CLAIMS ADMINISTRATION

Activities of US military personnel serving in foreign countries will occasionally result in personal injuries, deaths, and property damage to other individuals and entities. Also, US armed forces personnel may be injured and their property, or that of the US government, may be damaged, lost or destroyed. Claims against the United States which arise in foreign countries are settled under a variety of statutes and international agreements. These include, primarily, the Foreign Claims Act, and status of forces agreements claims provisions. Article VIII of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) status of forces agreement, for example, provides for the settlement of claims arising out of NATO operations.

USE OF CHEMICAL HERBICIDES AND RIOT CONTROL AGENTS

Presidential Executive Order 11850, 8 April 1975, prescribes policy for the use of chemical herbicides and riot control agents. It states in part—

> "The United States renounces, as a matter of national policy, first use of herbicides in war except use, under regulations applicable to their domestic

use, for control of vegetation within US bases and installations or around their immediate defensive perimeters, and first use of riot control agents in war except in defensive military modes to save lives such as:

(a) Use of riot control agents in riot control situations in areas under direct and distinct US military control, to include controlling rioting prisoners of war.

(b) Use of riot control agents in situations in which civilians are used to mask or screen attacks and civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided.

(c) Use of riot control agents in rescue missions in remotely isolated areas, of downed aircrews and passengers, and escaping prisoners.

(d) Use of riot control agents in rear echelon areas outside the zone of immediate combat to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists, and paramilitary organizations.

I have determined that the provisions and procedures prescribed by this Order are necessary to ensure proper implementation and observance of such national policy.

Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States of America by the Constitution and laws of the United States and as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. The Secretary of Defense shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the use by the armed forces of the United States of any riot control agents and chemical herbicides in war is prohibited unless such use has Presidential approval, in advance.

SECTION 2. The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe the rules and regulations he deems necessary to ensure that the national policy herein announced shall be observed by the Armed Forces of the United States."

(Signed)
GERALD R. FORD
President of the United States

Commanders should consult their legal advisors on the implementation of this policy on a case-by-case basis.

APPENDIX C

How to Analyze an Insurgency or Counterinsurgency

This appendix provides guidance for the analysis of an insurgency or counterinsurgency. It contains general questions which the analyst must ask. The questions address conditions in a whole society. The answers are not simple and the list of questions may not be complete. A study based on this guide could fill several volumes.

The military analyst must analyze such a situation in detail. He must understand the nature of this complex conflict to determine effective courses of action. His analysis must consider the following factors:

- The nature of the society.
- The nature of the insurgency.
- The nature of the government.

The analyst must identify the principal factors for each of these broad areas; he must study each in turn. Finally, he must weigh and compare the factors in each area and reach conclusions. These conclusions lead to development of courses of action. The analyst then predicts the potential effects of each possible course of action, and selects the best one.

This guide for analysis is more than just a simple checklist. Each area and factor requires detailed study. The process is time-consuming and may require additional expertise.

MISSION ANALYSIS

Mission analysis requires a concise, yet broad, description of the end state to be achieved. The analyst must consider all constraints and restrictions affecting mission achievement. Among these are materiel and human resource constraints, as well as the demands of politically active groups in the society. The analysis uses assumptions in the absence of facts and replaces them with the facts when they become available.

NATURE OF THE SOCIETY

Social Organization

1. Identify social groups; for example, race, religion, national origin, tribe, economic class, political party, ideology, education level, union memberships, management class, armed forces, occupation, or age.

2. Identify overlaps among classes and the splits within them. Do union members belong to one or a few religious or racial groups? Are there ideological divisions within a profession?

3. Identify composite groups based on their political behavior; for example, those which actively or passively support the government or the insurgent or those which are neutral. Determine the component and composite strength of each.

4. Identify active or potential issues motivating the political behavior of each subgroup and group; for example, desire for economic benefits, social prestige, political participation, perception of relative deprivation. Determine population growth or decline, age distribution, changes in location by groups.

Analysis. Determine programs which might accommodate the goals of a plurality of the politically active groups. Are these programs within the value systems of the insurgency or counterinsurgency?

Conclusion. The analyst must determine which groups and composite groups might be motivated to support his position. He should determine which groups might be politically neutralized and identify programs acceptable to him which might mobilize these groups.

Economic Organization and Performance

1. Identify the principal economic ideology governing the society; for example, communist, socialist, capitalist, or a mix of these. Determine local innovations and departures from this ideology.

2. Evaluate the economic infrastructure; for example, fuel and mineral resource locations; electricity production and distribution; rail, highway, and other transport facilities; and postal, telephone, telegraph, and other communication networks.

3. Evaluate economic performance; for example, gross national product, gross domestic product, foreign trade balance, per capita income, inflation rate, and annual growth rate.

4. Evaluate the performance of productive segments of the society; for example, agriculture, manufacturing, information, service, transportation, mining, and forestry. Determine ownership patterns in each. Public or private? Concentrated or dispersed?

5. Evaluate public health factors; for example, birth and death rates, nutrition, water supply, sanitation, and the availability of health care. Identify endemic diseases.

6. Identify foreign trade patterns; for example, domestic and foreign indebtedness (both public and private) and resource dependencies.

7. Determine the availability of education; for example, its accessibility to individuals and groups, and its sufficiency for national needs. Consider scientific, technical, professional, and liberal education and crafts training. Identify surpluses and shortages of skills in the society.

8. Identify unemployment, underemployment, and exclusion of groups from employment. Identify career mobility, both horizontal and vertical.

9. Identify taxing authorities, tax rates, and how they are determined.

10. Evaluate the distribution of economic benefits, occurrence of poverty, and concentration of wealth.

11. Identify population shifts; for example, rural-to-urban or manufacturing-to-service. Determine their causes and effects.

Analysis. Correlate the economic factors with social groups and subgroups. Determine which groups are favorably and unfavorably affected by each economic factor. Identify the economic motives and goals of group behavior.

Conclusions. The analyst must identify economic programs—consistent with his values and resources—which might generate favorable support, stabilize neutral groups, or neutralize hostile groups.

Political Organization and Dynamics

1. Determine the formal political structure of the government.

2. Identify the informal structure and compare the two; ask, for example, whether the government is a dictatorship with only superficial democratic characteristics.

3. Identify legal and illegal political parties. What determines their legal status? Do they have reasonable prospects to accede to office? What is the program of each? Quantify the strength of each. Which might unite in coalitions?

4. Identify nonparty political organizations; for example, political action groups. What issues motivate them? Assess the strength of each organization. Which political parties do they support? Does the government regulate these organizations?

5. Identify nonpolitical interest groups; for example, churches, cultural and professional organizations, and unions. Do they have interests corresponding to parties or to nonparty political organizations?

6. Identify the mechanism for government succession. Are government offices inherited? Does government function by exercise of power or consensus of a ruling class or oligarchy? Are elections held regularly? Are the results honored? What are the requirements to vote? Does the electoral process systematically exclude any groups? Determine which groups, if any, vote as a bloc. Does a patron-client relationship determine bloc voting?

7. Determine if the judiciary is independent.

8. Determine if government or any other group controls the press. What alternatives exist for dissemination of information and opinion?

9. Determine if decision making is over-centralized. Determine whether individuals and groups can make important decisions for themselves. Determine whether government agents at the state or local level can make important decisions. Can individuals and groups make their voices heard in policy-making councils?

10. Determine the administrative competence of the bureaucracy. Are politicians and civil servants self-serving or corrupt?

Analysis. Correlate political groups with economic and social groups. Determine which subgroups have joined together to form significant political forces. Are they favorable or unfavorable to the insurgency or are they neutral? Identify the political issues motivating the behavior of subgroups and groups.

Conclusion. The analyst must identify political programs which fall within his value limits. He must ask which programs might neutralize opposing groups or mobilize support from neutral groups? He should identify groups which can combine to produce a plurality favorable to the analyst's position.

History of the Society

1. Determine the origin of the incumbent government. Does it have a long history? Was it elected? Have there been multiple peaceful successions of government? Did the government originate in violence? If so, was it by popular revolution or *coup d'etat*?

2. Determine the history of political violence; for example, is violence a common means to resolve political problems? Is there precedent for revolution, co*ups d'etat*, or assassination? Does the country have a history of consensus building? What is the frequency of violent crime?

3. Does the present insurgency have causes and aspirations in common with historic political violence?

Analysis. Determine the legitimacy of the government. Estimate how acceptable violent remedies to political problems are among the people.

Conclusion. The analyst must determine the type and level of violence required by the insurgent or counterinsurgent. He should determine the type and level of violence the opponents are likely to employ. He should identify groups or subgroups which will support the use of violence and those which will oppose it.

Environment

1. Determine the density and distribution of population by groups. What is the balance between the urban and rural populations? Are there sparsely populated areas? Are primary racial, linguistic, or similar groups concentrated in specific areas?

2. Identify distinct geographic regions; for example, mountains, forests, plains, deserts, swamps, and coastal lowlands. What are their effects on economic and social development?

3. Identify natural and manmade aids and obstacles to mobility; for example, rivers, canals, lakes, roads, railroads, mountains, forests, and urban areas. What are their effects on economic development? What are their effects on political and social integration?

4. What are the effects of aids and obstacles to mobility on tactical operations? Is heavy equipment road bound? Are special units required (for example, airmobile, riverine, amphibious, mountain units)? What special equipment and tactics can overcome geographic limitations? How can off-road mobility be enhanced? Are electronic communications masked? How can cover and concealment be used to advantage?

5. Identify climate types by area and season. What are the effects of extreme heat, cold, rain, snow, blowing dust, and sand on tactical operations? What are their effects on mobility? And air operations? Do the seasons dictate the timing of operations? How can weather restrictions be used to advantage? How can weather obstacles be overcome?

Analysis. How does the environment affect development programs? Are some economic dependencies a result of the weather and terrain? What are the effects of weather and terrain on the organization, equipment, and doctrine of the security forces?

Conclusions. Are development and security programs appropriate to the environment? What changes need to be made in plans, organization, and doctrine?

NATURE OF THE INSURGENCY

Objectives

1. What is the desired end state of the insurgency? Is it clearly formulated? Is it openly articulated?

2. Do all elements of the insurgency share a common view?

3. Is the desired end state different from that publicly advocated?

4. How does the insurgency's view of desired social organization differ from that of the government?

Analysis. Identify groups and subgroups which support the general objectives of the insurgency, as stated publicly or privately. Identify factions, minority views, and dissensions within the insurgency regarding all or parts of its general program. Identify groups which the insurgency may have misled or deceived concerning its end-state objectives. Make a similar analysis of groups and subgroups supporting the government.

Conclusions. The analyst should identify objectives of groups supporting the government and those supporting the insurgency. He must determine which of these objectives he can accommodate within his value system as part of a preemptive strategy. He should devise programs to attract groups away from the enemy into neutrality or into support for the analyst's position.

Organizational and Operational Patterns

1. Determine the organizational and operational patterns used by the insurgency (see Chapter 2). Identify variations or combinations of the basic models of organization and operation employed. Determine whether the insurgency has previously shifted from one pattern to another or is likely to do so in the future. Determine the balance between urban- and rural-based centers of insurgency. Does one have primacy over the other?

2. Determine the stage or phase of the insurgency. Has it progressed through successive stages? Has it regressed to an earlier or simpler stage? Is the insurgency capable of moving forward or backward from stage to stage?

3. Is the insurgency employing a united front? With what group? What are their common interests and areas of disagreement?

Analysis. Determine the organizational and operational pattern employed by the insurgency. Identify leadership, environmental, and geographical factors in the selection of one pattern over another. Identify elements within the insurgency which disagree with the model being used. Determine the ability and propensity of the insurgency to adopt different organizational and operational patterns.

Conclusion. The analyst must identify resource, leadership, and environmental conditions and requirements which will best enable the insurgency to accomplish its goals. He must determine whether the insurgents need to change organizational and operational patterns, how they should do this, and how the government can prevent or limit their freedom to do so. The analyst must identify conditions which will permit the insurgency to advance to a higher phase or stage. He must determine which factors will force the insurgency to regress to an earlier or simpler stage.

Leadership

1. Who are the leaders of the insurgency? Is there a single, dominant charismatic leader?

2. Are the leaders highly dedicated to an ideology?

3. Are the leaders committed to a specific organizational and operational pattern? Identify differences of opinion among leaders as to purpose and method.

4. What is the relationship between the leaders and the combat elements? Do the leaders participate directly in violence?

5. Determine the decision-making process in the insurgency leadership. Are decisions made by a dictator, by consensus, or by democratic participation?

Analysis. Identify divisions within the leadership. Determine whether rigid commitment to a method constitutes vulnerability. Correlate the leadership's goals and methods with the preferences of major societal groups. Will the leadership's methods enhance social mobilization?

Conclusion. The analyst must determine the political and physical strengths and weaknesses of the insurgency's leadership, and how an opponent could exploit weaknesses to destroy or discredit it. Conversely, he must determine how the insurgents exploit the government's weaknesses in order to build their strength.

Tactics

1. What are the short-range and long-range tactical objectives of the insurgents? Are they designed to apply force decisively at the areas of government weaknesses?

2. Identify the insurgents' primary targets; for example, government organization, security forces, or economic infrastructure.

3. Identify military tactical doctrine, order of battle, training, morale, and discipline of the insurgents' regular and part-time combat forces.

4. Do the insurgent's tactics make effective use of the terrain and the political environment? What is their attitude toward the use of terror? How do they use it?

5. Identify the insurgents' materiel resources and determine how they can overcome the limitations of these resources.

Analysis. How can the insurgents develop locally superior combat power? How can the insurgents overcome the government's superior firepower and mobility? What intelligence sources and methods does each side use?

Conclusion. The analyst must determine how the insurgents can use terrain, offensive actions, surprise, and cross-country mobility to develop locally superior combat power. He must identify areas of government and insurgent weakness. He must determine the political effect of insurgent combat tactics and government countertactics. He must develop courses of action which will optimize the political-military coercive power of the analyst's side. He must consider the government's superior mechanized mobility, firepower, air power, and numerical strength.

External Support

1. Identify the sources of external support for the government or the insurgency; for example, countries, blocs, or nonstate entities (including international organizations, ideological groups, religions, terrorist groups, cultural, social, linguistic groups).

2. Determine the extent and effectiveness of moral or political support. How and by whom is it articulated? What media are used? What are the effects of moral and political support?

3. Identify the sources and amounts of foreign economic support. How is money made available; for example, through foreign banks or "laundering"? Is economic support overt or covert? Does it originate with public or private sources? What constraints does the supporting entity require? Do they hinder the government or the insurgent's operations?

4. Identify sanctuaries for insurgent forces, for logistical activities, and for political and propaganda work. How can sanctuaries be denied? Consider the possibilities of political action (boycott, information or propaganda operations). Consider military action (attack, isolation, interdiction). Identify the land, sea, and air routes to and from sanctuaries.

5. Identify materiel support; for example, weapons, equipment, supplies, and services provided.

6. Identify advisory assistance as well as CS, and CSS assistance.

Analysis. Determine the dependency of the government and the insurgency on external support. What would be the effect of reduction or elimination of this support?

Conclusions. The analyst must develop plans for the reduction or elimination of external moral or political support, economic support, or military and materiel support. Conversely, he should determine the means for increasing such support.

NATURE OF THE GOVERNMENT

National Strategy

1. Has the government established a general plan for counterinsurgency? Does the plan address political, social, and economic issues? Does it correctly define the issues? Does it consider all social and political groups and subgroups?

2. Determine the government's organization and methods for strategic planning and execution of its program. Identify areas of strength and weakness. Identify resource requirements and constraints. Has the government established realistic priorities?

Analysis. Determine the effect of the government plan on specific groups and subgroups. Which will the government's plan mobilize? How can an opponent prevent mobilization? Which groups or subgroups are not likely to be satisfied by the plan? How can the insurgents mobilize them? What is the effect of mobilization by the government or by the insurgents on the political balance?

Conclusions. The analyst must identify the means by which the government can mobilize a favorable political balance through combinations of coercive measures and progressive political, social, and economic development. Conversely, he should determine what insurgent actions might tip the balance in its favor.

Coercive Measures

1. Identify the government's use of populace and resources control. How does it affect each social group? How can the insurgents turn adverse effects to their own advantage?

2. Determine the organization, equipment, and tactical doctrine of government security forces. Are they sufficient? Are they appropriate to the environment? Are they appropriate to the nature of the conflict?

3. What is the effect of government military operations on each group within the population? Does the government effectively limit collateral damage to people and property?

4. Does the government maintain the initiative? Can it identify, locate, and attack key insurgent personnel, installations, and military forces? How does the government

protect installations and the populace? What is the effect of protective measures on the government's ability to take the offensive? Do the people provide intelligence to the government and deny it to the insurgents?

Analysis. The analyst must balance the beneficial effects of coercive measures against the harm they may do to friendly or neutral groups.

He must determine the favorable balance between government firepower and mobility and its logistical support and modern LOC. Does government firepower cause civilian injury and death, thereby undermining popular support? Are government weapons and vehicles restricted to roads?

Conclusions. The analyst must develop plans for populace and resources control which will not cost him popular support. How does the government provide security for the populace without losing the initiative?

He must devise tactics to employ superior firepower without debilitating dependence on logistical support. He must ask how the insurgents can employ surprise, deception, and restrictive terrain to overcome government firepower, armor protection, and air power. He must determine how the government can seize the initiative to overcome insurgent guerrilla tactics.

Balanced Development

1. Determine prioritized economic programs to mobilize support within key subgroups and groups. Determine which groups, if mobilized, will tip the balance of forces. Identify each group's perception of its economic standing. To what extent will groups tolerate the postponement of economic programs? How can the government or an insurgency make economic benefits contingent on supportive behavior by affected groups?

2. Establish feedback mechanisms to determine group reaction to programs. How can decision-making be decentralized without loss of direction?

3. Determine social imbalances. Identify the affected groups. Develop programs to correct these imbalances. What is the effect of these social development programs on other groups?

4. Identify groups which lack a political voice. How can the government accommodate them? How can the insurgents accommodate them?

Analysis. How can the benefits of development be evenly distributed?

Conclusions. The analyst must identify groups whose change of loyalty will affect the balance of forces. He should target those groups for development without adverse effect on other key groups.

Administrative Competence and Efficiency

1. Determine whether national plans are effectively executed. Identify sources of incompetence and corruption.

2. How is a balance achieved between centralized planning and decentralized execution?

Analysis. Identify corrupt and incompetent officials. How can they be reformed or eliminated? Were they appointed by a spoils or patronage system? To what levels of government does corruption reach? What would be the effect of reform on the structure of government? Identify the source of new leadership. Do artificial barriers exist?

For example, does the government require unnecessary academic degrees, racial or other social classifications, or patronage as the precondition for employment? Are there opportunities for vertical mobility by merit? Are the best people concentrated at higher levels of government?

Conclusions. Determine the means for equitable distribution of competent leaders at all levels of government. Determine whether material and symbolic rewards are adequate. Are talent and initiative frustrated? What psychological and tactical opportunities does government incompetence and inefficiency provide to the insurgents?

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

The analyst must now consider the separate analyses of the society, the insurgency, and the government together. His conclusions must reflect the interaction of all factors. The analyst must determine the dynamic with which each side attempts to mobilize human and materiel resources in its favor. This dynamic affects specific groups of people. The analysis identifies issues which concern key political, social, and economic groups. The government and insurgency offer solutions to the people's problems and attempt to deliver on their promises, within resource constraints. Measured combinations of benefits, persuasion, and coercion motivate groups to conform their behavior to the will of the government or the insurgency.

COURSES OF ACTION

Conclusions lead to courses of action. Whether the analyst is the insurgent or the counterinsurgent or an interested third party who supports one side or the other (or chooses to remain neutral) he must determine what is necessary to—

- Mobilize a plurality of societal groups to provide active or tacit support.
- Neutralize opposition groups.
- Prevent unaligned groups from supporting the opposition.

Whether he is an observer, or a direct or an indirect participant in this struggle, the analyst must keep his courses of action in balance. He must consider the effect of each course of action on each societal group. Frequently, a benefit to one group will have a negative effect on another. He must consider all groups and neglect none. He must assign priorities to groups in proportion to their importance in achieving a favorable balance of forces.

If the analyst is the insurgent, the counterinsurgent, or a supporter of either side, he must consider using coercive measures against those groups implacably committed to the opposition. He should recommend the use of a degree of violence appropriate to the nature of the groups' involvement in the conflict. He may recommend an attack on the enemy's main combat forces with all available military resources. He may recommend the neutralization of passive supporters by close observation and movement control. He concedes no group permanently to the enemy. He holds open the option that they will defect to his ranks. In general, he should select those courses of action which hold the greatest promise of mobilizing groups to his side and the least risk of driving groups into the camp of the enemy.

APPENDIX D

The Mass-Oriented Insurgency: How it Organizes, How to Counter it

This appendix describes the mass-oriented insurgency, the most sophisticated insurgency in terms of organization and methods of operation. It is difficult to organize, but once under way, it has a high probability of success and is the type of insurgency most likely to require external assistance to defeat. Consequently, it is the form of insurgency US forces may most often encounter.

This type of insurgency originated in China under Mao Tse-Tung. Mass-oriented insurgency relies on the mobilization of very large numbers of people into an alternative government with many highly specialized political and military agencies. It bases its mobilization on a clear identification of social dysfunctions and an appealing program for fundamental political change. The element of popular participation is such that the method can be consistent with US values and objectives. Thus, the United States may support or oppose mass-oriented insurgency. It is not always against such a movement.

Mass-oriented insurgency combines political and military resources to attack and destroy the existing government. Therefore, organized military action will probably be a necessary part of a program to counter it. US armed forces must understand mass-oriented insurgency's organizational and operational methods, if they are to oppose it successfully.

STRUCTURE

The structure of mass-oriented insurgency generally includes the following elements:

- A control element to perform centralized policy-making and supervisory functions. The control element is normally compartmentalized to provide security against penetration by intelligence agencies.
- Mass civil organizations that connect people with the leadership. Through these, the leadership can effect control and receive popular support.
- Overt or covert armed elements or both.



Figure D-1. **Organization of a Mass-oriented Insurgency.**

The heart of every mass-oriented insurgency is a disciplined political element that directs both military forces and mass organizations. In the Maoist tradition, the political element is the central committee of the Communist party. (Figure D-1 depicts the organization of a mass-oriented insurgency in simplified form.)

PHASES

The evolution of any phase in a mass-oriented insurgency may extend over a long period of time. A successful insurgency may take decades to start, mature, and finally succeed.

The classical phases of a mass-oriented insurgency are—

- Latent and incipient (phase I).
- Guerrilla warfare (phase II).
- War of movement (phase III).

An insurgency may not require all phases for success, nor are these phases separate and distinct from each other. Regardless of the number or the duration of the actual phases the insurgency undergoes, its leadership necessarily will initiate some type of final consolidation activities. These may include removing potential enemies or establishing additional control mechanisms. At a minimum, they will probably include educating the society about its new government. (Figure D-2 presents typical activities that may occur in each phase of a successful insurgency.)

PHASES AND TYPICAL ACTIVITIES

PHASE I. (LATENT AND INCIPIENT)

- ORGANIZATION: Organize, educate, proselytize; infiltrate other organizations; form party
- PROBATION: Inflitrate government and other organizations; create local cells, expand national cells, train groups; conduct political activity more openly:
  - Labor organization
  - Front groups/political organization
  - Strikes

PHASE II. (GUERRILLA WARFARE)

- INITIATION: Initiate low-level violence—sabotage, terrorism; conduct propaganda; mobilize masses; seek international support; create base areas/low-level guerrilla action
- INSURRECTION. Establish/expand base areas; expand guerrilla attacks; proclaim counter government
- CONSOLIDATION: Expand attacks; expand political activity; enlarge forces; enlarge, link base areas

PHASE III. (WAR OF MOVEMENT)

- CONFRONTATION. Begin conventional war; continue guerrilla war
- FINALIZATION: Establish national government; neutralize/eliminate political front allies; consolidate military-political front allies; consolidate military-political dominance; neutralize/eliminate former political elite

GOAL: POLITICAL CONTROL/REPLACEMENT OF THE SOCIOECONOMIC SYSTEM

Figure D-2. **Typical Activities Within Phase of Insurgency**

Latent and Incipient Phase

This phase ranges from circumstances in which insurgent activity is only a potential threat (latent or incipient) to incidents and activities which occur frequently and in an organized pattern. This phase involves no major outbreak of violence or uncontrolled insurgent activity.

Starting from a relatively weak position, the insurgents plan and organize their campaign and select initial urban or rural target areas. They make basic decisions regarding ideology and determine fundamental leadership relationships. They also establish overt and covert organizations. If the insurgents' movement is illegal, the organizations they create are normally covert; if their movement is legal, they may establish overt organizations. A covert control element should exist in either case. Throughout this period, the insurgents use PSYOP to—

- Exploit grievances.
- Heighten expectations.
- Influence the populace.
- Promote the loyalty of insurgent members.

As the insurgents consolidate their initial plans, their organization coalesces into a shadow government. After this, they concentrate on—

- Gaining influence over the populace.
- Infiltrating government, economic, and social organizations.
- Challenging the government's administrative ability.
- Recruiting, organizing, and training armed elements.

Various elements may attack government forces. They may also carry out intimidation activities and some minor military operations. These tactics gain additional influence over the populace, provide arms for the movement, and damage the government's public image by demonstrating its inability to provide adequate security. In this first phase, the groundwork is laid for broad external support needed to expand the insurgency.

Guerrilla Warfare Phase

The movement reaches the guerrilla warfare phase when it gains sufficient local external support to begin organized guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the government. Activities begun in Phase I continue and expand. Insurgent control, both political and military, over territory and the populace intensifies.

The insurgents form a government of their own in insurgent-dominated areas as the military situation permits. In areas not yet controlled, insurgent forces make efforts to neutralize actual or potential opposition groups and to increase infiltration into existing government agencies. Intimidation through induced fear and threat of guerrilla action increases.

The insurgents' major military goal is to control additional areas; the government must then strain its resources to protect many areas at the same time. Insurgent forces attempt to tie down government troops in static defense tasks, interdict and destroy LOC, and capture or destroy supplies and other government resources.

War of Movement Phase

Mass-oriented insurgency moves from phase II to phase III when it becomes primarily a conventional conflict between the organized forces of the insurgents and those of the established government. However, some insurgencies may be successful even before they reach this stage.

Activities conducted in Phases I and II continue and expand. Larger units fight government forces, attempting to capture key geographical and political objectives in order to defeat the enemy.

THE MAOIST EXAMPLE: THE PARTY

The Maoist and Marxist party organization illustrates how to achieve effective centralized direction of a mass-oriented insurgency. Analysis of this organization provides a basis for understanding mass-oriented insurgency.

The party focuses on eventual control over all three main elements of the organization: the core element, mass organizations, and armed elements. It begins with control of "liberation" committees that parallel the country's existing government at the local, subnational, and national levels. These committees interlock organizationally to ensure party control over their activities. The interrelationships of these elements may vary from one insurgency to another, but this interlocking arrangement, with its high degree of centralized control, usually emerges. (Figure D-3 illustrates the numerous elements of a party infrastructure.)

The Party Core

The *cell* is the basis of the mass-oriented insurgent party structure. A party member usually belongs to two or more cells—the local party cell and one or more functional cells such as those in schools, in factories, or in trade organizations. Parallel chains of command exist between the party structure and the various functional organizations. Party cells and functional cells often overlap.

Party groups normally control and coordinate the activities of two or more party cells. Each party group, in turn, is responsible to a higher office, the interparty committee. This committee is responsible to its counterpart committee at the next higher political echelon. The chain of command within the overall party structure extends downward from the central committee at the national level through each interparty committee at the national, subnational, and local levels.

Although all authority stems from the cellular party organization, *functional committees* carry out the party's day-to-day activities. The primary organization for this purpose is the party executive committee, often called the party revolutionary committee. Such committees normally exist at national, subnational, and local levels. Functional cells perform their tasks under the direction of local committees. The secretariat of the central committee exercises control at the national level.

At each political level, the membership of the party core cellular organization intertwines with its counterpart *revolutionary committee*. All members of the revolutionary committee concurrently are party members and members of a party organization cell.

A *youth organization* is another structure which parallels the party as an indispensable affiliate. Its members engage in many insurgency activities and acquire experience in party work. This experience prepares them to enter the core of the organizational apparatus when they are eligible.

Mass Civil Organizations (Front Groups)

Front groups are mass civil organizations and are the primary means used by the insurgents to achieve control and influence over the populace. The insurgents use these



Figure D-3. **Party Infrastructure**

groups for intelligence, logistics, and recruiting requirements. Some of the individuals recruited may initially be unaware of the organization's true role.

There are three types of front groups: popular organizations, special interest groups, and local militia. *Popular organizations* are the most important of the mass civil organizations because they are large and organized on a countrywide scale. They have committees at the national, subnational, and local levels. *Special interest groups* focus on particular issues. They have a smaller range of interests than popular organizations. The

local militia bridges two categories. It is a mass civil organization but is also somewhat military in nature. Its functions are listed in the next section.

Armed Elements

The *local militia* isolates the populace from government control. It is not normally in the military chain of command. It has three distinct paramilitary elements: the local guerrilla or self-defense force; the combat guerrilla unit; and the secret guerrilla unit.

The local guerrilla or self-defense force organizes, trains, and deploys to defend communities and to secure base areas. It is the local instrument for inflicting damage on the government and for gaining and maintaining population control. The *combat guerrilla unit* supports insurgent military forces. It also conducts independent small operations. The *secret guerrilla unit* enforces the will of the party in a given area. The great majority of its personnel are party members.

Insurgent *military forces* often fall into two classes: main forces and regional forces. The *main force* is a body of well-trained soldiers forming a highly motivated, elite fighting group. The main force is under national-level control and is deployable where needed. Personnel recruited directly from the mass civil organizations or promoted from the ranks of the local militia normally compose the *regional force*. This force generally confines its operations to its specific region, state, or province.

The military forces are only one of several instruments through which the party seeks to achieve power. Mass-oriented insurgency anticipates military reversals and the possible need to retrench, restructure, or temporarily disband should the opposing government's strength prove overwhelming. Party strategy assumes that as long as the party core and the mass civil organizations remain intact, the military forces can reactivate or rebuild. Without the party nucleus and mass civil organizations base, however, the movement cannot succeed.

COUNTERING THE MASS-ORIENTED INSURGENCY

A government may achieve significant success in countering an insurgency in any of its phases if it designs its strategy for a twofold mission: to prevent insurgent activities from escalating and, ultimately, to eliminate the insurgent threat. The ideal response is flexible and the government adjusts it to the intensity of insurgent activities and conditions within the country. The government tailors its activities to fit a situation. It monitors operations and continues only those that contribute to success.

The government should begin new programs to prevent the insurgency from recurring and continue ongoing programs that help improve conditions. The following is a brief outline for an integrated, government-wide response to a mass-oriented insurgency.

Phase I

Certain counterinsurgency activities are particularly important during the latent and incipient phase. They are—

- Government-wide developmental actions to improve political, economic, or social conditions.
- Measures to strengthen the psychological and organizational links between government and populace.
- Measures to control the insurgents' access to the populace and resources.
- Military civic action. (See JCS Pub 1-02 definition.)

- Action to improve police performance, intelligence, and counterintelligence operations.
- Psychological operations.
- Action to upgrade security forces.
- Action to train military forces.

Phase II

The guerrilla warfare phase begins when the insurgent employs full-time organized forces in combat. It normally requires changes in emphasis in activities begun earlier and the introduction of other measures. These include—

- Strengthening territorial security forces.
- Increasing PRC measures and PSYOP to isolate the insurgents physically and psychologically from the populace.
- Conducting tactical operations to seek out and defeat insurgent armed elements.

Phase III

Should the government fail to contain insurgency in earlier phases, it faces the danger of military defeat in the war of movement phase. The government must begin more comprehensive internal defense activities and administer them more strictly as it attempts to consolidate its support and defeat the insurgent forces. In phase III, combat may approach the levels of conventional warfare and will probably take priority over all other activities.

APPENDIX E

A Guide to Counterinsurgency Operations

This appendix builds on the discussion of the counterinsurgency process outlined in Chapter 2. It develops strategies, policies, and programs, known collectively as the internal defense and development concept. The IDAD concept can help a government defeat an insurgency. It explains the concepts, objectives, and methods armed forces of an affected country can employ.

GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES

A government facing the challenge of insurgency must reorder the organization of its society so as to eliminate the causes of conflict. The government must address two groups—the populace and the insurgents. These two target groups are the objects of the IDAD concept. The IDAD concept provides measures to mobilize the populace and ward off, destroy, isolate, or convert the insurgents.

The Populace

The populace will mobilize on behalf of the government when the people feel that its policies meet their needs and they are reasonably free of the threat of insurgent violence. Unless the people feel safe, they are cautious about supporting government programs. Their reluctance to do so may give the appearance that they do not care which side wins. The government must protect the people; then it must engage in balanced development to redress their social, political, and economic grievances. A government under attack normally does not have the resources to respond to all the needs of all the people at once. If it did, it would probably not be faced with an insurgent threat in the first place. The government must analyze the situation and establish priorities for programs for which it does have resources and which will tip the balance of mobilization in its favor. (A guide to counterinsurgency analysis is at Appendix C.)

Institutional development is a major way in which a government promotes social cohesion and popular mobilization. Institutional development is the process of creating mechanisms within a society that enable people to identify common goals and work together to achieve them. Institutional development involves people at the local level and links them to the national community. It promotes organizations and methods for the two-way communication essential to mobilizing popular support for national objectives. Institutional development integrates disparate groups around common social, political, and economic needs, establishing new structures where none existed. It strengthens existing institutions. It modifies or eliminates those that work against national unity.

The government, however, must be prepared for the adverse effects of institutional development. These will inevitably arise from changes in familiar ways of doing things. But these discontents, in the long run, are less dangerous than maintaining the status quo. Government provides encouragement, leadership, and material and financial support to constructive institutions. Institutions enable the government to ascertain the needs of the people, to formulate development programs, and to evaluate their effect. They permit the government to exert influence and to be influenced.

The Insurgents

In order for the government to address the causes of insurgency through balanced development, it must also protect the people from insurgent violence and separate them from insurgent control. This requires rendering the insurgent leadership and organization ineffective by persuasion, prosecution, or destruction. Denied its infrastructure, the insurgent organization will lack direction and sources of personnel, materiel, and intelligence. The insurgent tactical forces will be cut off, forced to fight on the government's terms, and vulnerable to disintegration. Government police, paramilitary, and military forces provide security, eliminate the infrastructure, and destroy, disperse or capture insurgent combat and support units. Information programs support both development and combat operations. They explain and promote the government's programs and discredit the insurgents. They offer an inducement for individual insurgents to leave the movement.

THE INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT

The IDAD concept flows from the nature of insurgency, in which opposing forces—the insurgents and the government—compete for legitimacy by mobilizing support from the same pool of resources. The IDAD concept incorporates four mutually-supporting functions. The government should perform them using the four principles of implementation discussed in Chapter 2 as a guide. The four functions of IDAD are—

- Balanced development.
- Security.
- Neutrality.
- Mobilization.

Balanced development seeks improvement in the social, political, and economic well-being of all groups and classes of people.

Security protects the people from insurgent violence, separates them from insurgent control, and establishes the conditions in which development can occur.

Neutralization renders the insurgents' effort ineffective by preempting valid parts of their program, physically or psychologically separating insurgents from the people, converting their members, disrupting their organization, or capturing or killing them.

Mobilization develops human and materiel resources from within the country through programs which enlist the voluntary, active support of a plurality of politically active people and assure the acquiescence of the rest.

The four principles which guide the implementation of the IDAD concept are—

- Unity of effort.
- Maximum use of intelligence.
- Minimum use of violence.
- Responsive government.

Unity of effort ensures coordinated employment of all civil and military agencies and private organizations in mutually supportive actions to achieve a common goal.

The maximum use of intelligence calls for the identification of all issues around which the insurgents mobilize and to which groups respond. It also calls for identification of the insurgent leaders, infrastructure, and combat forces so the government can neutralize them with minimal harm to noncombatants and their property.

The government should employ the minimum amount of violence necessary in any given situation, and an emphasis on the denial of support to the insurgents by

persuasion and preemption of issues. It also avoids the creation of new issues by unintentional injury of noncombatants or damage to their property.

Administrative efficiency and competence will lead to a responsive government, able to administer and bolster internal defense and development.

PLANNING

The national strategy guides all programs. Effective planning integrates all counterinsurgency programs, to the extent possible, into an overall plan. For example, programs to correct the causes of an insurgency should complement operations to defeat insurgent organizations.

Programs planned at the national level guide activities at regional, state, and local levels. Planning activities at the lower levels contribute to national plans and to the achievement of national objectives. Plans allow for integrated and area-oriented execution by civil and military agencies.

The government prepares a national plan to set forth objectives and broad, general guidance on priorities of effort, budget limitations, and resource allocation. The plan includes both short- and long-range goals.

The plan undergoes review and updating for relevance on a periodically scheduled basis. It includes detailed and comprehensive guidance for national-level planning. At the same time, it provides a foundation for planning at regional, state, and local levels.

The various government departments and agencies whose resources and capabilities aid in implementing the national plan have supplemental plans to support it. These concern specific programs and describe how to implement them. National plans must reflect realistic assessments of local conditions, resources, and the needs and desires of the people.

The bases for plans at all political subdivisions of a nation are national priorities, conditions in each area, and higher-level plans. Departments and agencies of government at each level assist in preparing the plan by developing programs and projects for their areas of responsibility.

INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT CAMPAIGNS

Planners at the national and subnational level create campaigns for operations in support of the overall program. The campaigns encompass a given period of time, a designated area, and specific goals. They include one or more of the following objectives:

- To implement development programs.
- To establish control in populated areas.
- To neutralize the insurgent infrastructure and tactical forces.
- To deny the use of insurgent bases.
- To establish government strength and authority in selected areas.

DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

Development plans identify social, economic, and other problems which are or may become political issues. The plans assess methods and resources available to alleviate the problems. They determine priorities and time-tables. They allocate resources—civilian and military, public and private. They create a synergistic combination of all national efforts, so that taken together, the result is greater than the sum of its important parts. They ensure that the security forces' defensive and development plans complement each other.

APPENDIX E

SECURITY FORCE PLANNING AND OPERATIONS

Security forces include the regular armed forces, reserve and paramilitary forces, and the police. They coordinate their operations with each other and with the development efforts in which they participate. Security force planning seeks to achieve unity of effort and efficient use of all forces in support of the IDAD program. It includes an agenda for improving the capabilities of the forces. Later, planning emphasizes security for the population, neutralization of the insurgents, and balanced development.

Security forces conduct major operations within IDAD campaigns in support of national and subnational counterinsurgency plans. The principal types are consolidation operations and strikes.

Consolidation Operations

Consolidation operations are interdepartmental, civil-military efforts which integrate counterinsurgency activities to restore government control of an area and its people. They combine military action to destroy or drive out the insurgents with programs for social, political, and economic development. The government may conduct consolidation operations during any phase of an insurgency. But the operations are more likely to succeed if they begin when the insurgency is in its weak, early stages.

State-level authorities usually control consolidation operations. National, subnational, and other levels of government provide the resources for these operations. Consolidation operations first establish firm control of an operating base area. Then they expand outward to enlarge the area of government control. This requires seizing, and consolidating control over contested areas. The forces' objectives are to obtain and keep control of population centers, natural and man-made resources, and LOC.

Once the force has cleared an area of insurgent tactical forces, the government must maintain an adequate defense. The defensive mission shifts to police and paramilitary forces as the situation improves. But military units continue to provide security as long as a credible insurgent threat remains. Police and paramilitary action to neutralize the insurgents' infrastructure ensures that the area remains secure. Balanced development seeks to mobilize the people to the government side.

Consolidation campaigns have four overlapping stages:

- Preparation.
- Offensive.
- Development.
- Completion.

Preparation Stage.

During the preparation stage, civil and military forces plan, train, organize, and equip for operations. Civilian and military planners must synchronize their efforts.

The bases for consolidation operation plans are national plan priority areas, available civilian and military resources, and estimated capability to achieve objectives. Security force planning must ensure sufficient personnel and materiel for tactical, psychological, CA, PRC, and intelligence missions at the beginning of the consolidation operation, and throughout its execution. Forces allocated must be superior to the insurgent threat in the AO. Air power provides transportation and resupply and, where appropriate, tightly controlled close air support. Plans include C2 measures for effective use of all resources. The ACC coordinates all operations.

Participating organizations form a TF which may be subdivided into local TFs. All TFs are joint and interdepartmental; all TFs include civilian and military elements.

When possible, boundaries and phase lines include entire political subdivisions. The chief governmental official in whose area of responsibility consolidation operations occur normally controls the operations. Communications provide parallel, interlocking, and integrated networks for police, armed forces, paramilitary, intelligence, and internal development organizations. All personnel conducting consolidation operations require training before actual operations begin. Special emphasis should be given to the training of the lowest echelons of government personnel.

Offensive Stage.

In the offensive stage the security force's first goal is to clear the area of insurgent tactical units. After this, adequate government forces, including available police and paramilitary personnel, stay in the area to protect the population from remaining insurgent elements.

The offensive stage involves—

- Moving the TF into the operational area.
- Destroying, dispersing, or clearing insurgent tactical forces from the area.
- Locating and destroying elements of the insurgency's supporting base area system.
- Identifying and apprehending members of the insurgency's political infrastructure.

The selective use of combat power prevents unnecessary harm to the population. Nonselective application of combat power may produce effects which are counterproductive to the overall effort.

TFs can conduct offensive tactical operations with C2 exercised through the military chain of command. Tactical operations conducted by large forces destroy any large and well-trained insurgent units. The TFs employ ambushes, cordon and search, and other techniques in these operations.

Typically, despite the overall scale of the operation, the majority of the action should occur at the small-unit level. Thus, training should focus on small unit operations, small unit leadership and the control of such operations at the task force level. The task force makes maximum effective use of air power by assigning Air Force liaison parties to the lowest organizational level possible and making maximum use of forward air controllers.

The police and other security organizations use PRC measures to deprive the insurgent of support and to assist in identifying and locating members of his infrastructure. Appropriate PSYOP help make these measures more acceptable to the population by explaining their necessity. The government informs the population that, although its actions may cause inconvenience, the threat posed by the insurgents makes them necessary.

Intelligence agencies and police forces operate an intelligence-collection program. They conduct interrogations and loyalty screenings and collect information to help identify and locate members of the insurgent infrastructure.

Development Stage.

During the development stage, civil and military forces take action—

- To eliminate remaining insurgent elements.
- To establish firm government control.

- To prevent the return of insurgents.
- To ensure internal security.
- To put developmental organizations into operation.

Emphasis shifts from offensive action to national development. The armed and paramilitary forces adopt an aggressive defensive posture to protect the secured areas established during the offensive stage. Small military elements can live among the population and work with local security forces. This permits other TF elements—the political, economic, social, and psychological action cadres—to conduct their activities effectively. Informational and psychological activities continuously motivate the population to support all governmental efforts.

Development activities and supporting military civic action demonstrate the government's concern for the population. Civic action projects should be simple, highly visible, and easily accomplished by the people with assistance from military resources. Air power can assist by supporting the establishment of efficient communications means with other government controlled sectors. These provide for the movement of goods and services to bolster institutional and infrastructure development. Security force activities include training local self-defense forces or other paramilitary forces to participate in territorial security and development programs. Ongoing offensive tactical operations eliminate the remaining insurgent elements and their supporting base areas. The defense of population centers, bases, installations, and LOC is also a continuing requirement.

Military forces conduct saturation patrolling over the entire area. They seek out the insurgent and block approaches into the controlled area. Military forces normally continue to conduct offensive tactical operations in nearby areas to relieve pressure on secured areas.

Police forces maintain law and order. They establish controls over the movement of personnel and supplies and guard critical food supplies and materiel during production and storage.

Completion Stage.

The completion stage involves the speedup and expansion of development programs and the enhanced ability of local authorities to defend against insurgent attacks. The government begins efforts to return all responsibility for local government to local authorities. Task forces gradually release unneeded armed forces and development cadre elements.

As local administrators become proficient in performing administrative functions, outside cadres move on to other assignments with the TF. As the local police and local paramilitary force become effective and assume more security responsibilities, TF security elements withdraw and redeploy. They must take care, however, not to redeploy too soon. As a safety factor, if needed, a local reserve force and higher level reserves can assist. The government ensures that it has adequate resources to carry out ongoing programs before extending the area under its control.

Strike Operations

Strike operations consist of major combat operations in remote, contested, or insurgent-controlled zones. They contribute to security by disrupting and disorganizing the enemy and reducing his morale. Strike operations help set the stage for a consolidation operation in the area when conditions are right. The guiding principles of

maximizing intelligence and minimizing violence help avoid counterproductive collateral damage in order to make a future transition to consolidation operations possible. The ACC coordinates strike operations (see Chapter 2).

Organization.

When the authorities designate forces to conduct strike operations, they should relieve them of routine area defense responsibilities well in advance of the operation. National, regional, or state-level authorities normally control strike forces. Strike forces organize as self-sufficient TFs able to operate for extended periods of time in areas remote from home bases. Strike forces contain intelligence, PSYOP, CA, police, and paramilitary elements as well as combat forces.

Operations.

The strike force maneuvers to destroy identified insurgent forces. Since the insurgents may hide their weapons and assume noncombatant guises in attempts to avoid capture, the strike force must make a thorough reconnaissance and search of the area. The strike force must treat captured suspects fairly, and in accordance with recognized laws to avoid turning innocent suspects into insurgent sympathizers.

When small units conducting reconnaissance operations sight relatively large insurgent tactical forces, they maintain surveillance and quickly deploy reaction forces to destroy them. In areas suspected of harboring insurgent forces or installations, reaction forces conduct reconnaissance and surveillance and follow with an immediate attack or raid when sufficient information has been developed on the target. Good communications and mobility are essential for success in these operations.

Offensive ground operations include movements to contact, raids, hasty or deliberate attacks, and exploitations and pursuit. CS and CSS operations can ensure responsiveness to operational requirements. Operations outside the support range of fixed CSS installations may require that these elements be attached or assigned directly from field depots and tactical bases. The TF commander and the appropriate headquarters coordinate these activities.

A hasty attack or raid can immediately follow air and ground reconnaissance to locate and test insurgent dispositions and strengths or to develop additional intelligence. Ground reconnaissance emphasizes the thorough reconnoitering of an area; operations are continuous, decentralized and conducted by small units. If they find a sizable insurgent force, friendly air and ground elements maintain contact until reaction forces can assist in its destruction.

EFFECTS OF SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS

This section addresses operations in remote, urban, and border areas. It stresses the unique operational requirements of each environment.

Remote Area Operations

Counterinsurgency forces conduct remote area operations to establish a government presence in a contested or insurgent-controlled area. Such a presence can delay or disrupt insurgent operations, especially mobilization efforts. Remote area operations can also be a source of valuable intelligence concerning future insurgent operations. Small, light, irregular combat forces normally conduct these operations backed by a highly mobile reserve. They attempt to mobilize ethnic, religious, or other isolated minorities to support

the government. Aerial resupply and close air support reaction forces must help sustain remote area operations. Remote area operations may lead to strike or consolidation operations.

Urban Area Operations

Operations in an urban environment require different emphases and techniques than those in rural areas. Population density and other characteristics of the area influence both insurgent and government operations. Local police may require military forces to reinforce them in controlling insurgent-provoked riots and disorders. Combat may be necessary if the insurgents take direct action to seize urban areas or their critical installations.

Principles.

Use of the minimum essential force to minimize the loss of life and destruction to property is vital. This requires detailed planning, coordination, and control.

Covert insurgent activity can be extensive in urban areas. The government must emphasize intelligence and police operations to counter the insurgents' clandestine organizational, intelligence, logistical, and terrorist activities.

Operations in urban areas may be part of a counterinsurgency consolidation plan. Urban areas require continuing counterinsurgency effort whether or not they are included in a specific operation. Counterinsurgency planning should include the military forces' participation in urban area operations during all phases of an insurgency. Military forces need preparation to assist national security and law enforcement agencies as the situation dictates.

Environment.

Urban areas need more governmental services than rural areas, and require more, and possibly larger, government organizations. Commanders should consider the activities and capabilities of all government agencies in planning and executing counterinsurgency operations.

A subversive element intent on destroying the government may strain the capabilities of local authorities. Insurgents make attempts to exploit local civilian organizations by subverting their goals and objectives, thus placing them in opposition to the government. Intimidation activities and PSYOP take place along with covert insurgent organizational, intelligence, and logistical operations. Police, internal security, and other government organizations are high priority targets for the insurgents.

Operations.

Operations require careful planning and coordination—particularly those which involve the use of force. Military forces should set up communications with police and other agencies involved in the operations. They collect and keep available detailed information on important installations. This should include detailed city plans, maps of subterranean construction, and descriptions of the locations of important installations. Personnel in the field check the data for accuracy. Data on counterinsurgency activities and the insurgent situation must be accurate and current to be useful in operations planning.

Populace and resources control is important in urban area operations. The best use of PRC comes before the insurgent has the capability for armed conflict. Police intelligence operations support PRC programs. Criminal acts such as robberies, kidnapings, terrorism,

and extortion may accompany insurgent PSYOP or money-raising activities. Careful records and surveillance keep officials aware of government and civilian sources of weapons and ammunition. Intelligence operations should also target locations and types of materiel production, collection, and storage activities that may form part of the insurgent's logistical system. Friendly PSYOP explain and justify necessary restrictive measures; for example, rationing, curfews, searches, and setting up checkpoints and restricted areas. Urban PRC operations require military support if other security forces cannot handle insurgent activity.

Government forces may stage tactical operations inside or near an urban area to defeat an insurgent attack. Any insurgent attempt to seize and hold an urban area will spark operations in nearby areas as well. When the police and other internal security forces can cope with the attack inside the urban area, military forces can best participate by establishing security around the urban area and by denying the insurgents reinforcement or support. When military forces reinforce police or defeat insurgent forces inside the urban area, operations must be closely controlled and coordinated. Military forces should withdraw as soon as police forces can handle the situation.

The concentration of mass media in urban areas and the size and composition of the target audience increase the importance of PSYOP. The government must seek and win the support of the major opinion makers. These include community leaders whose support of the counterinsurgency effort will increase its chance of success: news editors, radio and television personalities, heads of religious groups, and educators. The government must maintain a favorable image for its forces when they operate in urban areas. Authorities should swiftly punish misconduct by security forces and let the civilian population know about it.

The military may need to support CA operations in urban areas. Plans to assist civilians in case of an insurgent armed attack are essential. This assistance may include—

- Providing rescue, evacuation, and medical care.
- Performing recovery and disposition of the dead.
- Handling refugees, evacuees, and displaced persons.
- Providing prepared food and shelter.
- Issuing food, water, and essential supplies and materiel.
- Restoring utilities.
- Clearing debris and rubble from streets, highways, airports, docks, rail systems, and shelters.
- Assessing damage.

Border Area Operations

Border area operations prevent infiltration of insurgent personnel and materiel across international boundaries. They can provide valuable intelligence concerning patterns of insurgent operations, status of insurgent forces and future insurgent activity. Armed forces may have to help other nonmilitary forces with border security, immigration, customs, analysis of intelligence, and internal security operations.

Tasks.

Tasks that may help forces prevent infiltration include—

- Security operations in populated areas.
- Intelligence and counterintelligence operations.

- Operation of authorized points of entry.
- Refugee control.
- Enforcement of movement and travel restrictions.
- PSYOP.
- Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition.
- Attacks against insurgent forces.
- Destruction of insurgent base areas.

Barrier and denial operations.

Early in an insurgency, border operations are normally a function of police, customs, and other government organizations. Armed and paramilitary forces assist these organizations, particularly in remote areas. Later, denial of external support to the insurgency leads to combat-type border operations. These operations require close coordination and cooperation between the armed forces, paramilitary forces, and all government agencies involved.

Barrier and denial operations occur only after careful consideration of the threat, the environment, the infiltrator's probable targets, and his methods of operation. Physically sealing the border may not be possible; it could require the commitment of more government forces and materiel than national resources permit.

The government classifies border crossing points according to importance because it may be impossible to guard or barricade every one. Natural barriers are preferred because they save resources. Using patrols, sensors, and obstacles in selected areas increases the effectiveness of natural barriers. Border police and guards form the nucleus of national border forces. Paramilitary and regular armed forces may support them, or take direct responsibility for portions of the international border.

Leaders at the national level plan, direct, and supervise border operations. Subnational and other area commanders may receive the authority to conduct these operations. Commanders should tailor border TFs to meet requirements in their assigned areas. They should contain sufficient CS and CSS elements to support operations for extended periods.

Border units normally use operational bases that require airpower, communications, engineer, and fire support assistance. The units can establish restricted zones or friendly population buffer zones as needed.

A restricted zone is a carefully selected area, varied in width and contiguous to the border. Authorities normally relocate all persons living in this zone. Authorities give public notice that they will regard all unauthorized individuals or groups encountered in the restricted zone as infiltrators or insurgents.

A friendly population buffer zone is an area in which civilians living in the AO are limited to those believed to be loyal to the government. The government relocates all persons whose loyalty it cannot establish. The government may use this operation to establish information nets and employ loyal citizens in self-defense border units. The operation denies insurgents potential civilian contacts and base areas for border-crossing activities.

The creation of restricted zones or friendly population buffer zones requires relocating many persons. These operations need careful planning. Although armed forces may assist them, civilian authorities normally plan and carry out a relocation program,

holding forced relocation to a minimum. The authorities must employ a continuing PSYOP effort to maintain the morale and loyalty of the population.

Continuous and detailed surveillance can determine—

- Infiltration and exfiltration routes and support sites.
- Frequency and volume of traffic.
- Type of transportation.
- Number and type of personnel.
- Amount and type of materiel.
- Terrain and traffic conditions.
- Probable locations of base areas and sanctuaries.

Authorities may use air and ground reconnaissance, as well as unattended ground sensors, in surveillance efforts.

Surveillance and control of coastal areas normally require the use of coordinated ground, air, and sea power. Strategically located observation posts and an effective system of licensing and identifying friendly military and civilian watercraft greatly assist this effort.

FUNCTIONAL AREAS

Authorities employ security forces to conduct the types of campaigns and operations described in the preceding paragraphs. But certain military functional areas are also very important. They require adaptation in their conduct and special consideration in planning. Commanders must design the following operations so that they are adaptable to changing circumstances or environments:

- Intelligence.
- Logistics.
- Civil military operations.
- Psychological operations.
- Civil affairs.
- Health services support.
- Public affairs and information.
- Tactical operations.
- Deceptions.
- Populace and resources control.
- Command, control, and communications.

In addition, a friendly foreign country, such as the United States, can provide security assistance, including advice. The supported and supporting countries must work together to integrate this help into the host nation's overall plans. To do otherwise risks degrading the legitimacy of the government fighting the insurgency, and is self-defeating. The following discussion concerns the host nation's forces, but its principles apply equally to US forces providing materiel, and advisory and training assistance.

Intelligence

The challenge insurgency poses to the intelligence community is wider in scope than other types of conflict. Intelligence agencies must monitor an enemy who may not yet be conducting continuous or even frequent operations. He also may not have organized his forces into easily observable military formations. Counterinsurgency forces need detailed economic, political, cultural, geographic, and law enforcement information. Military intelligence organizations may have to collect, evaluate, and disseminate these types of

intelligence products, along with more conventional intelligence reports concerning insurgent combat forces. As part of the total national effort, well-coordinated military intelligence operations must begin as early as possible. Intelligence operations aim to identify the insurgent infrastructure and aid in development of the national IDAD program. National leaders must assign a high priority to them.

Intelligence supports counterinsurgency planning and operations by providing both general and specific knowledge of the AO and the insurgent forces. Early intelligence objectives should already have been met in general terms. These early objectives are—

- To identify the indicators of impending insurgency, and respond with appropriate action.
- To obtain information about the insurgents, weather, terrain, and populace.
- To reduce insurgent espionage, subversion, and sabotage to a minimum.

Subversion is an early indicator of the presence of an insurgent organization. It precedes other insurgent activity and continues throughout the entire effort. Subversion alienates the population from the government.

Basic Intelligence.

Basic intelligence on a specific area and situation comes from strategic reports and studies augmented by available current intelligence. Effective intelligence operations require a study of the internal and external forces subverting a society; they are the basis for the government's counterinsurgency plans, estimates, and training.

Intelligence collection planning has three general areas:

- Strategic intelligence.
- Assessment of the insurgent infrastructure and exploitation of it for additional information.
- All-source intelligence collection, threat intelligence, and area information.

Strategic intelligence exposes actual or potential insurgency problems. It uses political, economic, and sociocultural information. Leaders use strategic intelligence to develop national and regional plans and programs (including support operations) as well as specific military counterinsurgency operations.

Assessment and exploitation of the insurgent infrastructure includes studying its mass civil organizations, and its C^3, recruiting, and logistics systems. These insurgent efforts involve covert and overt activity and require significant numbers of people to carry them out. Intelligence collection efforts targeted against these activities can lead to early detection and identification of key members of the infrastructure.

All-source intelligence collection, threat assessment, and area information on terrain, weather, and manmade features provide operational and tactical-level commanders the information necessary for military action.

A unified, centralized all-source intelligence system is especially important to the effective conduct of counterinsurgency operations. It should exist at all government centers at and below the national level for proper coordination of intelligence efforts. This intelligence system should—

- Operate throughout the nation.
- Maintain a central registry of information.
- Maintain a centralized system of source control.

- Coordinate all intelligence and counterintelligence programs.
- Provide direction, collection, processing, and dissemination for the intelligence effort.
- Prepare national intelligence and counterintelligence plans and estimates.
- Conduct covert operations as directed.

When insurgent groups form, intelligence agencies should identify them and make recommendations for future surveillance or neutralization operations. The value of good human intelligence (HUMINT) and police intelligence operations cannot be overstated.

Counterintelligence.

Counterintelligence operations include the following activities:

- Formulating and conducting training programs.
- Carrying out measures necessary to protect national security information, personnel, facilities, and materiel against insurgent intelligence operations.
- Passive security measures; for example, document registry, use of secure means of communication, and noise and light discipline.
- Active measures; for example, continuous tactical patrols designed to overburden the insurgent's intelligence network, establishment of defensive sources, and coordination of tactical agent operations.

Production.

Accurate and timely intelligence satisfies requirements at each operational echelon. Intelligence requirements vary according to echelon, user, and mission. No single format is adequate for all users; therefore, production programs must be flexible and must provide several degrees of detail. Determination of production objectives and priorities requires careful analysis.

Dissemination.

Timely dissemination of intelligence is essential. The need to react immediately to intelligence information requires quick establishment of systems to process and transmit information to units at operational levels. Primary, alternate, and special intelligence channels of communication should exist when facilities and resources permit.

Security.

All personnel use every available means to protect security information. They entrust such information only to persons with appropriate security clearances who require it to accomplish their official duties. Authorities closely supervise and observe cleared personnel as the latter may encounter insurgent coercion, influence, or pressure.

Planning.

The intelligence portion of the military annex to counterinsurgency plans identifies all available assets. It furnishes the guidance necessary to collect, process, and disseminate information concerning the insurgent, the weather, the terrain, and the population. It provides guidance for counterintelligence activities to minimize insurgent espionage, subversion, and sabotage. It includes intelligence information for PSYOP, CA, and communications security monitoring and support.

Logistics

In counterinsurgency operations, traditional concepts of logistics require modification. In these operations, logistics often play a leading role in nation building. CS and CSS

units greatly bolster humanitarian, CA, and PSYOP programs. CS and CSS forces can have a decisive psychological impact in building legitimacy by providing supplies and services for nation building. This in itself can help alleviate the causes of insurgency. Indeed, combat forces may perform security operations in a supporting role to the logistical efforts that is, to make an environment available for development. Logistics elements may precede combat units into the AO or may be the only forces to deploy.

However, the logistics base for counterinsurgency is often inadequate. Therefore, the government may seek assistance from an external power. US or other foreign elements providing logistical support must be aware of its possible impact on the country's resources. Their purchase or other use of local supplies, services, and facilities may impose an excessive burden on the host nation. Planners must consider this risk. US elements should rely on locally contracted support only when US forces can use it without detriment to the host nation.

Simplicity is an essential ingredient of logistics support; it allows the flexibility needed for effective support under adverse conditions. A streamlined logistics chain should permit units in the field to requisition supplies, directly from the depot, bypassing intermediate echelons.

Operations typically may have to rely on relatively unskilled manpower, and will often lack automated data processing support. Logisticians should design or modify provisions so that they are workable.

Civil-Military Operations

Civil-military operations are political, economic, social and psychological activities to support—

- Operations affecting the relationship between military forces and civilian authorities and the population.
- The development of favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups.

Two major CMO functions are CA and PSYOP. Counterinsurgency operations call for close and continuous coordination of these functions.

Psychological Operations

Both the government and the insurgent use informational instruments, including PSYOP, to mobilize the people. Informational activities target not only enemy or foreign groups, but also populations internal to the nation. PSYOP activities are integral to counterinsurgency. Planners tailor PSYOP to meet specific requirements for each area and operation. They consider all courses of action in terms of their psychological impact. This requires them to sacrifice short-range tactical advantages to preserve long-range psychological objectives.

Objectives.

Psychological operations support the achievement of national objectives and target specific groups. The PSYOP objectives for the main target groups are as follows:

- Insurgents—to create dissension, disorganization, low morale, subversion, and defection within insurgent forces. Also important are national programs to win insurgents over to the government's side.
- Civilian population—to gain, preserve, and strengthen civilian support for the government and its counterinsurgency programs.

- Military forces—to gain, preserve, or strengthen military support with emphasis on building and maintaining the morale of these forces. The loyalty, discipline, and motivation of the forces are critical factors in combating insurgency.
- Neutral elements—to gain the support of uncommitted groups inside and outside of the threatened nation by revealing the insurgency's subversive activities. Also important is bringing international pressure to bear on any hostile power sponsoring the insurgency.
- External hostile powers—to convince the hostile power supporting the insurgents that the insurgency will fail.

National Program.

The national PSYOP program contains national objectives, plans, guidance, and desired approaches. Planners prepare and coordinate an informational program at the national level. A single agency should be responsible for coordinating these efforts to avoid conflicting themes and programs.

Agencies at all levels base their PSYOP on the national plan, interpreting them in terms of local requirements, and coordinating them through appropriate ACCs. To achieve maximum effectiveness, all informational activities depend on clearly established channels.

Civilian and Military Organizations.

PSYOP organizations conduct and support informational activities at the national level and at the subnational and local levels.

A single agency at the national level—

- Plans a coordinated national PSYOP program.
- Organizes, trains, and allocates PSYOP units and resources.
- Conducts strategic PSYOP.
- Develops program effectiveness criteria.
- Monitors the PSYOP program.
- Produces, analyzes, and disseminates PSYOP intelligence.
- Provides an analysis of specific target groups.

At the subnational level, the ACC translates national PSYOP programs and directives into implementing guidance for local ACCs and all government agencies. At the local level, the ACC provides direction to area agencies, forces, and PSYOP teams. Paramilitary organizations normally do not have their own PSYOP teams. Civilian or armed forces organizations provide PSYOP support.

Judgments about the behavior of military forces are a major factor in the formation of popular attitudes toward the government. Commanders should be aware of the psychological effects of operations and of the behavior of their troops during operations. The success of an operation depends on the commander's awareness of the psychological and political implications of his unit's actions.

Planning.

An effective PSYOP plan depends on information and includes—

- Knowledge of the history, background, current environment, and attitudes of potential target groups.

- Knowledge of the insurgency's organizations, motivation, and sources of men and materiel and how they are obtained.
- Knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of ideological and political opponents.
- Unity of effort in support of national objectives.

The annex to the military plan prescribes the required PSYOP missions, objectives, roles, and resources. It categorizes the target audience and prescribes the themes. It bases military PSYOP on the national informational plan and objectives.

Themes.

The unity of effort required in the counterinsurgency environment dictates that PSYOP staffs at subnational and national levels regularly monitor locally developed PSYOP material. They may delegate authority to approve specific PSYOP messages, based on approved themes, to local-level PSYOP personnel with a knowledge of distinctive local target groups. This should enhance the effectiveness and credibility of the PSYOP program with the local groups.

The PSYOP themes support current operations and campaigns. The PSYOP themes supporting operations in remote areas, for example, maintain the morale of government forces and win the support of the local population. Those supporting PRC operations stress the need and benefits of law enforcement. They emphasize that the insurgents are the cause of restrictions on freedom such as curfews and identification cards. Themes that support consolidation operations stress the security and benefits that the people have and can gain if they lend their support. Themes supporting strike operations emphasize the need for the operations and the government's efforts to provide for the safety of the civilian population.

Overall themes directed against the insurgent forces stress the futility of fighting, the importance of family ties, and the acceptability of amnesty programs. Planning should carefully coordinate PSYOP with tactical operations to avoid losing the element of surprise and to maximize the effectiveness of tactical operations.

Civil Affairs

Civil affairs include any activity concerned with relationships between the military forces and the civil authorities and people in the area. They are a responsibility of military commanders at every echelon. In addition to helping the commander meet his legal and moral obligations, CA operations provide assistance to civil authorities and help to organize and motivate the people to support counterinsurgency projects. Activities may range from military civic action projects to the exercise of authority that normally is the responsibility of the local government.

Scope.

The scope of CA operations varies with the type of local government and reflects the economic, social, and political background of the country and people. The CA effort is the linchpin of the military role in national development. Military CA personnel coordinate efforts of PSYOP, engineer, medical, logistics, military police, and administrative elements.

The CA effort is closely coordinated with, and in direct support of, civilian efforts. It supplements the civilian effort with activities such as construction in remote areas and extension of LOC. Engineer, signal, medical, and logistics units can often directly contribute to the development process and increase the country's military capability in

remote or insecure areas where commercial firms are unable to operate. CA coordinates the military role in development, and prevents civilian interference with military operations. It also coordinates all other civil-military affairs such as community relations, routine military civic action projects, PRC, and civil defense.

Objectives.

The overall objective of CA in counterinsurgency is to mobilize and motivate civilians to assist the government and military forces. Successful CA operations eliminate or reduce military, political, economic, and sociological problems. The objective of CA is to restore stability, contribute to national development, and promote support for the government. Close and continuous PSYOP support maximizes the effect of CA.

Organization.

Regardless of service affiliation, all military units have a capability to conduct CA, particularly military civic action. The CA projects range from an individual act to the use of substantial forces and equipment for large-scale development projects on behalf of an entire community or country. They address the fundamental needs of the nation and its people and support the national development plan. Engineer, transportation, medical, signal, and other units frequently undertake roles in such actions. Military civic action used as part of the total government effort to attack the causes of discontent contributes significantly to the prevention of an insurgency, or its defeat.

Units of all sizes may be assigned CA elements and a CMO staff officer to assist in carrying out CA plans. Organizations or staff elements specifically designed for CA liaison and coordination establish and maintain contact between military forces and government agencies.

Operations.

Civil affairs operations require good relationships with the population. To establish a good relationship, military discipline, courtesy, and honesty in dealing with the people are absolutely vital. If they are not enforced, the counterinsurgency will likely fail. When sound rapport has been established between the armed forces and the population, properly administered CA operations contribute materially to the attainment of IDAD objectives.

Planning for CA includes political, economic, social, psychological, and military considerations. Comprehensive CA planning considers—

- The national development plan to support programs that meet the needs and desires of the people.
- Civic action projects conducted by military forces.
- Personnel and units required to support host nation agencies at subnational levels.
- Training program requirements for national and allied forces.
- Requirements to provide government administration in areas of the country which need it.

A unit commander may require specialized CA personnel or units to execute his civil affairs responsibilities. CA plans include provisions for support to tactical unit commanders.

Emphasis on military civic action varies with the intensity of insurgent activities. Whatever the level of military civic action, planners must design and coordinate projects

to fit in with internal development programs. In the prevention of insurgency or in its very early phases, military civic action concentrates on social and economic development. When they are not involved in tactical operations, many military resources support military civic action projects providing both long- and short-range benefits.

During later phases of the insurgency, military civic action concentrates on projects that prevent the insurgency from greater expansion. These are projects which can produce noticeable improvements in a relatively short time.

Examples of such projects are—

- Farm-to-market roads.
- Bridges.
- Short-range educational programs.
- Basic hygiene.
- Medical immunization programs.
- Simple irrigation projects.

Projects must conform to the national plan, and fit the development program for the area. Direct local beneficiaries of the project should have a voice in the selection of projects and establishment of priorities.

Health Services Support

Military medicine is perhaps the least controversial and most cost-effective means of using military forces in support of national development. Medical teams can enter the affected area to remove some important causes of discontent even before the situation degenerates into open conflict.

Medical services appropriate to a counterinsurgency effort include—

- Public health and preventive medicine—hygiene, immunization, and training in nutrition, safety, child care, home remedies, and paramedical skills.
- Diagnosis and treatment of trauma and disease.
- Provision of medical supplies, prostheses, and eye glasses.
- Provision of continuing education for civilian doctors, nurses, and technicians.
- Consultation with local medical personnel.

Counterinsurgency may require a new or expanded role for military medical personnel, especially in upgrading local civilian skills and facilities. These make a major contribution to the national development effort, CA, PSYOP, and collection of medical intelligence.

Public Affairs and Information

Leaders and advisors in a government facing the challenge of insurgency must understand the role and functions of the news media. The images and information which the news media present influence public opinion. Involved parties regularly try to exploit the news to gain public support.

Counterinsurgency operations are, by nature, political. For this reason, they attract media interest. The closeness of news reporters to combat and the near-real-time broadcast of events can readily focus public attention and affect opinion on specific issues. At the same time, reporters can be a source of intelligence for belligerents. A coordinated PA program can attract popular support, bolstering a cause while reducing collusion with opponents. The PA program must serve the information policies of the

nation, including maximum disclosure within security limitations. At the same time, the program must remain credible and not become either a real or perceived propaganda tool.

A mutual respect between PA officials and the news media can ensure that security restrictions on release of information about military operations are understood and followed. Establishing a joint or combined press bureau is the best approach to support this goal. Provisions for such a bureau and other PA efforts should be included in all aspects of counterinsurgency planning.

Tactical Operations

Tactical operations are the most violent and extreme of all activities employed in counterinsurgency; military forces normally carry them out. Paramilitary, police, or other internal security forces also may participate in tactical operations. Operations may emanate from remote base. These may be permanent or semipermanent installations and must contain essential C3, CS, and CSS elements. Operations cannot be ends unto themselves. They must support the overall goals of the counterinsurgency effort.

Objectives.

Tactical operations destroy or neutralize insurgent tactical forces and bases and establish a secure environment in which to carry out balanced development programs. They are part of an approved campaign, coordinated with other operations through the ACCs.

Organization.

Organization for tactical operations emphasizes appropriate firepower and mobility. Organization should stress tactical self-sufficiency and provide adequate CS and CSS elements to conduct semi-independent or independent operations. Tactical forces must have CA and PSYOP capabilities.

Operations.

Tactical operations generally include—

- Ambushes.
- Raids.
- Movements to contact.
- Hasty or deliberate attacks.
- Exploitation and pursuit.
- Defense of key installations.

Small units operating in dispersed areas are the norm in counterguerrilla operations. If they encounter large-sized insurgent units, additional combat power deploys to the area to destroy them.

A mobile warfare threat by insurgents demands modified tactics. This condition requires massed artillery fire and maintenance of larger reserves, operating units, and security and defense detachments. In mobile warfare, use of terrain, organization of fires, and maneuver are critical in seizing and holding the initiative. Commanders should not expect envelopments, penetrations, or turning movements to affect insurgent forces in the same way they would if occupation of terrain were the key consideration.

Insurgent tactical units locate caches and safe havens in several areas so that they need not depend on, or protect, a single critical logistical base. Thus, they can disperse units and move in several directions in reaction to an offensive maneuver.

The insurgent's use of logistics highlights one of the key differences between counterinsurgency military operations and those in conventional war. The insurgent gets

the majority of his logistical support from the population, as a result of his mobilization efforts. Thus, when he is successful, he advances toward his source of support; as he advances, he shortens his LOC rather than extends them as is normally the case. It is better for the counterinsurgent to mobilize the people against the insurgent than to try to deny him logistical support by coercive means. This is because the insurgent's LOC are not supply routes in the literal sense. It is the friendly political environment which enables him to draw logistical support directly from the people.

Commanders must maintain continuous pressure against insurgent forces; they cannot consider insurgent forces destroyed merely because active opposition has ceased. Merely by surviving, the insurgent has accomplished one of his aims; time is a critical element in planning counterinsurgency operations. Counterinsurgent forces should not permit the insurgents time to rest, reorganize, and prepare for offensive operations.

Successfully countering an insurgency requires patience, determination, and an offensive spirit tempered with discretion. The insurgency may retreat into quiescence only to come back strongly when the opportunity arises. Therefore, the government must persist in its defense and development efforts. Counterinsurgent tactical operations focus on denying the insurgents access to the population. They also stress the security of installations critical to mission accomplishment or overall objectives.

Offensive tactical operations destroy or disrupt the operations of organized insurgent forces. These actions require a force conditioned to operate in different environments and trained to operate in dispersed independent formations. By taking the offensive and operating in the insurgent's own environment, the opposing commander denies him the ability to train and sustain his force. Night operations restrict the insurgent's freedom of action, denying him the initiative and agility gained by operating under the cloak of darkness.

When confronting an enemy using guerrilla tactics, the commander must seize the initiative and deprive the enemy of any local advantages gained. The activities of the insurgent force will fluctuate between the use of organized forces and ambushes by small forces to acts of terrorism. Commanders must be adaptable enough to recognize these changes in operations.

Defensive tactical operations normally are coordinated military and civilian programs. They are designed to—

- Protect installations, bases, and the population.
- Reduce the insurgent capacity for offensive action.
- Deny the insurgent entry into an area.
- Destroy or trap the insurgent force.
- Develop more favorable conditions for offensive action.
- Economize forces in one area so that decisive force can be applied elsewhere.

Retrograde operations preserve the integrity of a force. They also—

- Draw the enemy into an unfavorable situation.
- Permit the use of the force elsewhere.
- Avoid combat under undesirable conditions.
- Gain time without fighting a decisive engagement.
- Disengage from combat.
- Relocate forces in relation to other friendly forces.
- Shorten LOC.

Deceptions

Deceptions should be part of the normal staff planning processes for counterinsurgency operations; as such, they require attention well in advance of force deployment. Deception is an art whose success depends on a proper mix of the following ingredients:

- An objective assessment of the extent to which police, security, and paramilitary and military forces are conscious of operations security.
- Political proscriptions or prescriptions concerning the use of deception (for example, who can and cannot be targets; what stories and objectives are acceptable or unacceptable). Centralized control is vital.
- The imaginative thinking of planners throughout the counterinsurgency.
- An assessment of whether the use of deception provides a potential operational payoff and achieves the military objective.
- The accuracy and completeness of the intelligence data base on the insurgent intelligence collection system, decision cycle, and troop control processes.

Objectives.

Deception operations provide an advantage to the commander by misleading the enemy or concealing from him—

- The size of the force (in terms of manpower and equipment).
- The force's mission.
- The force's location.
- The time of the operation.
- The force's morale, state of readiness, and leadership.
- The status of equipment.
- The commander's intent and style.

Organization.

All military units can conduct deception operations. Deceptions range from individual actions to elaborate schemes with many events. They involve organic resources or deception-specific organizations.

Planners at the national level thoroughly coordinate and monitor strategic deception operations. The ACCs can plan independent deception operations. They can also plan for the execution of parts of national deception plans.

Operations.

Regardless of the planning level, deception operations support attacks against the insurgents' center of gravity—the insurgent-population relationship. Deception efforts should focus on weaknesses and internal divisions in the various insurgent operations.

Principles.

The following principles are fundamental in planning deceptions:

- Planners may assign deceptive tasks to lower organizational levels with or without revealing the deceptive intent of the tasks. If deceptive intent is revealed, coordination is mandatory.
- Deception plans must be comprehensive to minimize unwanted side effects, self-deception, and other negative impacts on the counterinsurgency program.
- Operations should target the insurgent decision-making apparatus. They should

consider the influence of sponsoring, or surrogate, third-party powers on the insurgency.
- Operations should normally last for relatively long periods of time, particularly at the strategic level.

Populace and Resources Control

Populace and resources control operations consist of measures to deny support and assistance to the insurgents by controlling the movement of people, information, and goods. They are an important method in counterinsurgency, but they have a high potential for harm if they are used excessively or incorrectly. Ideally, the police should conduct PRC operations with the armed forces providing support. If it is necessary to use military units in PRC, they should receive police training and police personnel should accompany them.

PRC measures can include—

- Suspension of *habeas corpus*.
- Curfews and blackout.
- Travel restrictions.
- Excluded or limited access areas.
- Registration and pass systems.
- Declaration that selected items or quantities of items, such as weapons, food, and fuel, are contraband.
- Licensing, rationing, and price controls.
- Checkpoints, searches, and surveillance.
- Censorship.

Among the products of the above measures is a wealth of statistical data which is valuable input to the intelligence process. Any plan for imposition of PRC measures should include measures for the use of this information. Otherwise a major benefit of these measures will be lost. By themselves, PRC measures cannot be decisive in counterinsurgency. The intelligence they can generate, on the other hand, can be.

These measures all impose a burden on the people, who will resent them unless they believe they are necessary and prudent. PRC must be limited to the least restrictive measures which will accomplish the purpose. The government uses PSYOP to explain and justify PRC, making it clear that the operations are necessary because of the insurgents' actions. The government should use the information generated by PRC to improve the security of the population. In this way, the people may see the benefits of the measures and accept them more readily. Enforcement must be consistent and impartial. Above all, the government should lift these restrictions as soon as the situation permits.

Command, Control, and Communications

Coherent, integrated C3 is essential to the success of counterinsurgency. The complex character of counterinsurgency poses a challenge to policy makers. The nature of the counterinsurgency threat calls for effective civil-military C3 mechanisms to implement national policy from the strategic to the tactical level.

Political constraints and stringent rules of engagement are the norm for military involvement in counterinsurgency. A commander rarely commits forces from a single service. Thus, he should establish a clearly understood chain of command to ensure unity of effort and economy of force.

C3 must also support objectives which are not wholly military. Traditional military operations usually are not designed for counterinsurgency with its inherent problems of integrating civilian and military actions. C3 planning for counterinsurgency requires interoperability and coordination among all services, agencies, and allies involved in the operation.

APPENDIX F

How to Prepare an Area Handbook for Peacekeeping Operations

This appendix provides an outline as guidance for the preparation of an area handbook for peacekeeping operations. The headquarters deploying as the US contingent to a peacekeeping operation prepares this pocket-sized handbook. The book contains information on the peacekeeping organization, the history and culture of the people, the terrain, the weather, and the local armed forces. Its graphics portray the insignia, markings, and identifying characteristics of armed forces, military weapons, and equipment. Each member of the peacekeeping force should receive a copy of the handbook.

SAMPLE OUTLINE

The area handbook should contain sections or parts describing—

- Rules of engagement.
- The AO, including maps and descriptions of the topography.
- Organization of the peacekeeping forces, their location, and terrain features.
- General climatic data and the estimated effects of weather and terrain on operations.
- Descriptions of the armed forces engaged in the conflict, including:
  - — Size and organization.
  - — Uniforms with rank and branch insignia.
  - — Weapons and equipment characteristics and markings.
  - — Culture and customs including interpretation and significance of possible offending gestures and body language.
  - — Common and frequently used phrases and words.
- Descriptions of each of the national contingents providing peacekeeping forces, with the same type of information provided on forces engaged in the conflict.
- Location and markings of known minefields, areas suspected of having unmarked minefields, and descriptions and safety precautions concerning mines which may be found in the area.
- Operational security, including physical security against terrorist attacks, document security, communications security, and personnel security.
- Training requirements.
- Pictures and sketches of vehicles and aircraft.
- Local environmental hazards such as poisonous plants, dangerous animals, diseases, or heat.
- First aid references and medical evacuation procedures.
- Flags or symbols of forces engaged in the conflict.
- Status of forces' agreements and pertinent host nation laws (for example, laws concerning drug trafficking).

Glossary

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACC	area coordination center
AECA	Arms Export Control Act
AFM	Air Force manual
AFP	Air Force pamphlet
AFR	Air Force regulation
AIASA	Annual Integrated Assessment for Security Assistance
AO	area of operations
AOR	area of responsibility
AR	Army regulation
AT	antiterrorism
AWACS	airborne warning and control system
C2	command and control
C3	command, control, and communications
CA	civil affairs
CDR	consolidated data report
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CMO	civil-military operations
CS	combat support
CSS	combat service support
CT	counterterrorism
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DOJ	Department of Justice
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency
ESF	Economic Support Fund
ETA	*Euskadi ta Askatasuna*
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FC	US Army field circular
FMLN	*Farabundo Marti* National Liberation Front
FID	foreign internal defense
FIDAF	foreign internal defense augmentation force
FM	US Army field manual
FMF	foreign military financing
FMS	foreign military sales
HCA	humanitarian and civic assistance
HUMINT	human intelligence
IDAD	internal defense and development
IED	improvised explosive device
IMET	international military education and training
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IRA	Irish Republican Army
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JTF	joint task force
JTTP	joint tactics, techniques, and procedures
LIC	low intensity conflict
LOC	lines of communication
LOI	letter of instruction
MAAG	military assistance advisory group
METT-T	mission, enemy, terrain, time, and troops available
MTT	mobile training team
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCA	National Command Authorities
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operations
NSC	National Security Council
PA	public affairs
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PRC	populace and resources control
PSYOP	psychological operations
ROE	rules of engagement
SAO	security assistance organization
SOF	special operations forces
SOFA	status of forces agreement
TAFT	technical assistance field team
TAT	technical assistance team
TC	US Army training circular
TF	task force
TOR	terms of reference
TRADOC	US Army Training and Doctrine Command
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USIA	United States Information Agency
USIS	United States Information Service
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UW	unconventional warfare
WPR	War Powers Resolution

TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Airlift commander: The airlift commander coordinates and directs activities of the airlift control element during noncombatant evacuation operations. The airlift commander is responsible to the evacuation force commander, and coordinates all actions with the ground force commander and representatives of the US diplomatic mission in the affected area.

Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance: Report submitted by the US diplomatic mission which, in addition to an assessment of the host country's capabilities, contains recommended and projected levels of security assistance. Also called AIASA.

antiterrorism: See combatting terrorism.

area coordination center: See coordination center(s).

area coordination group: A composite organization, including representatives of local military, paramilitary, and other governmental agencies and their US counterparts, responsible for planning and coordinating internal defense and development operations. (JCS Pub 1-02)

border operations: Operations designed to deny infiltration or exfiltration of insurgent personnel and materiel across international boundaries.

campaign plan: A plan for a series of related military operations aimed to accomplish a common objective, normally within a given time and space. (JCS Pub 1-02)

civil affairs: Those phases of the activities of a commander which embrace the relationship between the military forces and civil authorities and people in a friendly country or area or occupied country or area when military forces are present. (JCS Pub 1-02) Also called CA.

civil-military operations: Military efforts to support resistance auxiliary organization development, undermine government claims, gain support for an insurgent government, and attain national objectives without fighting. Civil-military operations are basic to any insurgency program. Successful civil-military operations increase civilian support to resistance organizations and improve US intelligence and logistical support to the resistance organization. Also called CMO.

civil war: A war between factions of the same country; there are five criteria for international recognition of this status: the contestants must control territory, have a functioning government, enjoy some foreign recognition, have identifiable regular armed forces, and engage in major military operations.

close air support: Air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. (JCS Pub 1-02) Also called CAS.

coercion: The attempt to enforce desired behavior on individuals, groups, or governments.

combatting terrorism: Actions, including anti-terrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum.

command and control: The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. (JCS Pub 1-02) Also called C2.

communications: A method or means of conveying information of any kind from one person or place to another. (JCS Pub 1-02)

consolidation operations: An operation organized in priority areas as an interdepartmental civil-military effort. Normally conducted at the state level, this operation integrates counterinsurgency programs designed to establish, maintain, or restore host nation governmental control of the population and the area and to provide an environment within which the economic, political, and social activities of the populace can be pursued and improved.

coordination center(s): The established operational locations from which area coordination groups conduct their activities. There is a single national-level center, supported by a number of specifically designated subnational or "area" centers which generally correspond to the number of political or administrative jurisdictions within the country. See also area coordination group.

counter-drug operations: See drug interdiction.

counterinsurgency: Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. (JCS Pub 1-02)

counterintelligence: Those activities which are concerned with identifying and counteracting the threat to security posed by hostile intelligence services or organizations or by individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism. (JCS Pub 1-02)

countersubversion: That aspect of counterintelligence designed to detect, destroy, neutralize, or prevent subversive activities through the identification, exploitation, penetration, manipulation, deception, and repression of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or suspected of conducting subversive activities. (JCS Pub 1-02)

counterterrorism: See combatting terrorism.

country team: The executive committee of an embassy, headed by the chief of mission, and consisting of the principal representatives of the government departments and agencies present (for example, the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Commerce, and the USIA, USAID, DEA, and CIA.)

crisis: A crisis is an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives.

crisis action procedures: Crisis action procedures define the process the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCs, services, and Department of Defense agencies use to develop timely

recommendations and implement the decisions of the NCA concerning the deployment and employment of military forces. These procedures describe a logical sequence of events beginning with the recognition of the crisis and progressing through the employment of US military forces.

deception: Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. (JCS Pub 1-02)

deterrence: The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. (JCS Pub 1-02)

doctrine: Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (JCS Pub 1-02)

drug interdiction: Military or police action to prevent trafficking in illegal drugs; includes intelligence, surveillance, border patrol, inspections, raids, and other operations.

economic actions: The planned use of economic measures designed to influence the policies or actions of another state, e.g., to impair the war-making potential of a hostile power or to generate economic stability within a friendly power. (JCS Pub 1-02)

Economic Support Fund: Program by which economic assistance is provided on a loan or grant basis, to selected foreign governments having unique security problems. The funds are used to finance imports of commodities, capital, or technical assistance in accordance with terms of a bilateral agreement; counterpart funds thereby generated may be used as budgetary support. These funds enable a recipient government to devote more of its own resources to defense and security purposes than it otherwise could do without serious economic or political consequences. Also called ESF.

end state: The ultimate conditions resulting from a course of events.

foco: Foco (or Cuban model) insurgency is one in which a guerrilla band enters a rural area where it has never operated before with the hope of serving as an "insurrectional focus" for a larger rebellion.

force protection: A security program designed to protect soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combatting terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by counterintelligence and other security programs.

foreign assistance: Assistance ranging from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and man-made disasters. US assistance takes three forms—development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance.

foreign internal defense: Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. See also internal defense. (JCS Pub 1-02)

foreign internal defense augmentation force: A specially trained, area-oriented, partially language-qualified, ready force available to the commander of a unified

command for the support of operations in situations short of open hostilities and in limited and general war. Foreign internal defense augmentation force organizations may vary in size and capabilities according to theater requirements. Also called FIDAF.

foreign military sales: That portion of US security assistance authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended. This assistance differs from the Military Assistance Program and the International Military Education and Training Program in that the recipient provides reimbursement for defense articles and services transferred. (JCS Pub 1-02) Also called FMS.

guerrilla warfare: Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. See also unconventional warfare. (JCS Pub 1-02)

hasty attack: In land operations, an attack in which preparation time is traded for speed in order to exploit an opportunity. (JCS Pub 1-02)

host country: A nation in which representatives or organizations of another state are present because of government invitation and/or international agreement. (JCS Pub 1-02)

host nation: A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, or operate in, or to transit through its territory. (JCS Pub 1-02)

human intelligence: A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. Also called HUMINT. (JCS Pub 1-02)

humanitarian assistance: Assistance provided by DOD forces, as directed by appropriate authority, in the aftermath of natural or man-made disasters to help reduce conditions that present a serious threat to life and property. Assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration and is designed to supplement efforts of civilian authorities that have primary responsibility for providing such assistance. (JCS Pub 3-05)

improvised explosive device: Those devices placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals, designed to destroy, disfigure, distract or harass. They may incorporate military stores, but are normally devised from non-military components. Also called IED. (JCS Pub 1-02)

indirect action: Military action in support of political, economic, and informational initiatives which are so dominant that they shape the form of the military action; military action through support of another party, such as security assistance to friendly foreign armed forces.

informational actions: Communication with a foreign government, its supporters, its opponents, and others to explain one's own policies and actions.

infrastructure: In an insurgency, the leadership organization and its system for command and control. In a broader sense, the systems of communications and the institutions which support the political and economic functions of a society.

insurgency: An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JCS Pub 1-02)

intelligence: The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. (JCS Pub 1-02)

internal defense and development strategy: The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called the IDAD strategy.

international military education and training: Formal or informal instruction provided to foreign military students, units, and forces on a nonreimbursable (grant) basis by offices or employees of the United States, contract technicians, and contractors. Instruction may include correspondence courses; technical, educational or informational publications; and media of all kinds. Also called IMET. (JCS Pub 1-02)

intimidation: The attempt to prevent an unwanted action by individuals, groups, or governments by the use of threats or by other means.

lead agency concept: The assignment of primary responsibility for a class of activity to one agency of government with assistance provided by and to other agencies.

LIC imperatives: Prerequisites for the successful prosecution of low intensity conflict; political dominance, unity of effort, adaptability, legitimacy, and perseverance.

logistics: The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. (JCS Pub 1-02)

low intensity conflict: Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain certain regional and global security implications. Also called LIC. (JCS Pub 1-02)

mandate: A commission, authorization, or charter of authority given to a person or organization to carry out specific responsibilities.

Marxist-Leninist ideology: A set of political beliefs generally based on the philosophy of Karl Marx, and V. I. Lenin, which relies on economic determinism to predict the inevitability of a revolution which will replace capitalism with rule by the proletariat (working class), and eliminate all private ownership of the means of production.

military assistance advisory group: A joint service group, normally under the military command of a commander of a unified command and representing the secretary of defense, which primarily administers the US military assistance planning and programming in the host country. Also called MAAG. See also security armistice organization. (JCS Pub 1-02)

military civic action: The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local populace at all levels in fields such as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, and sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) (JCS Pub 1-02)

mobile training team: One or more US personnel drawn from service resources and sent on temporary duty to a foreign nation to give instruction. The mission of the team is to provide, by training instructor personnel, a military service of the foreign nation with a self-training capability in a particular skill. (JCS Pub 1-02) Also called MTT.

mobilization: The process of bringing people and things together and preparing them for action; to assemble, organize, make ready for duty, to meet either the requirements of a national emergency or war or more limited social goals. In an insurgency, mobilization produces organization, leadership, skilled workers, and fighters; it raises money and acquires weapons, equipment, and supplies of all kinds. Mobilization grows out of popular dissatisfaction with existing conditions and occurs because of the appeal of programs to ameliorate them.

National Command Authorities: The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Commonly referred to as NCA. (JCS Pub 1-02)

neutralize: To render a thing ineffective or unusable; to render a person or group politically and militarily ineffective or irrelevant, by persuasion or coercion.

operational categories: Groupings of methods of military operations in low intensity conflict, according to shared characteristics; they are: support for insurgency and counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping operations, and peacetime contingency operations.

paramilitary forces: Forces or groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. (JCS Pub 1-02)

peacekeeping operations: Military operations conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties to a conflict, to maintain a negotiated truce and to facilitate diplomatic resolution of a conflict between the belligerents.

peacemaking operations: A type of peacetime contingency operation intended to establish or restore peace and order through the use of force.

peacetime contingency operations: Politically sensitive military operations normally characterized by the short-term, rapid projection or employment of forces in conditions short of war.

players: Participants or active parties in a conflict.

political actions: Diplomacy; communication with a foreign government or group to persuade or compel it to support one's own policies, by means of argument, promises, and threats.

professional terrorists: Persons who earn their living by terrorism, with or without commitment to a political cause. They are frequently emotionally addicted to excitement, violence, and intrigue; ideology is not a dominating factor in their motivation.

propaganda: Any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly. (JCS Pub 1-02)

psychological operations: Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign government, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JCS Pub 1-02)

raid: An operation, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or to destroy his installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal on completion of the assigned mission. (JCS Pub 1-02)

remote area operations: Government operations undertaken in contested areas to establish host nation strongholds. These areas may be populated by ethnic, religious, or other isolated minority groups; however, remote area operations may be conducted in areas devoid of civilian population and in which insurgent forces have established training areas, rest areas, logistical facilities, or command posts. The remote area tactical force should be composed mainly of personnel indigenous to the operational area.

resistance movement: An organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability. (JCS Pub 1-02)

routine, peaceful competition: The condition of relations among states in which each seeks to protect and advance its interests by political, economic, and informational means without employing violence.

security assistance: Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, credit, or cash sales, in furtherance of national policies and objectives. (JCS Pub 1-02)

security assistance organization: All DOD elements located in a foreign country with responsibilities for carrying out security assistance management functions. For example, military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, liaison groups, defense attache personnel and other groups which perform security assistance functions. Also called SAO.

strategic intelligence: Intelligence required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels. Strategic intelligence and tactical intelligence differ primarily in level of application but may also vary in terms of scope and detail. (JCS Pub 1-02)

strike operations: Combat operations in zones under insurgent control or in contested zones. They are targeted against insurgent tactical forces and bases outside areas of government control. Other internal defense activities may support tactical forces during combat operations. Strike forces normally do not remain in the area of operations after mission accomplishment.

subversion: Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological or political strength of a regime. (JCS Pub 1-02)

surveillance: The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (JCS Pub 1-02)

tactical intelligence: Intelligence which is required for the planning and conduct of tactical operations. Tactical intelligence and strategic intelligence differ primarily in level of application but may also vary in terms of scope and detail. (JCS Pub 1-02)

tailor: To design the organization, strength, equipment, and methods to meet the requirements of a specific mission or situation.

terrorism: The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against people or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives. (JCS Pub 1-02)

unconventional warfare: A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled or politically sensitive territory. Unconventional warfare includes, but is not limited to, the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, and other operations of a low visibility, covert, or clandestine nature. These interrelated aspects of unconventional warfare may be prosecuted singly or collectively by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source or sources during all conditions of war or peace. (JCS Pub 1-02) Also called UW.

urban area operations: Counterinsurgency operations in an urban environment characterized by close coordination between the armed forces, police forces, paramilitary forces, and other security forces for the protection of critical installations and control of subversive activities. Counterinsurgency operations in an urban area also may be part of a consolidation campaign or a continuing effort not specifically designated as a campaign.

vigilante group: A group organized without government authority to enforce its own concept of law and order or to advance its own interests outside the established process of law.

References

RELATED PUBLICATIONS

Related publications are sources of additional information. They are not required in order to understand this publication.

Department of Defense

Department of Defense Manuals and Regulations

2000.12-H	Protection of DOD Personnel Against Terrorist Acts
2055.3-D	Manning of Security Assistance Organizations and the Selection and Training of Security Assistance Personnel
5105.38-M	Security Assistance Management Manual
5132.3-D	DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Assistance

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

JCS Pub 0-2	Unified Action Armed Forces
JCS Pub 1-02	Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
JCS Pub 3-0	Doctrine for Joint Operations
JCS Pub 3-07	Doctrine for Joint Military Operations in Low Intensity conflict
JCS Pub 5-02.4	Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS), Vol. IV (Crisis Action Procedures)

Department of the Army

Army Regulations (ARs)

12-15	Joint Security Assistance Training
380-13	Acquisition and Storage of Information Concerning Nonaffiliated Persons and Organizations
525-13	The Army Terrorism Counteraction Program

Department of the Army Pamphlets (DA PAMs)

27-1	Treaties Governing Land Warfare
27-1-1	Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
190-52-1	Personnel Security Precautions Against Acts of Terrorism

Field Manuals (FMs)

19-15	Civil Disturbances
19-30	Physical Security
19-40	Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees and Detained Persons
27-2	Your Conduct in Combat under the Law of War
27-10	The Law of Land Warfare
31-20(C)	Special Forces Operations (U)
31-24	Special Forces Air Operations
33-1	Psychological Operations
34-1	Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations

34-3	Intelligence Analysis
34-60A(S)	Counterintelligence Operations (U)
41-10	Civil Affairs Operations
46-1	Public Affairs
90-2	Tactical Deception
90-8	Counterguerrilla Operations
90-10	Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)
100-1	The Army
100-5	Operations
100-10	Combat Service Support
100-26	The Air-Ground Operations System
100-27	USA/USAF Doctrine for Joint Airborne and Tactical Airlift Operations
100-37	Terrorism Counteraction
101-5	Staff Organization and Operations

Department of the Air Force

Air Force Manuals (AFMs)

1-1	Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Forces
2-1	Tactical Air Operations—Counter Air, Close Air Support, and Air Interdiction
2-2	Tactical Air Operations in Conjunction with Amphibious Operations
2-4	Tactical Air Force Operations—Tactical Airlift
2-6	Tactical Air Operations—Reconnaissance
2-36	Search, Rescue, and Recovery Operations
2-50	USA/USAF Doctrine for Joint Airborne and Tactical Airlift Operations
2-53	Doctrine for Amphibious Operations
3-2	Tactical Bare Base Operating Manual

Air Force Regulations (AFRs)

1-2	Assignment of Responsibilities for Development of Aerospace Doctrine

Department of the Air Force Pamphlets

AFP 110-31	International Law—The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations
AFP 110-34	Commander's Handbook on the Law of Armed Conflict

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☆ U.S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 1990—527-027/20103

FM 100-20
AFP 3-20
5 DECEMBER 1990

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